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INTRODUCTION
One of the oldest American prejudices is anticatholicism.
deistic

From the first landing of the pilgrims to the

principles

embodied

in

the

Declaration

of

Independence, Americans formed a cultural tradition with an
inherent hostility toward Catholicism.

The Puritans of the

Reformation and the Founding Fathers of the Enlightenment
provided the emotional and intellectual basis for America's
anti-Catholicism.

They portrayed the Catholic Church as

authoritarian,

anti-democratic,

superstitious,

and

Catholicism was

the

statist.

religious and individual liberty.
anti-American.

foremost

intolerant,
enemy

of

It became and simply was

Intrinsic in this anti-Catholic tradition

was the exclusion of any Catholic from the highest office in
the land, the presidency of the United States.

1

In such a hostile environment and determined to
become first-class citizens, Catholics settled, survived,
and thrived in the United States in spite of numerous
outbursts of bigotry.

Roughly one hundred years after the

Constitutional Convention, the inconceivable, or impossible,
1 James Hennesey, s. J. American Catholics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 36-39.
1

2

happened.
catholic

Char le s

O' Con or

presidential

became

candidate

the

in

country ' s

1872.

first

O'Conor,

a

prominent New York attorney, was unexpectedly nominated as a
result of internal dissension within the Democratic party.
A splinter group, which broke away from the Democratic party
after

it

nominated

Horace

Greeley

at

its

convention, selected O'Conor as its candidate.

national
The election

results proved the futility of O'Conor's protest candidacy.
The first Catholic presidential candidate collected only
29, 000 votes compared to 3 million for Greeley and 3. 5
2
million for Grant.
Fortunately the unfeasibility of
O'Conor's candidacy mitigated the fires of anti-Catholicism
and failed to raise the ugly head of bigotry.

One political

analyst has noted, "Because the contest was really between
Greeley and Grant,

O'Conor's candidacy did not produce a

flood of vitriolic anti-Catholic literature comparable to
that thrown against Al Smith in 1928. 113
Fifty years later, the second Catholic presidential
candidate, Al Smith, emerged, and unlike O'Conor, he was the
viable presidential

candidate of the

Democratic party.

Governor of New York and representing the new constituency
of urban ethnics and Catholics that emerged as a result of
the great wave of immigration at the turn of the century,
2

Lawrence H. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American
Catholicism (New York: Meredith Press, 1967), p. 153.
3

Ibid.

3

smith posed a serious challenge to the tradition of "No
catholic

in

the

perce~ved

Smith's candidacy

Americanism.

White

House."
~s

Protestant

Americans

a threat to the virtues of

If he were elected,

Protestants feared the

pope would take over the country, destroying the country's
heritage of separation of church and state and of religious,
political,

and

individual

freedom.

The

editor of the

Christian Century, a non-denominational journal, summarized
Protestant hysteria over a Catholic in the White House.
"They

(Protestants)

cannot look with unconcern upon the

seating of the representative of an alien culture, of a
medieval Latin mentality, of an undemocratic hierarchy, and
of a foreign potentate in the great office of the President
of the United States. 114
The intolerant decade of the 1920's that produced
the Red Scare and revived the Klu Klu Klan intensified the
religious rancor, hysteria, and hate in this presidential
campaign.

"It was a field day for bigots," observed James

Hennesey, S. J., a leading Catholic historian.
was a crushing defeat for Al Smith.

The result

In the popular vote,

Smith received 15 million ballots to Herbert Hoover's
21.5 million.
4

Smith was resoundingly overwhelmed by an

Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism
pp. 67; Hennesey, American Catholics, pp. 252-253.

4
electoral college vote of 444-87.
have

reinterpreted

the

reason

5

for

In hindsight, historians
Al

Smith's

Anti-Catholicism was not the explanation.

defeat.

Even if Smith had

been Protestant or if the Democratic party had chosen
another candidate, there was no possibility of beating the
opponents major appeal -- "Republican prosperity."

Smith's

less than American (urban-ethnic) public image, his stalwart
support of anti-prohibition forces, and his association with
the corrupt politics of urban machines also contributed to
his downfall.

Finally,

Smith exacerbated the religious

issue by failing to respond to anti-Catholic accusations.
Regretfully, the few times that he did break his silence
ended up being defensive and wrathful harangues, which only
gave more credence to the "Popish Plot. 116
Whatever the

final

judgment scholar/g-7 will make

concerning Smith's defeat in 1928, Smith and the American
Catholic Church and community were convinced that the major
culprit was anti-Catholicism.

Frightened,

humiliated and

deeply hurt, Catholic-Americans, inheriting a psychological
scar that they were undesirable and disloyal aliens, took up
a posture of bitter retreat and a mentality of defensive
5

Hennesey, American Catholics, pp. 252-2531 Albert
J. Menendez, John F. Kennedy:
Catholic and Humanist (New
York: Prometheus Books, 1982), pp. 18-19.
6

Menendez, John F. Kennedy, pp. 18-191 Fuchs,
Kennedy and Catholicism, pp. 69-70, Richard Hofstadter,
"Could a Protestant have beaten Hoover in 1928?," Reporter,
March 17, 1960.

5

ghettoism.

Catholics were convinced that America was, and

would be, a Protestant country with a Protestant president.
Contrary

to

this

pessimistic

forecast

of

his

religious community and contrary to the country's centuries
old anti-Catholic tradition, John Fitzgerald Kennedy became
the first Catholic president of the United States only 30
years later.

Kennedy's victory in 1960 seemed to have
It denied and shattered the

accomp:J-ished the impossible.
seemingly

inherent

American history.

logic of the

cultural

tradition

in

It is this great break with the past that

this study will scrutinize.

Simply put, how and why did

John F. Kennedy become the first Catholic president in 1960?
How did he avoid another 1928?

How was the campaign of 1960

different from that of 1928?

Historians have failed to

address adequately these questions.

By narrowly focusing on

the candidate himself, and the Protestant dimension of the
religious
Catholic

issue,
issue

they

and

its

have

overlooked

indispensable

Kennedy's election victory. 7

completely
role

in

the

John F.

This study defines the

7Elias Macropoulos, "The Treatment with Reference to
the Roman Catholic Issue, of the Democratic Candidates in
the Presidential Elections of 1928 and 1960," (Ph.D. New
York University, 1966); Beryl McClerren, "The Southern
Baptist State Newspapers and the Religious Issue during the
Presidential Campaigns of 1928 and 1960," (Ph.D. Southern
Illinois University, 1963); David Smith, "Al Smith and JFK:
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of
1928 & 1960," (Ph.D. Southern Illinois University, 1964);
Teddy Lisle, "The Catholical Impediment:
JFK and the
Religious Issue during the 1960 Presidential Campaign,"

6

catholic issue as the reactions of the American Catholic
hierarchy and press to Kennedy's pursuit of the highest
office in the land.*

Ultimately, these reactions allowed

Kennedy to avoid a remake of 1928 and to succeed where Smith
failed.

Lastly, the study will reveal the impact Kennedy's

campaign and election had upon the Catholic community as
well as religious relations in the United States.
(Ph.D. University of Kentucky, 1982); Patricia Barrett,
Religious Liberty and the American Presidency, (New York:
Herder & Herder Co., 1963); Dulce, Berton. Religion and the
Presidency, (New York:
The MacMillan Co., 1962); Lawrence
Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism, (Des
Moines:
Merideth Press, 1967); Paul Lopatto, Religion and
the Presidential Elections, (New York:
Praeger Studies,
1985); Albert Menendez, John Fitzgerald Kennedy: Catholic
and Humanist, (New York:
Prometheus Books, 1978); Albert
Menendez, Religion at the Polls, (Philadelphia:
The
Westminister Press, 1977); In fact, the only time the
Catholic issue emerged was to stress the antagonism between
Kennedy and the Church. See Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 122-127.
*See Appendix.

CHAPTER I

AN AMERICAN CHURCH AND CANDIDATE
America between the years 1945-1960 was different
from Al Smith's America.
metamorphosed.

Protestant America was being

Demographic, social and economic changes of

postwar America presaged the demise of the cultural hegemony
of Protestantism and the emergence of a new pluralism.

By

the end of this period, Anglo-Protestants consisted of only
one-third of the country's 171 million population, while
Catholics had more than doubled in numbers to comprise 26%
1
or roughly 40 million of the nation's inhabitants.
Catholic Americans experienced economic and social success
and acquired a
future.

new found confidence in their political

Will Herberg, journalist and sociologist, observed

in 1955 that "American Catholicism has successfully negotiated
the transition from a foreign church to an American religious
community.

It is now part of the American way of Life. 112

1 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960
(New York: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 270-271.
York:

2 will Herberg, Protestant, Catholics and Jew,
Doubleday and Co., revised 1960), pp. 175.
7

(New

8

Aroericanization coupled with social acceptance spawned the
necessary breeding ground for the rise of the Americacatholic politician, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

It made it

possible for a Catholic to consider once again running for
the highest office in the land and to transform his faith
into a political asset in 1956.
After Al

Smith's defeat,

the

American Catholic

Church turned its attention away

from politics to the

building of a

and efficiently

structurally

sound

run

administration to meet the educational and spiritual needs
of its membership.

This brand of

"brick and mortar"

Catholicism reached its "zenith" in the 1950's, culminating
in a

great outburst of devotionalism and boosterism. 3

Having fought bravely in World War II and being a direct
beneficiary

of

the

G.

I.

Bill

of

Rights,

Catholics

encountered economic and social upward mobility, became a
part of America's middle-class suburbia, and for all intents
and purposes, were Americanized.

By the end of the decade,

theologian Gustave Weigel opined that this good fortune had
created an "American" church.
At the present moment the American Catholic Church is
neither a harassed minority nor a belligerent group.
It is more prone to conservatism than radical change.
Its tendency is toward American chauvinism rather than
anything anti-American. It is rather contemptuous of
3

Jay Dolan, The American Catholic Experience (New
York:
Doubleday and Co., 1985), pp. 352-260. Don Brophy,
ed., The Story of Catholics in America (New York:
Paulist
Press, 1978), pp. 123-130.

9

what is foreign, even when visible in the Church
elsewhere.
Its generosity, activism, 4 and optimism are
probably more American than Catholic.
Catholics

had

100%

become

Their

American.

pure

Americanism propagated a smugness and self-importance in the
catholic community in terms of its role in American society.
They

began

spiritual

to

and moral

civilization.

themselves

as

values

both American

for

the

last

reservoir
and

and

implemented

a

materialism,
vigorous

the

American

missionary

policy

Church

throughout

the

The saving of souls became a patriotic duty.

To

Sheen's

spearheaded
Catholic.

Western

Catholic

be a true Catholic was also to be a good American.
J.

of

As the last spiritual bastion against godless

secularism

country.

see

television
this

drive

program,
to

"Life

save

Is

Worth

America

by

f'nlton
Living,"

making

it

This conversion drive peaked in 1960 when nearly

150,000 Americans converted to Catholicism.

5

Pure Americanism also led Catholics down the path of
politics

again

with

a

new

found

confidence

During these years of the Cold War,

and

purpose.

the Church's hierarchy

became stalwart supporters of Senator Joseph McCarthy and
fervent leaders in the anti-communist crusade.

6

Thomas T.

4

Gustave Weigel, "Protestant-Catholic Dialogue,"
Catholic Mind, Vol. 57, Sept.-Oct. 1959, pp. 390-391.
5

Dolan,

The

American

Catholic

Experience,

pp.

391-394.6
Flag:
Hill:

One should consult, Donald Crosby, God, Church and
Senator Joe McCarthy and the Catholic Church (Chapel
University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

10
McAvoy, historian and priest, exhorted fellow Catholics that
only second to presenting the Christian gospel to fellow
Americans

was

the

primary

responsibility

of

Catholic

Americans to participate in the political and social life of
the nation.

Catholic political activism, McAvoy believed,

would imbue society with Catholic social principles and
values.

McAvoy's call was heeded.

catholics sat in the

By 1955, seventy-two

House of Representatives and ten

catholics had been elected to the United States Senate.
catholics such as Edmund Muskie, Eugene McCarthy, Robert
Wagner,

and

politicians.

John

F.

McAvoy

Kennedy
was

became

leading

national

especially

pleased

with

the

appearance of such Catholic leadership in American political
life.

"It marks the emergence of many Catholic political

leaders who found no conflict between their Catholicism and
their Anglo-American tradition. 117
The increase of Catholic power and influence in
American politics was not looked favorably upon by all
American citizens.

Non-Catholics--Protestants, secularists,

and liberals--feared the impact this rise in political power
would have upon the

country 1 s

liberty and religious freedom.

tradition of individual
They were still apprehensive

about an institution they thought symbolized persecution,
dogmatism, authoritarianism, and conformity.
7

Paul Blanshard,

Thomas T. McAvoy, CSC, "This American Catholicism,"
Catholic World, Vol. 190, November 29, 1959, pp. 118-119.

11
a congregational Minister,

lawyer, and leading Protestant

propagandist, capsulized the bigoted anxieties, doubts, and
misconceptions

of

anti-Catholicism

in

his

work,

entitled, American Freedom and Catholic Power.
major:_!:!:iE!.l?~s __ !/.CiS

--------'

Blanshard's

that the CaU1olic Church was an inveterate
.

enemy of American freedom.
o~ly

aptly

Blanshard envisaged the

to Communism.

American

freedom

authoritarianism.

In this regard, it was second

and

the

First

Amendment

crushing of

by

Catholic

He depicted Catholic Americans with two

allegiances, one to the pope, the other to the constitution.
When the two loyalties conflict, Blanshard argued,
take

precedence

over

papal

obligations

would

constitutional

principles.

Finally, when the Catholic Church had acquired

enough political power, he foresaw it, at the behest of the
pope, rescinding the constitution and coercively imposing
upon the country Catholic beliefs and morals.

8

Thirty percent of his fellow Protestants agreed with
Blanshard that under no condition did they desire a Catholic
in the White House. 9

The remaining seventy percent did not

espouse the bigoted beliefs of Blanshard but did entertain
some legitimate fears and concerns about Catholicism's
compatibility with American democracy.
8
(Boston:

Will Herberg in his

Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power
Beacon Press, revised 1952), pp. 1-30.

9 Albert J. Menendez, John F. Kennedy:
Catholic and
Humanist (New York:
Prometheus Books, 1982) p. 25.

12
book, Protestant, Catholic and Jew, presented a sociological
explanation for Americans'

anti-Catholic response to the

emergence of Catholics into the mainstream of American life.
He characterized contemporary American society as one based
upon a

"transmuted Pot" of three cultures, Protestant,
10
catholic, and Jew.
Religion was the foci of these three
cultures, defining a member's identity, and delineating his
or her purpose in life.

According to Herberg, religion in

this sense was the soul of one's

social and cultural

identity, and ultimately the reconciler of Americanism with
the country's religious and economic diversity.

Such a

tripartite division in culture, Herberg contended, explained
the increase in Catholic power and symbolized the end of
Protestant America, a demise Protestants attempted to thwart
by anti-Catholic protests.
What seems to be disturbing many Protestants is the
sudden realization that Protestantism is no longer
identical with America, that Protestantism has, in
fact, become merely one of three communities with
equal status and equal legitimacy in the scheme of
things. This sudden realization, shocking enough when
one considers the historical origins of American life
and culture, appears to have driven Protestantism into
an essentially defensive posture, in which it feels
itself a f'fre minority threatened with Catholic
domination.
It also explained the Protestant defensiveness that made
Blanshard and others
10 Herberg,

"vehement champions of an extreme

Protestant,

102-103.
11

rbid.

I

P• 251

Catholic

and

Jew,

pp.

13
doctrine of the separation of church and state" and that
portrayed Catholics as "un-American, undemocratic, alien to
American ways, and prone to place loyalty to the Church
.
12
above loyalty to state an d nation.
some

Catholics

responded

to

accusations of disloyalty with the
defensiveness of Al Smith.

these

unfounded

same bitterness and

A new generation of Catholics,

however, sought to understand the foundations of Protestant
fears.

They concluded that such fears were based upon past

and present misconceptions of the American Church and its
doctrines, and that a campaign was needed to demonstrate to
concerned

non-Catholics

that

the

true

principles

Catholicism were compatible with the constitution.

of
James M.

O'Neill, a Catholic layman and scholar, participated in this
campaign of understanding by providing the definitive reply
to Blanshard' s
Freedom.

In

charges

in his Catholicism and American

this book,

argument point by point,

O'Neill

undermined

Blanshard' s

concluding that it was more a

fictional account of what Blanshard had envisioned Catholic
America to be, than what it actually was.

13

John Courtney

Murray, S. J., a leading American theologian, provided the
rational Catholic response to anti-Catholicism in his work,
12

Herberg,

Protestant,

Catholic

and

Jew,

pp.

251-253.
13 James O'Neill, Catholicism and American Freedom
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 246-268.

14
Catholic Reflection on the American

We Hold These Truths:

-

ftoposition.

In his preface, Murray confidently approached

the compatibility controversy.
The question is sometimes raised, whether Catholicism
is incompatible with American democracy.
The question
is invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner of
its position inverts the order of values.
It must, of
course, be turned around to read, whet:ffr American
democracy is compatible with Catholicism.
Murray

argued

that,

contrary

to

popular

opinion,

most Catholics fully supported the First Amendment.

He and

fellow Catholics realized the importance of prohibiting an
established

state

religion

in

order

to

keep

religious peace in America's pluralistic society.

civil

and

"It is in

fact the only view that a citizen with both historical and
common
that

sense

if

ever

can

take."

the

day

15

Murray

would

come

reassured
when

non-Catholics

Catholics

represent a political majority in the country,
be no Catholic take over of America.
in

the

White

House.

would

there would

The pope would not sit

A Catholic-American

president,

like

previous presidents, would be limited in his actions by the
constitutional

and

institutional

American system of government.

limitations

built

in

the

Murray further insisted that

Catholic obedience to the clause of the First Amendment was
based upon a moral imperative to promote the common good in
society:
14

James Courtney Murray, S. J., We Hold
Truths (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. ix.
15

Ibid., p. 23

These

15
He, the American.-Catholic, takes the highest ground
available in this matter of the relations between
religion and government when he asserts that his
commitment to the religion clauses of the Constitution
is a moral commitment r~ them as articles of peace in
a pluralistic society.
while
the

O'Neill

theoretical

and

and Murray
rational

attempted

to

demonstrate

compatibility of Catholicism

and American democracy, Catholic politicians such as John F.
Kennedy undertook the more difficult task of demonstrating
this

compatibility

in

American electorate.

concrete

actions

and

words

to

the

In 1946, John F. Kennedy, a decorated

war veteran, successfully ran for Congress in Massachusetts.
Six years

later,

he

became

a

United

States

Senator.

In

1956, when Kennedy considered the possibility of being Adlai
Stevenson's

vice-presidential

running

mate

for

the

Democratic party, he encountered the anti-Catholic ghost of
Al Smith and nag to weigh for the first time the political
liabilities of his Catholic

faith.

His

father,

employing

the religious issue as his rationale for his son not to run
for the vice-presidency, insisted that Stevenson would lose,
and with his

son on the

ticket,

political analysts would

attribute the defeat to his Catholic faith which could only
hinder his future chances for national office. 17

Theodore

Sorensen, advisor and friend, as well as other members of
16 Murray, We Hold These Truths, p. 78.
17 James MacGregor Burns, Kennedy:
Information Service, 1960), pp. 60-61.

A Profile

(U.S.

16
's staff, prevailed upon him the necessity to run.
J{enne dy
such an opportunity would catapult him into the national
political

limelight,

increasing

his

chances

the

for

presidency in 1960.18
Determined to seek and win the vice-presidential
candidacy, Kennedy publicly defended the compatibility of
catholic and American principles.

More importantly,

he

endeavored to convince fellow politicians that his faith
would not be a liability to the Democratic ticket, as it was
purported to be in Al Smith's campaign of 1928.

In two

separate memorandas, one composed by Sorensen and the other
by John Bailey, a leading figure in Connecticut Democratic
politics, Kennedy divulged his theory that his Catholicism
was, in fact, a political asset.

19

He first undermined the

mythology surrounding Al Smith's defeat.

He argued that it

was fallacious to believe that Smith lost because of his
faith.
wet,

It was "Republican Prosperity" and the candidate's
urban,

and

ethnic

Democratic party in 1928.
candidacy possessed none
18

Burns, Kennedy:

19

background
2

°
of

that

defeated

the

Kennedy insisted that his
Smith's

deficiencies.

He

A Profile, pp. 60-61.

Theodore Sorensen, "Memorandum for Democratic
Nominee
in
1956,"
(John
F.
Kennedy
Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810;
John Bailey, "The Democratic National Ticket: An Analysis
of Available Data and Polls," (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810.
20

Ibid.

17

·ntained that he could win the election for the Democrats
ma1
by attracting the large Catholic vote that had switched to
Eisenhower in 1952 and that was strategically placed in
states with the largest electoral votes.
ticket,

With him on the

it meant the winning of 14 key states and

261

electoral votes for the Democratic party because "Catholics
voted not as union members or farmers or women or old people
21
but as Catholics.
There is or can be a Catholic vote."
Sorensen

concurred

with

Kennedy's

Catholic

scenario:

"Kennedy, on the ticket, would attract all of these voters,
particularly the Catholics,

back to the Democrats.

If

Stevenson can carry the South and if Kennedy can get the
Catholic Democratic vote back, the Democratic party will win
22
in November."
A

Kennedy,

thus,

adeptly disarmed his anti-Catholic

opponents by transforming his faith into a political asset
for himself and his party.

He went to the Democratic

Convention in Chicago as a "Catholic vote-getter."

After

Adlai Stevenson had won the presidential nomination of his
party, he announced that the convention delegates would
decide who his vice-presidential running mate would be.
21 Theodore

Sorensen, "Memorandum for Democratic
Nominee in 1956," (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810;John
Bailey, "The Democratic National Ticket:
An Analysis of
Available Data and Polls," (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810.
22 rbid.

18

"

..

past.

I have concluded to depart from the precedents of the
I have decided that the selection of the vice-

presidential nominee should be made through the free process
of the convention. 1123
began to

lobby

for

Immediately,

their

favorite

convention delegates
candidate,

and

the

selection process turned into a struggle between Kennedy and
Estes Kefauver.

In the end, the candidate from Tennessee

defeated his formidable Catholic opponent.

On the brighter

side, Kefauver did not win because of Kennedy's faith, but,
as

Sorensen

explained,

because

of

numerous

strategic

blunders made by Kennedy's staff on the convention floor.

24

Kennedy supporters as well as political analysts
perceived a great victory in Kennedy's defeat.

Overnight,

they maintained, this viable vice-presidential candidate had
become a well-known and respected national leader of the
Democratic party.

McCall magazine observed that "when the

convention was over it had crowned only one hero -- John F.
Kennedy. 1125

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concurred.

I wanted to say that, however, the V.P. contest came
out, you clearly emerged as the man who gained most
during the convention.
You hit the bull's eye on
every one of your appearances; and your general
demeanor and effectiveness made you in a single week a
23

Burns, Kennedy, pp. 186-188.

24

York:

Ibid. , p. 18 8. ; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy,
Bantam Books, 1965), pp. 101-103.

Cl.1pp1ng,
.
McCall, 1956 (John F. Kennedy
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box

25p ress

Library:
No. 810.

(New

19
national political figure.
You are bound to be in
everyone's
mind
from
now
on
f~
any
future
consideration of national candidates.
James MacGregor Burns boldly predicted that "In this moment
of triumphant defeat,
born."

his campaign for the presidency was

27

Kennedy,
began

to

encouraged

campaign

by

these

unofficially

candidacy of the Democratic party.
overcome

and

buried

Smith's

voices

for

the

of

optimism,

presidential

He was convinced he had

tragic

legacy.

He

had

confronted publicly the religious issue, transformed it into
a political asset,

and most

important,

conveyed a

image of an American and not a Catholic candidate.
liberal

scholar and journalist,

John Cogley,

public

Catholic

thought that

this was the major difference between Smith's failure and
Kennedy's success.
John F. Kennedy is no Al Smith. He is much closer to
the enduring Protestant image of the President than
the self-made man who grew up on the East side of New
York • . • Kennedy is the American Catholic arrive . •
If the tradition which has kept Catholics out of the
White House is to go, the image Kennedy projects will
provide a fairly painless transition.
The stereotype
of the Irish-Catholic politician, the pugnacious,
priest
ridden representative of an embittered,
embattled minority, simply does not fit the poi~gd,
urbane, cosmopolitan young socialite from Harvard.
26

Arthur J. Schlesinger, Jr. to John F. Kennedy,
Letter, August 21, 1956 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files, 1956), Box No. 810.
27

Burns, Kennedy, p. 187.

28
John Cogley, "A Catholic
Commonweal, April 10, 1959, p. 53.

for

President?,"

CHAPTER II

BETRAYER OF HIS OWN KIND:
KENNEDY AND THE CATHOLIC ISSUE IN 1959
Next to birth control and Pope John's announcement
of the Vatican Council, the top religious news story of 1959
among the country's some forty million Catholics was the
likelihood of a Catholic presidential candidate.

1

During

this year, Kennedy expressed his views on the religious
issue in an exclusive Look interview.

He hoped that his

interview would allay Protestant fears and, once and for all,
bury the religious issue before the official presidential
campaign began the following January.
mitigate

His interview did

some of the more moderate anti-Catholics,

but

surprisingly, it incurred the wrath of the American Catholic
hierarchy and diocesan press. To them, he became a betrayer
of his own kind.

At the end of the year, Kennedy once again

found himself in an uncomfortable religious controversy
1Boston Pilot, January 2, 1960, p. 8: other important
religious news stories for the year were:
Bishops condemn
the use of birth control, Mother Seton was declared
venerable, Krushchev visits the United States for 12 days,
President Eisenhower told news conference that the he saw no
reason why a Catholic should not be elected president.
20

21

bee a U

se of the hierarchy's pastoral letter on birth control.

60 dawned, Kennedy realized that he had to appease
When 1 9
both protestant and Catholic sensitivities if he were to
become the next president of the United States.
With the presidential campaign approximately twelve
months away, Kennedy had a long conversation with Dr. Henry
Knox, former presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church in the
united States, about church-state issues and anti-Catholicism.
After the meeting, Kennedy was convinced that Protestants,
even "eminent ones," still had doubts about his religious
views and his relationship with church officials.

2

Wanting

to convince Protestants and other non-Catholics that he
believed in separation of church and state and that as
president he would make his decisions independent of Church
dogma and papal influence, Kennedy submitted to an interview
with Fletcher Knebel, a nationally respected journalist.
I gave the interview on my own initiative because I
felt that the questions which were raised were matters
which ref le ct honest doubts among many citizens and
because I felt that frank answers might help to remove
this problem from a political context.
In giving
these answers, I was simply stating candidly my firm
belief that a Catholic can serve as the President of
the United States and fulfill his oath of 3office with
complete fidelity and without reservation.
The contents of Kennedy's interview were published
2

Fletcher Knebel, "Democratic Forecast:
in 1960," Look, March 3, 1959, pp. 16-17.
3

A Catholic

John F. Kennedy, Memorandum, March 1959 (John F.
Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers,
General
Correspondence), Box No. 998.

22

arch 3rd issue of Look magazine. Kennedy succinctly
in the M
·s views on the controversial church-state issues.
stated h 1
atholic, he perceived no difficulty in maintaining
AS a C
absolute fidelity to his presidential oath: his Catholicism
would not impede his overriding responsibility
constitutional duties.

to his

"Whatever one's religion in private

life may be, for the office holder, nothing takes precedence
over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts
including the First Amendment and the strict separation
4
He also vehemently opposed sending
of Church and State."
an American ambassador to the Vatican in Rome

because

"Whatever the advantages might be in Rome -- and I am not
convinced of these -- they would be more than off set by the
5
divisive effect at home. "
He finally rejected direct
federal aid to parochial schools.

"The First Amendment to

the Constitution is an infinitely wise one.

There can be no

question

support

of Federal

funds

being

parochial or private schools.

used

for

of

It's unconstitutional under

the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
I'm opposed to the Federal government's extending support to
4

5

Fletcher, "Democratic Forecast," Look, pp. 16-17.

Ibid.
Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History
Interview,
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
~ollection), Transcript p.3 Cushing gave his opinion on this
issue.
"That was an absurd objection against the election
of President Kennedy.
I do not know one member of the
hierarchy in the United States who in my lifetime favored
such a step. Undoubtedly there were some, but I never knew
them."

23
6
sustain any Church or its schools."
Kennedy's

interview did manage

to assuage

some

protestant fears but, to his chagrin and surprise, it "drew
a less enthusiastic reaction from Catholics than antiCatholic bigots."

7

The aspect of the interview that most

disturbed Catholics was Kennedy's "nothing takes precedence
over the oathn statement, a statement his Catholic critics
called a "pretty pathetic" espousal of godless secularism to
appease bigots.

8

The American Catholic hierarchy found it

necessary to publicly state its disagreement with Kennedy in
its national Catholic Almanac.

Separation of religion from

one's public life was impossible, according to American
bishops; the Catholic conscience must interact and adjudge
the constitutional oath.

The bishops reminded Kennedy that

"The demands of integrity require him to be answerable to
God for actions whether public or private." 9

Thurston Davis,

6

rbid.
Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History
Interview, (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection) , Transcript p. 3 Cushing gave his opinion on this
issue.
"That was an absurd objection against the election of
President Kennedy.
I do not know one member of the hierarchy
in the United States who in my lifetime favored such a step.
Undoubtedly there were some, but I never knew them."
7

The Tablet, February 28, 1959, p. 6.

8 Donald McDonald, The Catholic Messenger, "Some 250
Percent Americanism," February 26, 1959, p. 12.
9

catholic Almanac, (1960), pp. 109-110.
Entitled
"Catholic Candidate for the Presidency: Catholic Conscience
vs Constitution," the article ended by giving advice ~n how
Catholics should vote.
"Competence and integrity are the
basic criteria of the fitness of any candidate, not because
he is or is not a Catholic."

24

s.

J

.,

editor of America,

magazine,

the

national
"Mr.

Kennedy doesn't

No religious man,

be he Catholic,

was taken aback by it.

really believe that.
protestant,

or

Jew,

Jesuit weekly

holds

such

an

opinion.

A man's

conscience has a bearing on his public as well as his
private l 1' f e. .. 10
Ave Maria's editor,
Kennedy

of

being

a

John Reedy,

proponent

of

C. S. C.,

godless

accused

secularism.

"Something indeed does take over the obligation to uphold
the

constitution

namely

conscience.

rightfully act against his conscience.

No

man

may

To relegate your

conscience to your private life is not only unrealistic but
dangerous because it leads to secularism in public life. 011
The San Francisco Monitor concurred.

"The mouthing of such

a phrase is a surrender to secularism by those who would
divorce public morality from religion and God from public
l 1' fe. 1112

The most vitriolic and ruthless attack emerged

from the pen of Robert Hoyt, editor of the St. JosephKansas City Register.
leaving for Tahiti."

"If this is an American doctrine, I'm
He called Kennedy a fascist who was

lOThurston,
Davis,
"On Questioning
Candidates," America, March 7, 1959, p. 651.

Catholic

11

John Reedy, "Catholics and the Presidency," Ave
Maria, March 7, 1959, p. 18.

12

Father Mark Hurley, "Question Mark?," San
Francisco Monitor, March 6, 1959, p. 4.
Hurley continued
his diatribe against Kennedy, accusing him of appeasing such
bigots as Blanshard and concluding that he should have "badmouthed" this bigotry.

25

unable t o keep his own conscience.

His oath statement was

•the same doctrine as the one used by Nazi torturers and
assassins in the Nuremberg trials.

They conunitted crimes in

absolute obedience to their superiors and laws of their
lan d •

"13
The most damaging charge against Kennedy in the

catholic press was

that he betrayed his

own

kind by

submitting to such a bigoted interview in order to appease
14
Protestants.
To the San Francisco Monitor, the interview
symbolized the compromise and humiliation of every Catholic
in the United States.

15

Gerard Sherry of the Catholic

Review was enraged by Kennedy's interview.

"Unfortunately,

a Catholic president is something quite a number of bigots
still can't stomach.

These bigots question the loyalty of a

Catholic presidential candidate solely on religious grounds
he appears to have gone overboard in an effort to
13

The Catholic Week (Birmingham, Alabama) March 20,
1959, p. 6. According to Hoyt, Kennedy was not a Catholic
if he had to be reminded by Catholics and by even "good
Protestants" that his ultimate loyalty was not to the state
but to God.
14

National Catholic Welfare Conference:
Religious
News Service (Microfilm: University of Notre Dame). Report
entitled "Questioning of Catholic Candidate Regarding Their
Americanism is condemned by Newspaper Editorials," March 2,
1959, pp. 59: 1394-1399.
Provided a brief sununary of the
negative responses of the Catholic press toward Kennedy's
participation in the interview.
15

J. Hurley, "Question
Monitor, March 6, 1959, p. 4.

Mark?,"

San

Francisco

26
placate the bigots.

1116

The Catholic Messenger, viewing the

entire episode with "considerable dismay," concluded, "It is
unpleasant to see a Catholic Senator in the awkward position
of bending over backwards as he tries to prove his loyalty
to the Constitution.

The whole affair is rather insulting

and should not be dignified by serious attention.

1117

The

Steubenville Register of Ohio expressed similar frustration
and exasperation in its future hope:

"Some day, we should

like to see a Catholic, when questioned about the possible
conflict between his Church and the Constitution to stand up
and say:

'It's none of your business how I

feel on these

matters.

Accept me for what I am, not for what I believe.

If you can't do this, then satisfy your prejudice and vote

. t me. '18
agains
Catholic journals disparaged Kennedy's submission to
such a religious test.
16

NCWC:

Two specialized journals for the

Religious News Service, March 2, 1959, pp.

59-1395.
17 Donald McDonald, "Some 250% Americanism," Catholic
Messenger, February 26, 1959, p. 12. McDonald advised that
Catholics should not allow Blanshards to ask such questions
and quoted Will Herberg for an explanation of Kennedy's
actions.
"American Catholics have been so eager to become
Americans that they have overdone this job.
They have
become 250% Americans. You get the most violent reaction to
the slightest slur on the American Way of Life from Catholic
Americans."
18 NCWC: Religious News Service, March 2, 1959, pp.
59-1396. Father James E. Quinn, "Art of the Possible," the
Lafayette Edition of Our Sunday Visitor, March 3, 1959, p.

2A.

27
American Catholic clergy,

The Priest and Homiletic and

Pastoral Review, usually reticent on political matters, were
disappointed with Kennedy and disenchanted with Catholic
. . .
19
po 1 it1c1ans.

"For

there

are

Catholics

who

look

to

political expediency or who are ill-informed on the natural
law in making their decisions and there are undoubtedly
catholics who bend over backwards and act in reverse just to
emphasize
America,

their

freedom of control

after depicting

the

by

the

interview as

Vatican. 1120
11

insulting,"

"discriminatory," "humiliating," and "a remnant of the bad
old days of Knownothingism, "
its entire editorial

staff.

21

summarized the feelings of
11

Our own reaction to the

controverted Look interview is one of impatience at the
earnest Massachusetts Senator's efforts to appease bigots
rather than of disagreement with the positive points he
made.

A Catholic political candidate, if he must make a

profession of his faith, should not seem to give quarter to
religious bigotry, even at the risk of having his words
distorted." 22
19

The Priest, Vol. 15, January 1959, pp. 6-13; The
Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol. 59, April 1959, pp--:-625-629.
20

Editorial, "Catholics in Politics," The Priest,
Vol. 15, January 1959, pp. 6-13.
21 oavis, "Questioning Catholic Candidate," America,
March 7, 1959, p. 651; Also consult "Third Degree for
Catholics," editorial in America, March 14, 1959, p. 675.
22

Ibid., p. 651.
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Not all Catholics, however, were Kennedy antagonists.
Kennedy did have some tentative and adamant supporters among
his religious peers in the hierarchy and the press.

Father

Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., dean for religious communities
at the Catholic University of America as well as a renowned
American theologian, refused to make any specific comments
on Kennedy's Look interview but advised the public and
supporters of Kennedy that he would give him the "benefit of
the doubt."

He assured Americans that there was no conflict

between Catholicism and the constitution, but if one did
emerge,

"God's law must come first."

23

Richard Cardinal

Cushing, long-time family friend and confessor, interpreted
Kennedy's Look interview and Catholic press reaction as an
example

of

how

confusion."

He

statements
thought

may
that

cause
Kennedy

"unintentional
had

given

straightforward answers, yet the quotes used by the press
were trite, while the commentaries were extensive.

He was

especially displeased that these questions had to be asked
at all.

"I

think it is a great pity

They are

certainly ridiculous when presented to a person in public as
long as Senator Kennedy." 24
23

NCWC:
Religious News Service, "Asserts Exemplary
Catholic would make best type of Public Official," March 9,
1959, pp. 59-1594.
24 Boston Pilot, March 14, 1959, p. 1; Father Philip
Kelley to John F. Kennedy, March 10, 1959 (John F. Kennedy
Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, General Correspondence),
Box No. 998.
Father Kelley wrote to Kennedy to praise
Cushing "who certainly gave you his blessing." John

29

The
Kennedy's

editor
oath

of

the

statement

non-Catholics of a

Michigan
as

Catholic

necessary

to

Catholic president's

adjudged
convince
"The

loyalty.

senator is merely saying that he foresees no conflict in
conscience between his duty as a Catholic and his duty, if
he were president, to uphold the cons ti tut ion." 25
The
leading

liberal

journal

Commonweal,

run

by

Catholic

laypersons, concluded that the time was ripe for Catholics
to correct false and misleading images of the Church and to
replace religious bias with religious tolerance.
not the time to cry religious test.

This was

Kennedy's interview

symbolized the challenge all Catholics must encounter to
.
1 ve d in
.
American
.
l'1 f e. 26 Finally, Father Raymond
b ecome invo
Gribbin

in

his

article,

"The

Catholic

President:

A

President who would violate his oath of office would make
himself an enemy of God,"
Catholic doctrine.

said Kennedy espoused sound

"All Catholics by force of obligation

must consider all oaths in such a manner,

for to violate

one's oath is to turn one's back on God.

It is a mortal

sin."

If violation of an oath were as "egregious as

murder," Gribbin contended, Catholics would examine their
F. Kennedy to Father Kelley, Letter, March 18, 1959 (John F.
Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers,
General
Correspondence), Box No. 998. Kennedy's thank you note.
25 Editorial, "Senator Kennedy's Stand," Michigan
Catholic, February 26, 1959, p. 4.
26 Commonweal, 11 A Catholic for President, 11 March 6,
1959, p. 587.

30

conscience

before

taking

any oath

and

find

that

the

presidential oath was compatible with Catholic principles.
"The oath taken by the president of the United States is an
oath that may be taken in good conscience by any Catholic
. . . he will put nothing before it.

His allegiance to the

pope then will be carried out in perfect harmony with the
27
demands of the oath."
In spite of these

few voices

of

support,

the

American Catholic church in its newspapers was very outraged
by Kennedy's interview.

Nearly a decade later, John Cogley

wrote:
I don't think you can exaggerate the reaction to that
Look article in the Catholic press, particularly
because it was a very negative and very naive
reaction, and I thought, a very politically unsophisticated reaction.
It indicated to me at the time that
27

Reverend Raymond William Gribbin, "The Catholic
Candidate: A Catholic Who Would Violate His Oath of Office
Would Make Himself an Enemy of God," Our Sunday Visitor
(National Edition), February 28, 1959, p. 2.
Arthur
Schlesinger Jr. defended Kennedy against a few of his
Protestant critics. Consult Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to Dr.
Robert Sampson of the First Methodist Church, Letter (John
F.
Kennedy Library:
Special Correspondence-Arthur
Schlesinger), Box No. 32.
He argued that Kennedy by his
oath statement was faithfully adhering to a presidential
tradition.
"I know of no president who had even said that
his religion took precedence over his oath to uphold the
constitution." He then concluded that since "religion is a
private matter in a free society," Dr. Sampson and other
critics were attempting to "Blackball Kennedy." Schlesinger
also wrote letters in defense of Kennedy to the editor of
Christianity and Crisis.
Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy,
Letter March 26, 1959.
Schlesinger to editor of
Christianity and Crisis, Letter, April 7, 1959 (John F.
Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers,
General
Correspondence), Box No. 998.
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the::( hadn 'ZB thought through this whole question very
serious,ly.
Naive or not,

Kennedy realized that he had failed to take

into account Catholic response to his Look interview.
did not anticipate Catholic hostility.

He

His close advisor,

Theodore Sorensen, contended, that Kennedy, unlike Al Smith,
was

preoccupied

with

challenging

the

Catholic

liability

charge, and casting doubt on the suspicions of "Americans of
good will."

In the end, allaying Protestant fears obscured

and took precedence over Catholic sensitivity.
To end those suspicions and to end the tradition
against a Catholic president, he knew he had to answer
not only reasonable questions but many unreasonable
questions as well.
He knew he could not afford to be
defensive, angry, impatient, or silent, no matter how
many times he had heard the 2 g5ame insulting, foolish,
or discriminatory questions.
Realizing the error in his strategy, Kennedy came to
his own defense in a memorandum sent out of his Washington,
D.C.

office to Catholic critics.

He stressed that his

interview was not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on
Catholic thought concerning the obligations of the officeholder in a democratic society.

He argued that such an

ambitious undertaking would have been presumptuous on his part
28

oral History Interview, John Cogley, February 20,
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection),
Transcript, p. 46. Cogley also explained how this involved
his first communication with Kennedy in his life.
After
reading his series in Commonweal, Kennedy sent him a note of
thanks and later incorporated his advice in his Houston
Speech.
29

Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy
Row, 1965), pp. 108-113.

(New York:

Harper &

32
"since I am trained neither in philosophy, theology, or
30
church history."
The purpose of his interview was to show
that a Catholic can be a loyal President.

Conunenting on his

oath statement, he emphasized that history demonstrated the
compatibility of

the

presidential

oath

and

conscience

because no previous president had resigned or violated the
oath.

Such a compatibility was ostensible.

"I should have

thought it self-evident that all men regard conscience as an
essential element in all human decisions • • • Indeed, the
oath of office would be a meaningless gesture were it not
for the principles which conscience imposes. 1131

Lastly,

Kennedy maintained that he was not a bigot appeaser" .
quite

frankly,

compromises;

I

and

do
I

not

feel

that

I

certainly am not,

have
as

made

you

any

suggest,

attempting to placate any particular group, anti-Catholic or
otherwise.
consider

I am merely trying to state in my own way what I
to

be

orthodox

principles

regarding

the

relationship between a Christian politician and his
beliefs. 1132
30 John F. Kennedy to Citizen, Memorandum, 1959 (John
F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, General
Correspondence), Box No. 998.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.; John F. Kennedy to Father Robert Whelan,
Letter, July 15, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, General Correspondence), Box No. 998.
NCWC:
Religious News Service, "Kennedy Conunents on
Editorials," March 3, 1959, pp. 59-1595.
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In

the

aftermath of

the

Look

interview,

Time

magazine conducted a poll to determine the extent of coreligionist support for Catholic presidential candidate.
Fifty-two

percent,

participants,

more

than

half

of

the

Catholic

admitted they would be willing to switch

political parties to vote for one of their own kind as
president.

Ninety-five percent of Catholics interviewed,,

said that they would prefer a candidate who shared their
33
.
. re l'1g1on.
.
The Alamo Register's
politics
as we 11 as t h eir
local poll, which comprised one thousand students enrolled
in San Antonio's Catholic institutions of higher learning,
found that a majority preferred Kennedy.

34

Organizing a

fifty-state listening poll, Newsweek administered a survey
of the country's Catholic community -- clergy, politicians,
and rank and file.

Newsweek deduced from its findings a

composite picture of what it thought to be the views of a
typical or average Catholic voter.

The average Catholic

voter discerned no conflict of loyalties between Catholicism
and Americanism; would vote only for the best qualified
candidate; sought to expunge religion from the campaign but
realized it was an impossible task; wanted, despite
apprehensions about the prematurity of a Catholic candidate
3311 Politics:
Can a Catholic Win?, Time, May 18,
1959, p. 23.
The findings also revealed that 58% of all
U.S. Catholics were Democrats.
34
Alamo Register, December 10, 1959, pp. 1, 11. Out
of 987 ballots, Kennedy received 345 or 35%, while Nixon
received 227 or 23%.

34
and about the possibility of the resurfacing of the bigotry
of 1928, a Catholic to run for the presidency; and even more
than that, wanted him to win -- to break the last major
symbol and bastion of Protestant America.

35

These polls provided some comfort to Kennedy but
they did not obfuscate his political

judgment.

Such a

hostile reaction convinced Kennedy that he could not take
catholic support for granted, and that he would have to be
more circumspect in his statements concerning Catholicism
and politics.

Even more important,

these polls and the

whole Look episode persuaded him that the Church's hierarchy
"was out to get him," and "out to embarrass him."

According

to John Cogley, Kennedy thought that some Republican bishops
"disliked the liberal tenor of his thinking," while others
revealed "a kind of resentment sometimes that here he was, a
Harvard man,

the boy who didn't go to Catholic schools,

being the nation's number one representative of Catholicism
• and also a fear that his style was altogether too
secularized for their tastes. 1136

He also suspected that the

Catholic clergy did not want a Catholic president because "A
Catholic could no longer be a persecuted minority, an
.
a tt i't u d e th a t ma k es f or co h esiveness
among th e 1 a1't y. 1137
3511 00 Catholics really want a Catholic President?,"
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 27.
36

John Cogley, Oral History Interview, February 29,
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection),
Transcript, pp. 38-40.
37

rbid.; "Report from the Capital," Jubilee, May,

35
Kennedy's suspicions of the Catholic hierarchy were
given more credence in November 1959 when American bishops
published their pastoral letter, "Explosion or Backfire?"
38
that opposed birth control.
The bishops contended that
there was a concerted and systematic effort to convince
Americans that the government should provide public funds
for promoting artificial birth control.

They opposed any

public assistance for artificial birth control, abortion,
and

sterilization.

They

claimed

that

explosion" was "hyperbolic propaganda."

the

"population

It was a

"smoke

screen behind which a moral evil may be foisted on the
public."

According to them, birth control was not the only

solution.

Scientific studies in agricultural production

could meet the need of a rapidly expanding world population,
and unlike birth control,

increased food production was

"morally" acceptable under the natural law of God.

The

bishops' pronouncement admonished:
Never should we allow the unilateral guess-estimates
of special pleaders to stampede or terrorize the
United States into national or international policy
inimical to human dignity.
For the adoption of the
morally objectionable means advocated to forestall the
so-called 'J>g>pulation explosion' may backfire on the
human race.
1959, pp. 2-5.
"Do Catholics really want a
President?," Newsweek, December 1959, p. 28.

Catholic
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Hugh J. Nolan, ed., Pastoral Letters of the U.S.
Catholic Bishops 1941-1961 (USCC: Washington, D.C., 1984),
Vol. 2, pp. 221-225.
39
rbid., p. 224; Editorial "Easy Way Out," Ave
Maria, December 12, 1959, p. 17. Editor considered birth
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The

American

Catholic

control a very serious matter.

church

considered

birth

Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.,

posed the question whether a Catholic druggist could sell
contraceptives.

Connell concluded that if a druggist did,
he was "guilty of a grave sin." 40 He was a public sinner
and should be refused the sacraments.
of any artificial means

To Connell, the use

of contraception violated

sacrament of marriage and God's natural law.

the

There were

only three acceptable methods of regulating conception:
defer marriage, protracted continence, and periodic rhythm.
These three methods protected "the true order of the ends of
marriage and preserved the natural integrity of the marriage
ac t . 1141

Theological

Studies

summarized

the

clerical

argument against contraception.
In summary, then, each single act of coi ti on is a
natural sign of the mutual, procreative love of two
partners.
Coition is the symbol of natural marriage
and of the supernatural, which later is, in turn, the
symbol of Christ's union with his Church.
control a specious solution.
"Birth control might seem at
first glance to be the easiest way out of a difficult
problem . . • To solve the problem of population pressures
by a policy inimical to human dignity would be folly
indeed." John L. Thomas, s. J., "The Catholic Position on
Birth Control," Catholic Mind, January-February 1960, pp.
239-243; John P. Leary, s. J., "Is Birth Control the State's
Business?," February 22, 1960; Vital Speeches (1960), pp.
377-379.
4 °Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.,
"The Sale of
Contraceptives," American Ecclesiastical Review, Vol. 140,
June 1959, pp. 120-123.
41 william J. Gibbons, s. J. "World Population and
World Food Supply," Catholic Almanac (1960), pp. 96-106.
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contraception is evil because it falsifies this sign.
contraception is wrong because it is a fictitious
symbol of love, a substitution, of what, in truth
symbolizes monstrous selfishness for what symbolizes
utter self-giving • • • Contraception w~2 evil; it was
a flat rejection of God's interjection.
Catholic bishops perceived

the

need

to publicly

express their opinion on birth control because of recent
developments.
study

the

In July 1959, the President's Committee to

United

States

Assistance

Program,

headed

by

William Draper, suggested that the United States help other
countries, upon request,

"in the formulation of their plans

designed to deal with the
growth. 1143

problem of

rapid

population

The committee recommended that the government

should support such programs in the United Nations.

This

Draper Report was generally interpreted as recommending the
distribution of birth control information.

It also became

noted

"population

for

the

popularization

of

the

term

explosion," which implied and rationalized
support of birth control programs.

the need and

44

The great historian and philosopher, Arnold Toynbee,
42

Paul M. Quay, s. J., "Contraception and Conjugal
Love," Theological Studies, Vol. 22, December 1961, p. 40.
43

James Reston, "Kennedy Opposes Advocacy by U.S. of
Birth Control," New York Times, November 28, 1959, p. 1.
Editorial, "Birth Control Debate," The Sign, January 1960,
p. 10.
44

Archbishop Karl J. Alter, "Twisting of Birth
Control Issue Charged," Catholic Transcript, February 11,
1960, p. 10; Archbishop Alter delivered the speech "To Keep
the Record Straight" to a layman's retreat organization of
Cincinnati.
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spoke in favor of a birth control program in Rome on
November 2.

The following week CBS presented an hour long

program which

was

widely

regarded

by

the clergy as
45
"propaganda for artificial birth control."
Finally, the

same week that the bishops met to draw up their pastoral
letter, the National Conference of the Planned Parenthood
Association held its convention in New York City.
conference delegates

passed a

resolution which

The

implied

eventual acceptance of the program by the Catholic Church:
"that no doubt the Catholic Church would in the course of
time modify its own ethical position on artificial birth
control. 1146
All these events, especially the last suggestion of
a

deferred

acquiescence,

prompted American

bishops

proclaim the Church's positions on birth control.

to

Bishop

Karl J. Alter, chairman of the Administrative Board of the
NCWC, attempted to explain that the church did not want to
generate controversy but had to make the statement when
events seemed to indicate that an effort was underway "to
foster the adoption of artificial birth control as part of a
45

Archbishop Karl J. Alter, "Twisting of Birth
Control Issue Charged," Catholic Transcript, February 11,
1960, p. 10.
46

Ibid., Also see New York Times, December 3, 1959,

p. 1.

47

Alter, "Twisting of Birth Control
Transcript, February 11, 1960, p. 10.

.,"Catholic

39

national policy in granting foreign aid."
good

intentions,

the

undermined whatever

issuance
good

of

Kennedy's

the

47

Despite Alter's

pastoral

Look

letter

interview had

accomplished and raised the religious issue once again.

It

revived non-Catholic fears and suspicions about a Catholic
president's ability to take a stance independent of such
moral pronouncements.

Kennedy, Sorensen noted, was outraged

with the Church's hierarchy.

"The Senator was

sharply

irritated that so sensitive and divisive an issue had been
needlessly dragged into the headlines on the eve of his
official campaign.

The bishop's declaration furthered his

belief

that the hierarchy did not want him to be a
48
candidate."
William E. Bohn, a Catholic and editor of the

New Leader,

a

journal sponsored by the American Labor

Conference on International Affairs, agreed with Kennedy's
assessment

in

his

article

"No

Chance

for

Kennedy." 49

According to Bohn, the nomination and election of Kennedy
was "nothing more than a bright dream of his optimistic
youth."

After reading numerous commentaries and talking to

many observers, Bohn concluded that the former attractive
candidate may as well call off his presidential campaign.
48
49

Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 126-127.

william E. Bohn, "No Chance for Senator Kennedy,"
New Leader, January 18, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 535; George
Meany, Oral History Interview, July 16, 1964 (John F.
Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection), Transcript, pp.
12-17.
Meany generally observed that labor remained
uncommitted until the Democratic Convention that summer.
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That statement of the Bishops was the most unfortunate
piece of public relations activity I ever observed • • •
But the position itself is not what provided the
greatest shock. What disturbs many people is the tone
of the pronouncement. These men speak like dictators.
And because they talk that way a fine, intelligent,
patriotic citizen named John Kennedy has not the
remotest chance to be nominated as the Democr~ ic
candidate for the Presidency of the United States. 0
In an effort to demonstrate his autonomy to noncatholics, Kennedy submitted to a telephone interview with
James Reston of the New York Times.

Kennedy articulated his

independent position on birth control at home or abroad by
the United States government.
especially

in

underdeveloped

Promotion of birth control,
countries,

he

could

not

support.
We have to be very careful on how we give advice on
this subject . . • Accordingly I think it would be the
greatest psychological mistake for us to appear to
advocate limitation of the black, brown, or yellow
peoples whose population is increasing no faster than
in the United States •
. For the United States to
intervene on this basis would involve a kind of mean
patriotism, W~fch I
think they would find most
objectionable.
Reston then asked Kennedy if his position on birth control
was in any way influenced by the sixteen bishops who drew up
the pastoral letter.
"No."

Kennedy rejoined with an emphatic

He argued that his position was independently

formulated,

held

long before

the pastoral

letter,

and

50

Bohn, "No Chance for Senator Kennedy," New Leader,
January 18, p. 6.
51
rnterview between Senator John F. Kennedy and
James Reston of the New York Times, November 1 7, 1959,
Copies, (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers,
1960 Campaign Files, Religious Issue), Box No. 1001.

41
unscathed by hierarchical influence.

He reassured Reston

that any decision that he would make concerning birth
control as a public official would be "in accordance with
his oath to do whatever was in the best interests of the
united States. 1152
In his commentary on the interview,
Reston drew one major lesson from the entire episode.
The current controversy over birth control has
least made one thing clear. That is the hierarchy
the Roman Catholic Church is not acting in a way
promote the candidacy of Senator John F • j<ennedy
Massachusetts or any other Roman Catholic. 5

at
of
to
of

Kennedy was relieved to see the year come to an end
without any further incidents.

The events of 1959 taught

him that the Catholic dimension of the religious issue could
prove hazardous to his winning of the presidency.
not politically afford the charge,
kind.

II

Henceforth,

He could

"Betrayer of his own

he realized that,

in his quest to

mitigate anti-Catholic forces, he would have to monitor the
reaction of the American Catholic Church.
controversy

shattered

Kennedy's

vision

impervious to and absent of bigotry.
strong

Kennedy

supporter,

eloquently

The birth control
of

a

campaign

Alf red Scanlan,
verbalized

a

the

anxieties of the Catholic presidential candidate on the eve
of the campaign.
52 rbid.; Bishop James A. Pike Episcopal Bishop of
San Francisco, also stated that the Catholic Bishops had
"condemned • . • millions of people of less fortunate parts
of the world to starvations, bondage, misery, and despair."
53 James Reston, "Kennedy Opposes
Birth
Control," New York Times, November 28, 1959, pp. 1, 12.
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So far as the present state of America is concerned,
including the election which lies ahead in 1960, any
publiC dispute concerning artificial birth control is,
as both President Eisenhower and ex-President Truman
have labeled it, a 'false' issue. But, I am afraid it
may be more than just false; it may be a contrived
issue, and therefore a fraudulent one.
There are
disturbing circumstances which suggest that the issue
may have been raised for the purpose of masquerading
an opposition to the presidential aspirations of
senator John Kennedy, which otherwise would stand
exposed as an qr,position arising solely out of
undiluted bigotry.

54Alfred L. Scanlan to Editor of Washington Post,
Letter, December 11, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, 1960 Campaign Files, Religious Issues),
Box No. 1001.
Also consult Editorial "Why Pick on
Kennedy?," Ave Marie, December 12, 1959, pp. 16-17.

Chapter III
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH:
KENNEDY AND THE CHURCH DURING THE 1960
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

In early 1960 two books, Bishop James Pike's A Roman
Catholic in the White House and Paul Blanshard's God and Man
1
in Washington, were published.
Both authors argued that a
Catholic should not be president of the
because he would be
Vatican.

United States

influenced and manipulated by the

When Kennedy announced his candidacy

for

the

presidential nomination of the Democratic party, he and the
Church, fearing a remake of the sectarian conflagration in
1928, submerged their antagonisms and tacitly cooperated to
defend the faith.

To circumvent another 1928, the Church's

leadership and press advocated a policy of political
neutrality toward the candidates, began their own campaign
1 George Gilmary Higgins, "Blanshard Back at Old
Stand," The Yardstick, February 8, 1960 (George Hilmary
Higgins Papers:
Catholic University of America Archives),
Box No. 49~ "Paul Blanshard:
New Title, Same Old Story,"
The Catholic Messenger, February 18, 1960, p. 10. "Paul
Blanshard: New Book, Same Old Plot," Boston Pilot, February
6, 1960, p. 5., Gustave Weigel, S.J., "Bishop Pike and a
Catholic President," Ave Maria, May 28, 1960, pp. 20-21.
43

44
of rational responses to anti-Catholic charges, and enjoined
all catholics to remain calm in the face of these bigoted
attacks.

Kennedy became a defender of the faith with his

campaign speech to the Associated Society of Newspaper
Edi tors,

maintaining

compatible.

Catholicism

With such a

proclaiming Kennedy

and

Americanism were

public defense and with both

"Not a Catholic Candidate,"

Kennedy

became the presidential candidate for the Democratic party
and the Church prematurely declared the demise of the
religious issue.
When the presidential primaries began, some leading
Catholic politicians of the Democratic party looked with
disfavor upon the running of any Catholic because it was
simply a lost cause -- a Catholic candidate could not win
2
the election.
In a conversation with Joseph Kennedy, David
L.

Lawrence,

governor of Pennsylvania, explained why he

could not support his son.
I'd love to be for your boy.

"I said to him,

'Mr. Kennedy,

I'd love to see him president

of the United States, but I don't think he can win.
think any Catholic can win. 113

I don't

Senator George McGovern of

South Dakota opposed Kennedy's candidacy because he feared
2

00 Catholics Really Want a Catholic President?,"
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 27.

3
oavid L. Lawrence, Oral History Interview, January
22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
Collection), Transcript, p. 27.
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the detrimental ramifications that a Catholic candidate
would have upon state and local elections.

"I feared the

impact of the religious issue on our part of the country.
It is a strongly Protestant area.
decisively

rejected Al

Smith's

It was an area that very
bid

in

1928.

I

knew

something about the religious character of the area and I
.

.

.

feare d t h e re 1 1g1ous issue.

.. 4

In January of 1960, David

Lawrence, Chicago mayor Richard Dailey, New York governor
Robert Wagner, and California governor Edmund Brown met for
breakfast at a local hotel in in Washington, D.C.

During

the course of the discussion, Brown came out in full support
of Kennedy:

"I thought that in spite of the fact that he

was a Catholic and that there had never been a Catholic
president, and there was Catholic prejudice, unquestionably,
that we should forget about that because this man had the
best chance of being elected the president of the United
States. 115

The best the other Catholic politicians could do

was remain "open-minded" about Brown's assessment of the
situation; for most believed that "the Catholic religion
would be almost a bar sinister. 116
4

senator George McGovern, Oral History Interview,
April 24, 1964 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
Collection), Transcript, p. 9.
5

Edmund G. Brown, Oral History Interview, July 26,
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection),
Transcript, pp. 4-7.
Brown wanted to set down on record
that at this breakfast "I was the real protangonist of John
F. Kennedy."
1964

6 Ibid.; Also consult David Lawrence, Oral History
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Leadership of the American Catholic Church agreed
with this pessimistic political outlook of the Kennedy
candidacy.

Father Charles Rice in a Newsweek poll observed,

"The Catholic people got badly burned in 1928 and I can't
see any advantage in stirring up the bitterness again.
Personally,

I wish that Kennedy would not run." 7

Robert Drinan,

s.

Father

J., Dean of Boston College Law School,

admitted that "Catholics are deeply divided on the subject
of a Catholic running for President.

Most are fearful we

may get a terrific black eye out of this situation, that if
Kennedy is defeated, his defeat may be attributed to his
religion. 118

Thinking that Americans were not ready for a

Catholic president, Cardinal Cushing, a long time supporter
of Kennedy's since 1956, halfheartedly predicted Kennedy's
campaign victory.
But I feared it was still too early for a Roman
Catholic to buck the strong, if mostly, silent, tides
of religious prejudice. Nevertheless, I was convinced
if anyone could break through that wall of prejudice,
our best hope was with John F. Kennedy. More than any
other Catholic of the twentieth century he was capable
Interview, January 22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral
History Collection), Transcript, pp. 3-4, 7.
Lawrence was
also soft in his support of Kennedy because of his loyalty
to Adlai Stevenson. Eugene McCarthy supported Stevenson as
well.
7

"Do Catholics really want a Catholic President?,"
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 28.
8

Ibid.
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of facing this herculean challenge.

9

John Sheerin, a paulist father and editor of the Catholic
world, took a dimmer view of Kennedy's prospects.

"I would

say that the American people are unwilling to vote for a
catholic

president.

The

majority

of

voters

are

not

emotionally and psychologically mature enough to conquer
bias and cast a ballot for a Catholic."
More

dreaded

among

the

10

Church

leaders

than

anti-Catholicism's adverse impact upon Kennedy's nomination
was its detrimental effect upon religious relations in the
United States.

With a Catholic in the running, they feared

the spread of anti-Catholicism and the concomitant rise of
Catholic belligerency,

the two primary ingredients for a

sectarian conflagration.

To avoid such a

confrontation

during the primaries, the Church's hierarchy established
a policy of political neutrality among the clergy.

The

three leading national journals for clerical instruction
delineated the precise meaning and full implication of this
9 Richard Cardinal Cushing, Oral History Interview,
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection) ,
Transcript, pp. 3-5; Richard Cardinal Cushing, Speech, 1960
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate
Files: Church and State Folder), Box No. 535.
lO John B. Sheerin, CSP, editor, "How Fair Are
Kennedy's Critics?," Catholic World, March 1960, Vol. 190,
pp. 333-335; "The 1960 Presidential Campaign:
A Jubilee
Poll," Jubilee, March 1960, pp. 9-15; "Priest Discusses
Catholic Vote for President," The Tablet, April 9, 1960,
p. 1.
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policy.

11
The Priest ordered clerics to adopt a non-partisan

stance in the primary campaign.

It advised its readership

that priests essentially had two roles in society.

They

were citizens of the United States, owing a duty to the
state to be intelligently informed on political issues and
to vote wisely.

But, foremost, they served as a spiritual

and moral guide for Catholic citizens.

They should educate

and consult them on certain moral-political

issues

and

encourage capable Catholics to become involved in politics,
basing their activism on Catholic social principles.

The

Priest observed that lack of clerical guidance led to the
travesty of
atheists

to

secularized

1928 and
dictate

has
to

education.

allowed a
Catholics

This

continue, urged the journal.
major responsibility:

must

small minority of
the

acceptance

not

be

allowed

of
to

Priests must not neglect their

"His job is to alert the people to

issues and candidates concerning justice and Catholic social
.
. 1 es. .. 12
pr1nc1p
Father Aidan Carr,

editor of the

Homiletic and

Pastoral Review, admonished priests about the longstanding
tradition that "Priests have no business being in Politics."
1111 Do Catholics Really Want a Catholic President?,"
Newsweek, December 21, 1959, p. 28.
12

E. F. Garesche, S. J., "The Priest in Politics: A
Non-Partisan Interest," The Priest, Vol. 15, December 1959,
pp. 1002-1007.
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But this dirt not mean "total indifference" to certain pieces
of legislation and politics in general.

Such a stance was

irresponsible and could be detrimental to the Catholic
community.
issues.

Priests should speak out on moral and religious

Priests should not openly support any candidate.

"Nothing will stir up bigotry more readily than the boast:
Father so and so says I'm the man for the job." In the end,
Carr demanded that priests be actively concerned about
issues but not committed to a candidate or party.
Whatever may be the political leaning of the priest,
his smartest course is not to show his hand.
This
isn't being wishy-washy.
It's common sense in the
view of the universal responsibilities of the priesthood. He can vote as he wishes and, whr~ the election
is over, congratulate the winner • • • "
Francis
Ecclesiastical

J.

O'Connell,

Review,

editor

reiterated

the

of
same

American
themes.

He

reminded priests that they were forbidden to take part in
political affairs directly.

Yet when public events or

matters concern the "greater good of religion or country," a
priest may be the purveyor of certain Catholic principles
"without in any way campaigning for any candidate."
counseled priests

to have

a

posture

He

of charity when

confronted with bigoted attacks.

Not confrontation but
prayer would enlighten the ignorant enemy. 14
13 Aidan Carr, "Priest in Poli tics,"
Pastoral Review, May 1960, p. 688.

Homiletic &

14 Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., "A Catholic for
President," January-June 1960, American Ecclesiastical
Review, Vol. 142, pp. 271-273.
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If the spirit of anti-Catholic bigotry pervades the
land in the near future, they must retain the spirit
of charity toward those who are hostile to the Church,
ascribing their antagonism to ignorance rather than
malice.
And Catholics should be urged to pray that
such persons may be enlightened so that they will come
to understand cofsectly the Catholic Church and
Catholic doctrine.
O'Connell further advised priests to consult the rank and
file about the proper criteria that should be followed when
voting.

Under all circumstances, a Catholic must vote for

the best qualified candidate or else commit a sin.
If a Catholic cast his ballot for a candidate because
he was a Catholic and passed over a non-Catholic, who,
in his estimation, would make a better president, he
would be guilty of a sin.
In oth16 words there should
be no Catholic party in our land.
Monsignor Frederick Barnes, editor of the Catholic
Messenger,

prescribed

neutrality

and

the

Catholic

same

policy

of

responsibility

for

newspapers in the presidential campaign.
roles for the Catholic press.
support or oppose a

candidate,

political
diocesan

He discerned two

An editor should not openly
but

this

neutrality on

political matters should give way to a public activism when
the candidate's religion was attacked.

"At this point, it

became a religious matter for the paper's serious
attention."

In fact, Catholic papers had an obligation to

15

Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., "A Catholic for
President," January-June 1960, American Ecclesiastical
Review, Vol. 142, pp. 271-273.
16 Ibid.:

In short, a Catholic was bound in
conscience to vote for the candidate best suited for office.
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report in their pages every bigoted attack against Kennedy,
and to defend publicly the position that Catholicism was
. 1 e w1. th t rue Arn er1can1srn.
.
.
l?
compat1b

Barnes f orewarne d th a t

such a policy would result in the name of Kennedy appearing
in the paper many times, and at first glance, would appear
that it was conducting a publicity campaign for him.

Such

an interpretation simply was not true, and such a policy was
not an endorsement of Kennedy but a defense of the Catholic
Barnes concluded that diocesan newspapers

faith.

follow such an editorial policy as

should

long as the Catholic

Church in America was on trial and not Kennedy's political
qualifications.

Once Americans decided to vote for the man

and not against his faith it should cease.
Progress

in

its

editorials

advised

responsibly to bigoted attacks.

18

The Northwest

Catholics

to

react

"My point is that Catholics

should practice patience even until it hurts in the corning
political

campaign."

According

to

the

paper's

editor,

Catholics must address charges of reasonable critics, but
ignore the unreasonable attacks upon their faith.

"In the

long run, if Catholics act patiently under the temptation of
anger,

it can prove

to reasonable

Protestants

that

the

Catholic Church is not running for the presidency and that

Barnes, II s enator Kenne d y,
Catholic Messenger, February 4, 1960, p. 10.
1 7 Monsignor
.
F re d er1c
. k

18

Ibid.

II
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the pope has no designs on the White House."

19

One of the initial charges in the primaries was that
there existed a Catholic voting bloc which was directly
controlled

by

the

The

Vatican.

Church

went

on

the

defensive, saying such a "Catholic vote" was a myth.

The

Catholic Digest argued that "Catholic voters are just as
free, unfettered, intelligent, and divided in their voting
preferences as any other group."

Catholics, to say the

least, were many things -- Democrats, Republicans, Irish,
20
There was no official
Polish, anti and pro labor.
Catholic

party

line

or

monolithic

Catholic

political

interest group seeking to take over the country.
attacks provoked the

Such

ire and concern of Father George

Higgins, a leading Catholic spokesman for social and labor
reform.

In his syndicated weekly commentary, entitled "No

Party Line for Catholics," Higgins reported the different
opinions

that emerged at

Association

Conference

in

the

recent Catholic Economic

Washington,

D.C.

Catholics

disagreed on right to work legislation and union shops.
These palpable differences, Higgins concluded, "can serve to
remind

some
19

of our

jittery

non-Catholic

friends

that

John Sheerin, "Campaign will test Catholics'
Patience," Northwest Progress, January 22, 1960, p. 4.
20 Elmo Roper, "The Myth of a Catholic Vote,"
Catholic Digest, Vol. 24, February 1960, pp. 31-32.
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American Catholics are not identical peas in a political
pod. 1121

Father Ralph Gorman in The Sign vehemently denied

that "There existed a monolithic Catholic line on the issues
which are handed down from the pope to bishops and priests
22
who pass it on to the lay people of the church."
In an attempt to dissipate Catholic anger over antiCatholicism, the Catholic press uncovered the roots and the
historical

reasons

for

this

blinded

prejudice.

Such

knowledge, the editors hoped, would lead to understanding.
America explained to its readers that a Catholic president
represented a dreaded turning point to anti-Catholics.

It

symbolized the death of Protestant America and the birth of
pluralistic America.

America argued that two hundred, and

as recent as thirty years ago,
Protestant country.
changed.

the United States was a

Yet in three decades this has all

"Today in 1960 we are certainly not a Catholic

country, nor are we on the way to becoming one.

But we have

virtually ceased to be Protestant . . • Thus, it is dawning
on us today that America has entered a Post-Protestant
Era. 1123

The journal believed that the 1960 campaign for the
21

George Higgins, "No Party Line for Catholics," The
Yardstick, January 4, 1960.
22

Father Ralph Gorman,
"Disagreements
Catholics," The Sign, October 1959, p. 12.

among

23 Thurston Davis, "Our Post-Protestant Pluralism,"
America, March 5, 1960, pp. 673-675.
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presidency represented the first national manifestation of
this cultural pluralism.

Protestant bigotry and bitterness

would be exhibited in the campaign because Kennedy, being
Irish-Catholic, represented an attempt to conquer the last
symbol of Protestant America -- the presidency.
Throughout these months, however, the fundamental fact
should be kept in mind that 1960 is not 1928.
Today
America is Post-Protestant in orientation. For better
or worse, America in 1960 is pluralist.
Today,
whether anybody happens to like it or not a Cabot or
Kenned¥ is pretty much a chip off the same old
4
block.
Victor

c.

Perkiss, professor of political science at

St. Mary's College, Moraga, California in the pages of The
Catholic Digest brought to the attention of Catholics what
he considered to be a new anti-Catholic group, the urbane,
sophisticated intellectuals who feared the influence of any
religion in American life.
perceived

all

religions

unenlightened past"

These "agnostic secularists"

as

"quaint

survivals

of

an

and wanted Catholicism to remain a

foreign and despised thing.

25

They interpreted the recent

rise of Catholics and religious orthodoxy in the 1950's as a
threat to their blueprint of a secular society, "a vision of
a homogenous America untroubled by religious absolutes and
religious divisions."

Thus, secularists, along with

Protestants alike, did not want a Catholic president.
24
25

rbid., pp. 674-676.

victor c. Ferkiss, "Why not a Catholic
President?," Catholic World, Vol. 190, February 1960, pp.
273-280.
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The inviolability of the White House is thus the last
symbolic bastion of the belief that Catholics are a
tolerated group of outsiders rather than full-fledged
members of the American community.
The vision of an
America in which Catholics do not matter -- a vision
shared by both the religious and anti-religious
opponents of a Catholic candidacy -- would be visibly
shattered by the inauguration of a Catholic president.
It is the psychological need to preserve the image of
America rather than any rational fear of what a
Catholic might do with the actual powers of the
presidency, which accounts for the dynamism ~G current
opposition to a Catholic in the White House.
Like the Catholic community, Kennedy was forced to
confront directly the forces of anti-Catholicism during his
Democratic primary campaign or else be defeated by them.
The

religious

issue

posed

its

greatest

challenge

to

Kennedy's nomination during the Wisconsin and West Virginia
primaries.

In both of these primaries the religious issue

was widely discussed, deliberated, and debated.
Kennedy defeated Humphrey

in Wisconsin,

population was

31% Catholic.

popular

his

vote,

victory

a

On May 5,

state whose

Winning with 56% of the

was

neither

overwhelming as had been predicted.

decisive

or

He did capture most of

the state's Catholic vote, sweeping the heavily Catholic and
old Joe McCarthy districts.

He also received a

large

percentage of the Catholic Republican crossover vote.

27

Despite the numerous questions asked about his faith in the
26

victor C. Ferkiss, "Why not a Catholic,
President?," Catholic World, Vol. 190, February 1960, p.
275.
27 Theodore White, The Making of the President 1960,
(New York: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 111-120.
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state campaign, it was these results -- Catholics voting for
Kennedy

and

non-Catholics

voting

for

Humphrey

--

that

catapulted religion into prominence in the primaries.

The

results confirmed all prior suspicions of non-Catholics,
especially a Catholic voting bloc that was attempting to put
Kennedy into the White House.
The Catholic press wasted no time in responding to
the

seemingly

intransigent

Monsignor Franklyn J.
catholic

Herald

"Catholic

Kennedy,

Citizen

of

vote"

charge.

assistant editor of the

Milwaukee,

was

especially

irritated by this accusation because it implied that priests
told Catholics how to vote
confessional.

The

in the

Sunday before

pulpit

the

and in the

primary

election,

Kennedy maintained, 2,000 priests in 1,214 pulpits conducted
themselves admirably and impartially.

"It is safe to say

that not one of the priests told his parishioners which
candidate to vote for."

28

In fact, the only time a priest

would tell Catholics to vote for or against someone was
"when

there

office. 1129
"absurd!"

is

a

known

Communist-atheist

running

for

The Boston Pilot called the Catholic vote charge
The rationale behind such a charge was to create

a counter Protestant vote, thus dividing the community along
28

Monsignor Franklin J. Kennedy, "Should We Tell
Readers What Candidate to Vote for?," Catholic Herald
Citizen, March 19, 1960, p. 2 and "The Catholic Vote," May
7, 1960, p. 2.
29

Ibid.

57

.
l'ines. 30
religious

The Catholic

journal,

Ave Maria in its

special

report on the Wisconsin primary admitted that Catholics
voted for Kennedy, and explained why religion played a major
role in Kennedy's victory.
In the opinion of this writer, it is precisely due to
the unsavory activities of a few bigots that a great
number of Wisconsin Catholics registered a determined
protest i~ the form of a vote for the Catholic
1
candidate.
Although such a development could mean the polarization of
the American religious community, argued the journal, the
catholic support for Kennedy in Wisconsin demonstrated tc
all other Americans that forty million Catholics "li'k: other
religious or racial minorities, are capable of expressing a
.
. d'ice. ,.32
spontaneous vote against
preJU

In the same issue,

Professor Eric Waldmon, chairman of the political science
department at Marquette University, declared the Wisconsin
results refuted the existence of a Catholic vote.

Catholics

voted for Kennedy not because he was Catholic but because

"Americans were anti-Catholic.

Both local and national news

media, concluded Waldmon, have distorted the primary
results.

"Such a

distortion was

30 Ed.
. 1,
itoria

a

disservice

to our

"Simmer Down," Boston Pilot, April 9,

1960, p. 4.
31 Editorial, "Wisconsin's Catholic Vote," Ave Maria
April 30, 1960, p. 16.
32

Ibid.
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.
"33
nation.

The

editor

of

Commonweal

realized

Kennedy

received the majority of Catholic votes and, as a result,
feared a political battle along religious lines, declaring
that "the religious issue is now firmly a part of the
•
campaign
more th an ever.

II

He then attempted to explain the

source of voter solidarity.
"
. we believe that it reflects only the natural
desire of a very large minority to achieve symbolic
recognition that they are, finally, more than secondclass citizens.
It does not represent a Catholic
plot. The Church as such has no stake in the election
of a Catholic as President; it does not seek nor could
it receive special favors from any Catholic who might
be president.
Indeed, we could go further; we do not
think American Catholics would support a Catholic
candidate who sought f av~~s from the Catholic Church
which were denied others.
As a result of Wisconsin's returns, religion became
the paramount issue in Kennedy's primary campaign in West
Virginia.

James Wine, future director of religious relations

in Kennedy's presidential campaign, observed:

"This was

really the first time that the issue had come out in full
bloom, both locally where the battle was being fought at the
time as well as attracting national attention and involving
the Protestant clergy to the extent that it did. 1135

With

33

cr. Eric Waldmon, "Special Report: The Wisconsin
Primary," Ave Maria, April 23, 1960, pp. 16-17.
34 Editorial, "The Religious
April 22, 1960, pp. 79-80.

Issues, 11

Commonweal,

35J ames r.;•
rvine, Oral History Interview, January 26,
1967 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection),
Transcript, pp. 10-11.
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catholics only

comprising

5%

of

its

population,

West

Virginia would be the public testing ground for the charges
and counter charges of Catholics and anti-Catholics.

It

would also demonstrate to politicians and voters whether
Kennedy was a viable presidential candidate whose appeal
crossed
vote.

sectarian

lines

and

included

the

non-Catholic

36

The Boston Herald ran the headline, "Kennedy Set to
'
Wes t v·1rg1n1a.
' ' n 37 Kenne d y
. .
I ssue Tes t in
Face Fu 11 Re 1 1g1ous
encountered a strong Protestant opposition that claimed a
Catholic in the White House would establish "a dictatorship
by telephone from the Vatican."

He needed to capture this

illusive non-Catholic vote, which seemed to escape him with
the widespread publicity of the religious issue in the
state.

A West Virginia poll showed Kennedy with a 40% lead

over Humphrey in 1959, but a more recent 1960 poll gave
Humphrey a 20% edge over Kennedy.

This drastic shift in

voting preference was attributed to religion:

"But no one

in West Virginia knew you were a Catholic in December 1959.
Now they know."
36

38

They knew because of coverage the issue

Theodore White, The Making of the President,

pp.

120-137.
3711 Kennedy Set to Face Full Religious Issue Test in
West Virginia," Boston Herald, April 20, 1960, p. 1.
38 white, The Making of the President, p. 1211 Also
consult Editorial, "Fabricated Issue," Catholic Transcript,
April 14, 1960, p. 4.
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received in the nation's press.
Nationalization of the religious issue exhumed an
In December 19 4 7,

obscure event out of Kennedy's past.

congressman Kennedy accepted, then rejected, an invitation
to speak at a fund raising dinner for the Chapel of Four
Chaplains in Phi!adelphia.
Poling,

chairman

and

He was invited by Dr. Daniel A.

editor

of

the

Christian

Herald

Magazine.

The chapel was dedicated to the memory of four

world War

II military chaplains,

two Protestants

(one

Poling's son), one Catholic priest, and one Jewish Rabbi.
on February 3,

1943, the four chaplains were aboard an

American ship which was torpedoed while off the coast of
Greenland, killing seven hundred men.

They gave up their

life preservers to soldiers, and then, joining together in
prayer, sank to their deaths. 39
Dr. Poling headed this fund drive for the interfaith
Chapel of Four Chaplains, which was to be located in the
lower level of Philadelphia's

Grae~

Baptist Temple and which

was to contain a separate altar for each faith.

Kennedy

initially accepted his invitation to attend the memorial
dinner at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel.

But a

few days

later he declined because of the religious undertones of his
invitation.

He could only attend as a "public officer."

39 Editorial "Senator Kennedy and
Commonweal, January 29, 1960, pp. 479-480.

the

Chapel,"
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I was happy to accept. A few days before the event, I
learned • • • that I was to be the spokesman for the
Catholic organization. I further learned the memorial
was to be located in the sanctuary of a church of a
different faith.
This is against the precepts of a
catholic
Church.
Because
of
this
fact,
the
Archdiocese of Philadelphia was unable to support the
drive.
Therefore, I felt I had no credential,fb to
attend in the capacity in which I had been asked.
Dr. Poling was very upset with Kennedy's actions.
He maintained that he had invited Kennedy as a "Congressman
from Massachusetts."

He accused Kennedy of submitting to

the pressure of the local Catholic hierarchy.

At the time,

cardinal Dougherty refused to cooperate with the Four
Chaplain fund drive because the chapel was to be located in
a Protestant church, a violation of Canon Law.

Poling

inferred the following explanation for Kennedy's withdrawal.
" • • • you did not decline an invitation, you accepted an
invitation,
Cardinal

and

then at

Dougherty,

engagement."

41

you

the request of his
abruptly

Eminence,

cancelled

the

The controversy was not resolved then, and

thirteen years later, Poling revived it in the pages of his
magazine, implying that Kennedy was not as independent of
.
Ch urc h as h e was c 1 aiming.
· ·
42
h is

40

John F. Kennedy, Press Release, January 14, 1960
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers;
Religious Issues File of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
41
Dr. Daniel A. Poling to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
June 30, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers; Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
42
Poling-Kennedy Correspondence, Letter, JanuaryJuly 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
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Kennedy became

restless

and

irritated over the

extensive coverage in the press of the Poling incident and
the

so-called

He had to

"Fabricated Issue."

resolve,

neutralize, or mitigate the effects of such news reporting,
if he were to win in West Virginia.

Would a presentation of

his religious views to a national forum be necessary?
own personal

staff was

divided on what

to

do.

His

His

washington staff suggested that he avoid such a direct
attack upon the
explosive! 1143

religious

"It was

issue.

simply too

His local West Virginian advisors recommended

a direct confrontation, a position supported by Kennedy's
Harvard intellectuals such as legal scholar, Archibald Cox.
He wrote Kennedy at the time encouraging him "to make a very
serious,

full dress speech upon the relationship between

Church and State."

Cox argued that such a speech would
It would demonstrate

accomplish three important things.

Kennedy's capacity to once and for all remove the religious
issue

from

"sizeable

the

political

group"

realm.

It would

of non-Catholics with

convert

thoughtful

a
and

serious reservations about his capacity to be a Catholic
president

without

any

interference

from

his

Church.

Finally, it was the appropriate time to address this problem
prior

to

the

Democratic Convention when

it might

Papers~
Religious Issue Files of James Wine) ,
Contains seven pieces of correspondence.

be

Box 1O15.

43 white, The Making of the President, p. 127.
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perceived as party doctrine and not as his
44
philosophy.

individual

Kennedy decided to confront the issue in his address
to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21 in
washington,

D. C.

He

changed

his

scheduled

talk

from

"America's stake in the Underdeveloped World," to "Religion
and Politics. 1145

In the beginning of his address he boldly

implicated the nation's press in creating the need to change
his topic.

"I have decided,

in view of current press

reports, that it would be appropriate to speak to you today
about what has been widely called the religious issue in
46
.American politics."
He emphatically denied that he was
trying to be the first Catholic president or was seeking the
Catholic vote.

"I want no votes solely on the account of my

44

Ibid.7 Archibald Cox to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
April 8, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 534. He ended by informing
Kennedy that Lucian Pye at MIT and Mark Howe of Harvard
would develop the speech into writing, and as for Pye, he
"is the most ardent of your making a speech now."

4511 Kennedy Set to Face Full Religious Issue Test in
West Virginia," Boston Herald, April 20, 1960, p. 1.
Theodore Sorensen, "The Catholic Issue in Politics," Speech,
February 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1033.
Sorensen, a Unitarian, served as major advisor to Kennedy on
religious issue until James Wine replaced him after the
Democratic National Convention.
Sorensen's speech was
probably the primary foundation upon which Kennedy's ASNE
speech was based.
46 New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17; John
Fenton, The Catholic Vote (New Orleans:
Hauser Press,
1960), pp. 132-140.
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religion • . • I do not want any vote cast for me for such
illogical reasons."

Defining the religious

issue as a

"misunderstanding" of his own religious convictions and as a
"suspicion" of a so-called Catholic vote, Kennedy forewarned
the editors that they had a grave responsibility beyond the
reporting of the facts and the writing of "lofty editorials
deploring intolerance."

They should ensure that religion

would not become the dominant issue of the campaign.
And the press, while not creating the issue, will
largely determine whether or not it does become
dominant
whether it is kept in perspective
whether it is considered objectively
whether
needless fears and suspicions are stilled instead of
4
aroused.
Kennedy revealed how the press up until his speech
magnified and oversimplified the

religious

controversy,

while ignoring the vital and significant issues.

Editors

throughout the Wisconsin primary highlighted the religious
issue above farm legislation, foreign policy, defense, civil
rights,
article,

labor unions, and price supports.
Kennedy noted,

One newspaper

used the work "Catholic" twenty

times in fifteen paragraphs.

He contended,

that until

national coverage in the press impressed upon the voters of
West Virginia that religion was the decisive and critical
issue in the upcoming primary, most were oblivious or
indifferent to it.
47

New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17.
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I do not think religion is the decisive issue in any
state.
I do not think it should be.
I do not think
it should be made to.
And recognizing my own
responsibilities, in that regffd, I am hopeful that
you will recognize yours also.
Kennedy rhetorically formulated and answered three
questions:
campaign?

Is the religious issue a legitimate one in the
Should voters be analyzed purely in terms of

catholic and anti-Catholic predilections?

Was there any

justification for solely applying the religious test on the
office of the presidency?

There was only one instance,

according to Kennedy, in which the religious issue was valid
and that was the concern over ecclesiastical pressures and
obligations upon the president to act against the national
interest.
many times.

Kennedy rejoined:

"I have answered the question

My answer was -- and is -- No!"

As far as he

was concerned, to generalize in terms of Catholic and antiCatholic votes distorted American political reality.

If

such criteria were acceptable, he could just as readily use
the weather as a tool of analysis.

"I ran strongest in

those areas where the average temperature in January was 20
degrees or higher, and poorest in those areas where it was
14 d egrees or 1 ower . . • 1149

To simplify the motivations of

Jews, Protestants, and Catholics to such an extent was
submitting them to a religious test:
48 New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17.
49 Ibid.
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To submit the candidates to a religious test is unfair
enough -- to apply it to the voters the~lves is
divisive, degrading, and wholly unwarranted.
Kennedy

thought

that

to

apply

a

religious

test

to

presidential candidates was unwarranted, especially since he
was not a

Catholic candidate.

candidate for president.

"I am not

a

Catholic

I do not speak for the Catholic

Church on issues of public policy -- and no one in that
church speaks for me."

In the long run, Kennedy insisted

upon his independent stand from the Church.

"Do not expect

me to explain or defend every act or statement of every Pope
or priest in this country or some others in this century or
51
the last • . . "
Kennedy concluded his oration by considering his
course of action in face of the religious issue.
simply withdraw

from

the

contest

to

avoid

He could

religious

controversy and accept the vice-presidential nomination to
placate Catholics in the country.
follow

such a

distasteful.

course:

"I

But Kennedy could not

find that suggestion highly

It assumes the worst about a country which

prides itself on being more tolerant and better educated
than it was in 1928.

America cannot admit to the world that

one third of its population was forever barred from the
52
White House."
He would run for the presidency instead,
50 New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17.
51

Ibid.

52 Ibid.

67
proceeding through the primaries, nominations, and election,
and if bigotry showed its invidious face,

so be it.

He

ended with a vigorous stand behind his position:
But regardless of the political outcome, the issue is
here to be faced.
It is my job to face it frankly and
fully.
And it is our job S:3' face it fairly, in
perspective and in proportion.
"Thank God!" for his speech and for such a great
defender of the faith, proclaimed the editor of Ave Maria.
His response typified the jubilant response to his oration
by the Catholic press. 54

West Virginians also reacted

positively to Kennedy's call, "Not a Catholic Candidate."
They presented him with a comfortable 2 to 1 victory margin
over Hubert Humphrey in the primary election.

The country

realized that the primary's outcome was not due to religion
but to other non-religious factors such as his charisma, his
appeal to the poor, his efficient campaign organization, and
his obtaining of support

from FDR's son. 55

His victory

convinced fellow Democrats that he could capture the nonCatholic vote.

David Lawrence's convictions were shaken.

Although still behind Stevenson,

Lawrence admitted that

Kennedy's vig:tory in West Virginia "shook Il1Y thinking a bit.;J'
about whether or not he could win." 56
53

State Democratic

New York Times, April 22, 1960, pp. 16-17.

54 Ave Maria, May 7, 1960, p. 16; NCWC, May 1960
55 Editorial, "A Fading Political Issue," Commonweal,
May 27, 1960, pp. 219-220.
56

oavid Lawrence, Oral History Interview,
22, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History

January
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leader, W.
results

H.

Holt of West Virginia,

clearly

demonstrated

the

declared that the

attractiveness

of

a

catholic president.
Sometimes I think it would do this country a
'power' 'o good' to have a Catholic for president. It
would do away with once and for all the religious
bugaboo that bothers a lot of peog7e and could promote
tolerance among his people . . . "
The morning after his victory in West Virginia
Kennedy announced that "the religious issue was buried."
The Catholic press voiced a similar optimism.

58

Commonweal

concluded that the religious issue "was certainly dealt a
damaging blow but it is still too early to offer the funeral
oration. 1159

America concurred.

"On all sides, finally, the

West Virginia vote won a warm welcome as grounds for hoping
that the religious issue might be on the wane in the
political arena. 1160 The magazine's Washington correspondent,
Mary

McGrory,

ended

her

commentary

on

the

following

Collection), Transcript, p. 4; Senator George McGovern, Oral
History Interview, April 24, 1964 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection), Transcript, p. 11. McGovern noted
that he was behind Humphrey until West Virginia.
After
Kennedy's victory, McGovern asked Kennedy for an appointment
on his staff.
57
w. H. Holt to Senator Cramer of Boston, Letter,
April 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers, Senate Files), Box No. 535.
58 Editorial, "A Fading Political Issue," Commonweal,
May 27, 1960, pp. 219-220.
59 Ibid.
60

Editorial, "West Virginia Votes," America, May 21,
1960, p. 271.
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auspicious note.
The conquest of prejudice, however, means that Senator
Kennedy need no longer name his religion as an
obstacle to nomination. More than that, as he said at
an early morning press conference at his jubilant
headquarters in Charleston: 'I think that after the
campaign in this state, it will not be necessary to
mention it again.'
Al\fresent would certainly say a
'fervent' Amen to that.
Lastly, the Providence Visitor argued in its editorial that
a Catholic was the best possible presidential candidate for
the country.

"No one could be better qualified for the

leadership of our country than a Catholic.

A Catholic is in

touch with the fullness of grace and saving truth. 1162
These

Catholic

commentaries

and

Kennedy's

own

purview of the religion controversy seemed to be accurate up
through the Democratic National Convention.

At the end of

May, the Vatican newspaper, Osservatore Romano, published an
article that argued the Church had a special role to play in
temporal affairs, and in this case, advised all Catholics to
vote for the anti-Communists in the upcoming election.

Such

church intervention in politics before West Virginia would
have generated a war of diatribes and accusations in the
United States.

But once news of the story came to America,

61

Mary McGrory, "Washington Front," Commonweal, May
21, 1960, p. 275.
Editorial, "The Catholic Vote," The
Tablet, May 14, 1960, p. 12. The Paper's editor was pleased
with results in West Virginia's primary.
"It indicates that
the ugly factor of religious prejudice has been discarded in
that state."
62

Editorial, "Is Catholic Best Possible Candidate?,"
Providence Visitor, June 3, 1960, p. 3.
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only a

few non-Catholics made it an issue in Kennedy's

campaign for the presidency.

Catholics, of course, denied

any complicity with the paper's position and said such a
pronouncement was only applicable to Italian politics.
catholic journal wrote at the time:

One

"It would be uncandid

to pretend that the editorial was not an embarrassment to
catholics in many countries. 1163
The Democratic National Convention took place during
this period of religious concord.

Only a

few certain

quarters harbored any religious doubts about Kennedy and
were ineffectual in preventing the Convention's nomination
of

Kennedy

candidate.
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as

the

Democratic

On July

15,

1960,

party's

presidential

Kennedy delivered his

acceptance speech to the convention's delegates, directing
his opening remarks to his faith.

"I am fully aware of the

fact that the Democratic party, by nominating someone of my
faith, has taken on what many regard as a new and hazardous
risk -- new, at least, since 1928. 1165

Kennedy assured his

captive audience that their trust and confidence in him on
this

issue was

not

unwarranted.

He would uphold

the

63

Editorial, "Osservatore Romano," Boston Pilot,
June 4, 1960, p. 4.
Editorial, "A Bewildering Article,"
America, June 25, 1960, pp. 390-391.
64 white, The Making of the President, pp. 180-215.
John McCormack, Oral History Interview, 1977 (John F.
Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection), Transcript, p.3.
6511 John F. Kennedy's Acceptance Speech
Angeles," Vital Speeches, (1960), pp. 610-612.

in

Los

71

constitution and the nation's interest above any religious
pressures

or

obligations

emanating

from

the

Church's

hierarchy, as evidenced by his past fourteen-year public
His

record.

"relevant. "66

religious

affiliation

was

simply

not

"I am telling you now that you are entitled

to know:

That my decisions on every public policy will be

my own

as an American, a Democrat, and a free Man! 1167
After Kennedy's nomination and acceptance speech

Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York sent him a note of
congratulations "on your wonderful victory" and told him how
he stayed up until 4:15 a.m. to hear the final nomination
68
results.
The Catholic Messenger rejoiced in Kennedy's
victory:

"It

is

the

clearest

sign

that

the

written

religious test for the Presidency is losing its hold. 1169
The

Northwest

Progress

in

its

editorial

interpreted

Kennedy's success as symbolizing the political downfall of
bigotry:

"that the ghost of prejudice and bigotry has so

often stalked the American convention's halls has at last
66
John F. Kennedy's Acceptance Speech
Angeles," Vital Speeches, (1960), pp. 610-612.
67

in

Los

Ibid.
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Francis Cardinal Spellman to John F. Kennedy,
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21, 196, p. 12.

72
been dispelled. 1170

The Advocate advised Catholics to take

great pride in Kennedy's nomination and to rejoice in the
fact that the United States had greatly matured since 1928.
Kennedy was
character

"a tribute to the virtues of his Catholic

and to

personality. 1171

the

gifts

of

his

Catholic mind

and

It was miserable out tonight, maintained

the San Francisco Monitor,

for the few remaining "dens of

bigotry in the United States. 1172

The Catholic Action of the

South in New Orleans unequivocally proclaimed that Kennedy's
nomination

had

undermined

the

validity

of

any

future

. .
t es t • 73
re 1 1g1ous

The primary campaign began with fear of another 1928
and ended with the
religious

issue.

declaration of
Kennedy

had

the

become

demise of
the

the

Catholic

presidential candidate of the Democratic party for several
Perhaps the most important was the' politically

reasons.

neutral• stance of the Catholic hierarchy and press coupled
with their importunings of fellow Catholics to remain calm
and understanding toward bigoted attacks.

This made more

credible the remarks of Kennedy in his ASNE speech.

Never-

70
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theless, underlying this cooperation between the Church and
Kennedy in their attempt to circumvent the religious rancor
of Al Smith's day resided a politically conservative and
liberal Catholic opposition.

CHAPTER IV

'NOT A CATHOLIC CANDIDATE':

CATHOLIC OPPOSITION

ON THE POLITICAL RIGHT AND LEFT
Not all Catholics celebrated Kennedy's nomination as
a symbol of the demise of the religious issue.
pages of Dorothy Day's newspaper,

Perusing the

the Catholic Worker,

readers would have received inadequate coverage of Kennedy's
entire primary campaign and victory.

The featured articles

of the Catholic Worker concerned civil rights, pacificism,
humanitarianism, and civil disobedience.

Not Kennedy but

Tolstoy, Thoreau, and Ghandi were the men of the hour.
bigotry

but

poverty

paramount concern. 1

and

nuclear

destruction

were

Not

of

Day's indifference was surpassed by

anguish among other Catholic editors, clerics, and politicians.
1

The Catholic Worker (Microfilm: University of Notre
Dame).
Day had her regular serial "On Pilgrimage,"
describing her travels throughout the United States. Also
see George Gilmary Higgins, The Yardstick:
Catholic Tests
of Social Order, 1959 (George Gilmary Higgins Papers:
Catholic University of America Archives).
Contained
complete set from 1945-1981, Box No's. 49-50.
Father
Higgins also ignored the Kennedy campaign. As the director
of the Social Action Department for the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, he prioritized working class problems in
his column, The Yardstick, subtitled "Catholic Tests of a
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They opposed Kennedy, perceiving him not as a Catholic
candidate

but

as

an

unsavory

liberal

or

conservative

politician.
John Courtney Murray,
theologian,

was

opposed Kennedy.

a moderate

S.

J.,

the great American

conservative Republican who

A firm supporter of Dulles' foreign policy

and of Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, Murray maintained that
his opposition to Kennedy had nothing to do with the fact
that the candidate was Catholic.

Although the Kennedy staff

sought out Murray's advice on theological matters -- the
most noted instance being Sorensen's call to him concerning
the Houston speech -- Murray was "not eager" to see John
Kennedy

elected

president.

He

considered

Kennedy

an

intellectual "lightweight" and was critical of his liberal
philosophy.

"He took a dim view of Stevenson and a dimmer

view of Kennedy. 112

Cogley,

a close friend of Murray's,

recalled that, after receiving a telegram from Robert F.
Kennedy asking him to

join the campaign staff, Murray

advised him not to accept and not to have "anything to do
with those people. 113
Social Order." Higgins championed the causes of the poor
and of social justice, and was particularly worried about
the survival of such causes among Catholics who moved up on
the socio-economic ladder and then into the suburbs.
2John Cogley, Oral History Interview, February 20,
1968 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History Collection),
Transcript, pp. 30-32.
3

Ibid.
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Throughout
conservative

the

National

primaries
Review

William

magazine

F.

took

Buckley's
a

unique

perspective on the religious issue and opposed Kennedy's
candidacy.

Although he perceived the bigoted anti-Catholic

attacks as "an unhealthy impulse to let loose on the body
politic," Buckley thought that religion should be an issue,
that voters should know whether a candidate was Catholic,
protestant,

Jewish,

or

a

Without

non-believer.

such

knowledge of the candidate's religious background, a voter
"will be making a

superficial

judgment.

It would be

ridiculous to forget the religious faith if one of them ran
for

an office that decides

disobedience, and war. 114

issues of property,

civil

With the above assumption in mind,

Buckley formulated his magazine's position concerning the
primary in West Virginia:
We are against Senator Kennedy for President but not
because he is a Catholic~ and we are against Herbert
Humphrey, though not for his Protestantism.
But at
the same time, in forming o'-¥ judgment, we do not
overlook their religious ties.
The National Review disliked Kennedy's attempt to be
"everything to everyone," a position and image that was
based upon insincerity.

Kennedy's insincerity allowed him

to be the "beneficiary of the voters' own moral
misapprehensions."

His

balancing

act

of

ambivalence

4Editorial, "Is Religion an Issue," National Review,
May 7, 1960, p. 285.
5 Ibid.
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resulted in votes "of both the pro-McCarthy Irish and the
6
anti-McCarthy members of the Harvard University Faculty."
Especially disturbing to Buckley and others on his staff was
Kennedy's liberalism.

They attacked his support of state

welfare, his belief in big government, and his advocacy of
7
negotiations with the Communists.
The

Wanderer,

a

reactionary

catholic newspaper out of St.
Kennedy's liberalism.
based upon a

Paul,

conservative
Minnesota,

decried

Founded in 1867, the newspaper was

tradition of anti-liberalism,

atheism, and communism.

lay

secularism,

During the primary, it summed up

its purpose:
It is in the first place historic liberalism which
continues to pave the way for worldwide atheistic
communism.
It is still liberalism's characteristic
brand of moral relativism and indifferentism which
constitutes the ugly boil .
. and the big question
today still is who wi~ lance the boil -- Catholicism
or the International?"
According to The Wanderer, Kennedy espoused the following
despicable liberal principles.

"He consistently expressed

predilections for centralized government and welfare statism
with its built-in tendencies toward mechanistic
regimentation and object dehumanization. 119

Most deplorable,

6John Chamberlain, "The Chameleon Image of John F.
Kennedy," National Review, April 23, 1960, pp. 261-263.
7 Ibid.
8 The Wanderer, January 7, 1960, p. 4.
9 Editorial, "The Religious
September 22, 1960, p. 4.

Issue," The Wanderer,

78

Kennedy received the backing of the leftist Americans for
Democratic Action, ADA, a group The Wanderer characterized
as a "malodorous hodgepodge of rabid ideologies, fuzzymined, egg-heads, Harvard beatniks, materialistic do-gooders
of every red and pink shade."

1

°

Finally,

the newspaper

found fault with Kennedy's approach to the religious issue
because it allowed him to obscure the fact that he was not a
product of parochial schools and that in London he was the
understudy of a socialist professor.
In any case, the religious issue injected into this
campaign to date has been and continues to be a
misleading and deceptive tactic, to say the least.
Without much regard for the long range social and
religious consequences, it was primarily concerned and
designed, so it would seem, as a calculated expedient,
a mere 'vote catcher' device, and as such it has
miserably failed to give the electorate the true
measure and worth of the Democrat's leading contender
either as a bonafide Christian statesman or seasoned
Catholic.
On these basic iffues among others, the
voters are still in the dark.
The Tablet, a conservative Catholic newspaper under
the authority of New York's Francis Cardinal Spellman, still
admired Senator Joseph McCarthy.

"Senator McCarthy, almost

alone and against tremendous odds, alerted this nation to
lOEdi torial, "Catholic in Poli tics," The Wanderer,
May 26, 1960, p. 4. Mrs. Harvey to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
June 8, 1959 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, General Correspondence), Box No. 999.
Mrs. Harvey
charged Kennedy with the same association with the ADA.
"However, I accuse you of not being a good Catholic because
of your connection with the Americans for Democratic
Action."
11

Editorial, "Catholics in Politics," The Wanderer,
May 26, 1960, p. 4.
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the communist menace within, as no man before or since has
done."

12

Harboring

such memories,

attacked Richard Rovere' s

the

paper's

editor

recently published study that

presented an unfavorable view of McCarthy.

Rovere was a

communist and anti-Catholic, while his book was "repulsive"
and at best "irresponsible trash. 1113

Kennedy entered the

fray when he publicly expressed his admiration for Rovere's
scholarship.

R. Emmet Kane in the "Reader's Column" of The

Tablet published an open letter to Kennedy.

Kane admitted

that he had been a Catholic-Democrat for years and that he
was looking forward to Catholic in the White House.

But

Kennedy's approval of Rovere's book and his delineation of
its merits had changed Kane's mind.
The shock occasioned today by your endorsement of
Rovere's uncharitable and untruthful biography of
McCarthy, has forced me to change my estimate of you
I can find no excuse for you nor can I trust
your judgment for approving of Rovere's book and its
proven false statements about a
fellow Catholic
patriot who is prevented by death from defe~~ing
himself.
I am sorry I can no longer endorse you.
12 oon Zirkel, "Richard Revere's Book on Senator Joe
McCarthy," The Tablet, July 11, 1959, p. 21.
13

rbid.

14 R. Emmet Kane, "Readers Forum," The Tablet, August
8, 1959, p. 6. Kennedy's reply was published in the paper.
He apologized for the misintepretation of his remarks which
were only meant to concern the merits of the book and the
skills of its author.
His remarks were not meant to be a
judgment on the "complex McCarthy character." Also consult
"Weird Logic, Timid Souls vs. Student Loyalty Oaths," The
Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol. 59, April 1959, pp:625-629.
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The best known of Kennedy's Catholic conservative
opponents was Juniper D. Carol, a Franciscan theologian and
editor

of

Marianist

Studies.

Carol

epitomized

the

anti-liberalism and anti-communism of the Catholic right.
His article, "Kennedy for President:

A Catholic Priest says

No!" appeared in the ultra-conservative magazine, Human
15
In it, Carol
Events, after Kennedy's nomination.
presented himself as a concerned citizen who would not be so
presumptuous as to tell his readers whom to vote

for.

Instead, he would advise his reading audience "as to the
type of candidate they ought not vote for."

According to

Carol, to cast a ballot for any liberal candidate would be a
disservice to the country.

Liberal beliefs

in welfare

statism, world government, and unionized labor represented
dangerous

encroachments

liberties.

on

individual

and

national

Carol perceived liberal policy toward communism

-- tolerating subversives in the country, aiding communistic
governments,

and

promoting

negotiations

and

cultural

exchanges with the Soviets -- as buttressing the growth and
domination of this diabolical ideology throughout the world.
Carol promised to do all in his power to stop such a
15 or. Juniper B. Carol, "Kennedy for President: A
Priest says No!" Human Events, July 28, 1960, pp. 313-314;
Also reprinted in the The Wanderer, May 26, 1960, p. 5 and
in John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine, Box No. 1020.
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"Frankly,

development:

the

frightening prospect of yet

another liberal Administration makes me shudder. 1116
Carol opposed Kennedy because he embodied this
liberal ideology.

Carol maintained that Kennedy's record in

Congress over the past two years palpably demonstrated his
liberal tendencies.

Ninety-three out of ninety-seven votes

found Kennedy on the same side with Hubert Humphrey, "the
most obnoxious egg-head in Congress."

Kennedy's 100% rating

from the ADA and his befriending of the president of the
United Auto Workers, Walter Reuther, who was "a ruthless
labor dictator and one of the most mischievious socialist
leaders in the country,

should be enough to chill the

enthusiasms of the most fanatic Kennedy backers."

Carol

concluded that Kennedy was the wrong man to provide the
strength, courage, and leadership to stave off the "Russian
Bear. 1117
Numerous
distributed

reprints

throughout

the

of

Carol's

country.

In

article

were

some

Catholic

circles, Carol was accused of disseminating hate literature
and abetting the cause of anti-Catholic bigots.

Editor,

Donald McDonald, referred to the whole conservative Catholic
right -- Carol, the Tablet, The Wanderer, and the National
16

or. Juniper B. Carol, "Kennedy for President: A
Priest says No!" Human Events, July 28, 1960, pp. 313-314:
Also reprinted in the The Wanderer, May 26, 1960, p. 5 and
in John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine, Box No. 1020.
17

Ibid.

82
Review -- as

"anti-Kennedy reactionaries"

blackguards."
moral

and

"outright

They all suffered from a pathological and

. k ness. 18
sic

A fellow

priest

accused

violating his proper role as a priest.

Carol

of

Numerous Catholics

complained that Protestants and other non-Catholics opposed
to Kennedy took advantage of Carol's article, in particular,
when they wanted to downgrade him in the eyes of his co. .
. t s. 19
re l 1g1on1s

Carol came to his own defense.

He first noted that

the editor of Human Events deleted a couple of paragraphs
from his original manuscript.

In these missing paragraphs,

he denounced the Republicans for following the same "liberal
line" on many issues as the Democrats,

especially their

stance toward communism.
The editor said he had no room for those two
paragraphs. The point I am making is that:
I was not
trying to promote one party at the expense of the
other.
I am not interested in politics as politics,
but I am very much concerned about the moral problems
involved, such as socialism and the appeasement of
communism.
I agree with you that non-Catholics will
use my article to further their own bigotry. I regret
that as much as you do, but I feel that such people
would twist even the wo2gs of the pope or of Christ to
suit their own purpose.
18walter L. Matt, "On This and That," The Wanderer,
September 15, 1960, p. 4.
19 Father Boniface Fielding to John F. Kennedy,
Letter, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1020.
2 0ibid.
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Carol's defense fell upon deaf ears.

One concerned

catholic citizen wrote Kennedy after he had read Carol's
21
"I'm so mad, I could spit."
Another Catholic
article:
could not believe that such a diatribe could flow from the
pen of a Catholic priest:

"We are very reluctant to believe

it was actually written by a priest, since being Catholics
ourselves, we never heard of anything quite like it, and
22
One Catholic
never thought such a thing reasonable."
bluntly informed Kennedy that the author of the article was
not a Catholic priest.

23

In his reply to these concerned

catholics, Kennedy reassured them that Carol's article did
not represent the official position of the Catholic Church.
He explained that Carol's diatribe was "merely an expression
of the extreme right wing economic and social opinions of
24
Father Carol himself."
21

Gertrude E. Mullen to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1020.
22 Mr.

& Mrs. James O'Connor to Democratic National
Committee, Letter, October 11, 1960 (John F. Kennedy
Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1008.
23

Miss Grace Ede Villiers to John F. Kennedy,
Letter, September 28, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine),
Box No. 1004.
24

J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. & Mrs. James O'Connor,
Letter, October 31, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine),
Box No. 1008.
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Conservative Catholics were also antagonistic toward
the Americanization of the Catholic community, a process
which

Kennedy

symbolized

and

which

eroded

principle in favor of secularist beliefs.

Catholic

Monsignor Irving

de Blanc, director of the National Catholic Family Bureau,
was disturbed by the effect American society had upon
catholic practices and beliefs.

Findings

from a recent

study of his bureau clearly demonstrated that Catholics
utilized

contraceptives

Dismayed by these

as

findings

readily

as

non-Catholics.

and convinced that American

influence was the cause, de Blanc called for Catholics to
withdraw from mainstream America, to avoid undue exposure to
non-Catholic culture,

and

to

return to the ghetto to

preserve the foundations of their faith.

Such a retreat

was the panacea to the erosion of Catholic morality and
convictions.

"Catholics should not have close associates

who are in a different religious

situation.

compromise with a cultural pattern. 1125
Maria,

You soon

The editor of Ave

after studying the report of de Blanc's bureau,

agreed that Catholic practice of birth control and divorce
signified a dangerous secular trend and the emergence of a
morals gap.

"What these figures really demonstrate is our

alarming morals gap between beliefs and practices of
Catholics.

The simple fact is they do not seem to practice

25 Ed.itoria
' l , "Back to the Ghetto?," Commonweal, July
16, 1960, p. 16.
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what

preach."

they

26

This

hypocrisy

existed

catholics lived in a non-Christian society.

because

"It is geared

to secular goals and values; it is monumentally indifferent
to religious values. 1127

The Tablet despised this American-

ization trend that Kennedy symbolized and that reduced the
number of new converts to the Church.

"We believe more

converts are attracted to the Church of firm principle then
a Church of weakened compromise.

So the way to correct and

amend recent trends and strengthen the Church is to believe
in a return to orthodoxy."

28

'
In the end, Human Events published an article
by one

of its assistant Catholics editors, Nicholas T. Nonenmacher.
He summarized conservative antipathy toward Kennedy.

He

contended that if there was going to be a Catholic vote, it
would

be

against

and

not

for

Kennedy.

Catholic

conservatives, according to him, will demonstrate that
tribal affinity will not help Kennedy in his quest for the
presidency.

"In sum, just being a Catholic will not make it

easier for Jack Kennedy to get Catholic votes. 1129
26

Editorial, "The Morals Gap," Ave Maria, July 16,
1960, p. 16.
27

28
29

Ibid.
Editorial, The Tablet, March 12, 1960, p. 11.

Nicolas T. Nonenmacher, "Will Catholics Defeat
Kennedy?," Human Events, August 11, 1960, pp. 345-346;
Reprint in John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files
of James Wine, Box No. 1020.
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Most Catholic liberals eventually supported Kennedy
in his presidential campaign.

But, before and even a short

time after his nomination, liberal support was tenuous at
best.

The editors of Commonweal, America, and Ave Maria,

Dorothy Day,

George Higgins,

Eugene McCarthy,

and David

Lawrence were Catholic liberals who along with Jews and
intellectuals questioned Kennedy's liberalism and who looked
to Adlai Stevenson for leadership and to Eleanor Roosevelt
for

inspiration.

Kennedy

American liberals.

needed the

support of these

Arthur Schlesinger advised Kennedy on

his liberal dilemma.

He explained that liberals remained

demobilized by and uncommitted to Kennedy because they
supported Stevenson, were suspicious of Lyndon Johnson, and
disliked Kennedy's
Without

organizational

issue-oriented

liberals

to

and machine
spark the

politics.
campaign,

Kennedy was left with the only remaining distinguishing tag
"the Catholic candidate, and fanatics have been allowed
to make religion the dominant issue in the campaign. 1130
Schlesinger drew up a plan of action to attract liberals to
his campaign.

He suggested that Kennedy would have to

reiterate that he was more liberal than Nixon, that he would
have to utilize more rhetorical flourishes in his orations,
and that he would have to meet with this issue-oriented
30 Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger), Box No. 32.
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segment of the electorate.

Once these things had been

accomplished, Schlesinger thought that issue-minded liberal
Democrats would enter Kennedy's campaign, giving it "steam,"
dissipating "the profound air of lethargy," and eradicating
the religious issue once and for all.
The only way to do this is to fill the vacuum -- to
charge the campaign with intellectual and emotional
content -- to make people think of you in so many
other ways that the question of your faith recedes
into the background -- all this means to enlist the
enthusiasm of the kinetic Democra31 who alone can
convert the campaign into t crusade.
In a

subsequent

letter to

Kennedy,

Schlesinger

discussed his participation in a meeting of the Board of
Directors of the ADA

(Americans for Democratic Action} •

Schlesinger observed these issue-minded people perceived
Nixon as "trouble," and half-heartedly supported Kennedy
because

they were

beliefs.

uncertain

about

Kennedy's

political

One board member confided in Schlesinger:

"It

isn't what Kennedy believes that worries me.
It's whether
he believes in anything." 32 Schlesinger reminded Kennedy
that it was this group that could revitalize his campaign
and bury the religious issue.

But Schlesinger discovered

another impediment at the meeting, one that was perhaps
insurmountable among a few liberals.
31

"Some liberals I am

Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger}, Box No. 32.
32
Ibid.
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ashamed to say, are secret anti-Catholics.
and certainly not many at this meeting.

But not many,

033

Another explanation for liberal antagonism toward
Kennedy was the stormy relationship between his family and
Eleanor Roosevelt, the supposed embodiment of true liberal
A firm

doctrines.

believer

in

civil

liberties,

Mrs.

Roosevelt for years had accused Kennedy of "too much profile
and not enough courage" on such issues as McCarthyism and
civil right.

34

Lawrence Fuchs, a liberal, Jewish professor

of political science was a close friend and colleague of
Mrs.

Roosevelt;

they

both

taught

University for several years.

35

courses

at

As early as 1959, Kennedy

sought out Fuchs for an explanation of Mrs.
aversion toward his bid for the presidency.
defensively
opposition

and
to

categorically

"prejudice."

Brandeis

attributed

It was

the

Roosevelt's
Kennedy

his

liberal

only plausible

explanation of liberal support for Stevenson even though he
could not win.

"They're just prejudiced against Catholics."

And

Mrs.

as

far

as

Roosevelt

was

concerned,

Kennedy

33 Arthur Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Special Correspondence-Schlesinger), Box No. 32.
34 Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Kennedys,
(New York:
Warner Books, 1984), pp. 299-300.
James
MacGregor Burns, John F. Kennedy: A Political Profile (New
York: Avon Books, 1959), pp. 93-95, 133-152.
35 Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History Interview, November
28, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
Collection), Transcript, pp. 7-16.
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believed:

"Well, it's just a matter of prejudice; it's an

argument she had with my father thirty years ago. 1136
Fuchs agreed with Kennedy to a certain extent.
all but some liberals were anti-Catholic.
tremendously

strong

disposition

to

"They had a

disbelieve

possibility of a Catholic being a free,
liberal President of the United States."

Not

the

independent and
Fuchs defended

Mrs. Roosevelt, however, exonerating her of any inkling of
anti-Catholicism." • • • she had the kind of mind that did
not stereotype people.

She never said anything like 'Well,

Catholics are like that!'"

Although she disagreed with

Spellman

of

and

other

members

the

American

Catholic

hierarchy on matters of church and state, Fuchs contended,
she harbored no "prejorative feelings about Catholics as
such."

In fact, she perceived Kennedy only as a person.

"She did not view Kennedy as a Catholic at all.
saw him as a person.
Catholic. 1137

I mean, she

We never talked about Kennedy as a

What still perturbed Mrs.

Roosevelt about

Kennedy was his inaction during the days of McCarthy, when
American civil liberties were in their greatest danger.
While Kennedy sat back in his hospital bed, the "greatest
menace of the nation" rampaged throughout the country.
36

In

Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History Interview, November
28, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
Collectic\n,, Transcript, pp. 7-16.
37

Ibid.
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spite of his later explanations and censure of McCarthy, she
still doubted Kennedy's courage.

Mrs. Roosevelt was deeply

committed to Adlai Stevenson, whom, according to Fuchs, she
38
considered one of the greatest statesmen of the country.
Kennedy's winning the presidential nomination of the
Democratic party in July 1960 transformed Mrs. Roosevelt
into a reluctant supporter of Kennedy.
can be

traced

in

the

This transformation

Kennedy-Roosevelt

between January 1959-August 1960.

correspondence

The correspondence was

initiated by one of Mrs. Roosevelt's articles critical of
Kennedy, claiming that he would be made president by his
father's unlimited spending.
denied her charge.

For several months, Kennedy

His persistence finally persuaded Mrs.

Roosevelt to admit that the sources for her accusations were
unreliable rumors and to prof fer a retraction that Kennedy
said was not necessary. 39
After

the

Democratic convention,

Mrs.

Roosevelt

agreed to meet Kennedy at Hyde Park in Chicago on August 7.
At the end of this meeting of reconciliation, she announced
38 Lawrence Fuchs, Oral History
Interview, November
28, 1966
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Oral History
Collection), Transcript, pp. 7-16.
39
Kennedy-Roosevelt Correspondence, January 1959August 1960, Letters (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Special Correspondence -- Eleanor
Roosevelt), Box No. 32. As late as May 1960, Mrs. Roosevelt
still had doubts about Kennedy or any Catholic president to
resist the pressures of the church and uphold the separation
of Church and state.
"I'm not sure Kennedy could do this."

91
to the press that she would campaign for Kennedy.

In a

letter to a close acquaintance, she divulged her change of
heart about the candidate.
I also had the distinct feeling that here was a man
who could learn.
I liked him better than I ever had
before because he seemed as little cock-,r&re, and I
think that his mind was open to new ideas.
she did confide to her friend that she still had some
reservations so she was willing to accept only the nominal
position of the Honorary Chairperson of Kennedy's Citizen
Such a position allowed her the

Committee.

luxury of

maintaining a wait and see attitude, becoming more active
and involved in the campaign on the basis of what she coined
"Kennedy's personal progress."
optimism:

She closed with a note of

"I will be surer of this as time goes on, but I

think I am not mistaken in feeling that he would make a good
41
president if elected."
With Stevenson's defeat and with Mrs.
conversion,
alike,

American liberals,

began

to

support

Roosevelt's

Catholic and non-Catholic

Kennedy,

filling

Schlesinger's

emotional and intellectual void in the campaign.

But some

rank and file liberals remained unconvinced because of the
religious issue.
40

Kennedy's Catholicism was too great of a

Eleanor Roosevelt to Mrs. Mary Lasker, Letter,
August 16, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Special Correspondence -- Eleanor Roosevelt), Box
No.

3 2.

41

Ibid.
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handicap to overcome in order to win in November.
simon,

a

Protestant-liberal

and

political

Frank A.

activist

in

California, foreboded as much only one month after Kennedy's
nomination.
I was very enthusiastic about the party's chances
after the convention, but that enthusiasm has faded.
I believe they will beat you with religious prejudice.
About two weeks ago I started a campaign of getting my
friends registered to vote.
To my amazement I found
several of my Democratic friends voting for Nixon
because you are Catholic. It appears we have not come
very far since 1928
I don't see how you can
possibly convert the people by November 8th. There is
a big percentage of Protestants who will vote against
you. I don't see much hop~ 2 in your carrying but a few
more states than Al Smith.
Simon advised Kennedy that no matter how great his efforts
were to neutralize the religious issue, they would all be in
vain.

There simply was not enough time, and Americans were

not ready for a president of his faith.

Simon did present

what he thought to be the only remaining viable alternative
for

Kennedy

to

follow

to

ensure

a

victory

for

the

Democratic party in November.
There is an alternative
resign in favor of Senator
Johnson. I believe Johnson would be a sure winner, in
fact I believe an¥ top Democrat other than a Catholic
would beat Nixon. 3
In spite of these voices of opposition on the
Catholic right and left, the American Catholic church
42

Frank A. Simon to John F. Kennedy, Letter, August
24, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers,
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1010.
43 Ibid.
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celebrated Kennedy's nomination.

It, however, was to be a

premature celebration of bigotry's demise.
foreboding was more accurate.

Frank Simon's

For these days of concord and

victory would soon be forgotten in the trenches of religious
strife.

A Texan poll at the time revealed the change in the

offing.

Whereas in 1959 Kennedy led Nixon by a comfortable

margin of two to one, this poll placed Nixon five percentage
points ahead of Kennedy.

The reason for this turnabout in

the voter's preferences was religion.
of the build up of the

"Today mainly because

religious issue Kennedy would

publicly face defeat in this predominately Protestant but
traditionally Democratic

state.

44

Dale Francis

in his

syndicated column seemed to convey a realistic view of the
situation.

Proclaiming a "Time for Love," he predicted that

the next three months of campaigning would be a time when
"Catholics will be bombarded by religious attacks unequaled
since 1928.

Catholics must be prepared to combat this hate

with its greatest enemy -- love."

45

44 John Belden, "The Texas Poll," June 1960 (John F.
Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential Papers, Senate Files), Box
No. 535; Also consult, James Wine, "Anti-Catholic Material,"
(John F. Kennedy Library:
Pre-Presidential Papers,
Religious Issue Files of James Wine) Box No. 1017, Folders
1-18.
45
Dale Francis, "A Time for Love," Our Sunday
Visitor (National Edition), July 31, 1960, p. 6714. Also
see, Editorial, "Kennedy Nomination," Catholic Week, July
22, 1960, p. 6.
It feared that Kennedy's nomination would
be used as "bait" to mount an anti-Catholic crusade in the
South.

CHAPTER V

KENNEDY AND CATHOLIC AMERICA ON TRIAL:
THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1960
John F.

Kennedy and Catholic America faced their

true religious trial during the 1960 presidential campaign.
Beginning in August, anti-Catholic bigots were resurrected
when they realized that in ninety days a Catholic could be
in the White House.

This group feared the "onward march of

totalitarian Roman Catholicism" and the ominous portent for
America's future:

"It is a safe bet that America will be a

Roman Catholic country in eight years."

1

During this trial,

Kennedy and the Church cooperated and defended themselves
against these charges that portrayed them as un-American.
The rationale behind their defense was to avoid a repeat of
1928 with all of its religious rancor, hatred, and strife.
While Kennedy, the politician, was more reasonable in his
response to such outlandish charges, numerous Catholics were
1 Rabbi

Arthur Gilbert, "Four Approaches to a
Catholic Presidential Candidate," The Catholic Messenger,
September 28, 1960, p. 8.
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incensed and bitter about these attacks and considered such
a trial unnecessary and unjust.

The official position of

the catholic Church and its press was a continued neutrality
to the political

fortunes

of Kennedy and restraint to

scurrilous voices of Catholic antipathy.

Kennedy became the

first Catholic president because both he and his Church
mitigated religious hysteria and persuaded non-Catholics
with honest doubts.
A California Baptist minister observed:

"The moment

the Democrats nominated a Roman Catholic, they transformed
10, 000 Baptist preachers into active politicians. 112

The

anti-Catholic groups on the periphery of the political
spectrum became more active and more conspicuous during the
month of August, so much so, that Bruce Felknor, director of
the Fair Campaign Practices Committee, presaged that the
levels of bigotry in 1960 could possibly surpass those in
1928. 3

James Reston in the New York Times acknowledged that

bigotry was becoming more acute, and Kennedy's campaign
headquarters was inundated with anti-Catholic mailings. 4
211 The

Issue That Just
September 28, 1960, pp. 61-63.

Won't

Die,"

Newsweek,

3 New York Times, August 25, 1960, p. 1.
4

Ibid. : Mrs. Eugene Meyer to John F. Kennedy,
Letter, August 24, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine),
Box No • 10 0 8 •
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John Kennedy, you are not fit for the Presidency of
this great Christian nation. Roman Catholicism is not
Christianity and you know it.
How intelligent people
can be enslaved to such ignorance, superstition, and
paganism is more than I can undersand • • • 5Read the
bible Mr. Kennedy and you'll learn the truth.
one of Kennedy's supporters

in Zanesville,

Ohio

informed Kennedy that a bogus and scurrilous oath of the
Knights of Columbus was being "widely distributed in the
area."

She was upset because, according to the so-called

oath, Catholics throughout the world were helping the pope
exterminate

all

those

of

the

Protestant

faith.

Each

catholic swore "That I will urge a relentless war secretly
or openly against all heretical Protestant, as I am directed
to extirpate them from the face of the earth •

To

accomplish this end, the oath sanctioned all Catholics to
maim, torture, murder, and "rip up the stomachs and wombs of
the women and crush the heads of their infants against the
5

Lillian Burnette to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
September 6, 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Religious Issue Files of James Wine) Box No. 1002.
Also consult John McNamara to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Pre-Presidential
Papers, Religious Issues Files of James Wine), Box No. 1008.
McNamara sent Kennedy numerous clippings from leading
newspapers of Alabama that not only told "lies," but "preyed
on ignorance and bigotry." He was upset about antiCatholicism while at the same time approving of segregation.
"My Brother, Msgr. McNamara of Savannah, Georgia, is an
integrationist.
I do not agree with either you or him on
that question.
I believe in equal rights -- voting and
education -- but certainly not mixing or intermarriage.
6
Mrs. Alice M. Dunn to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1003
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wall in order to annihilate their execrable race."
f_riest in its editorial

7

The

"Foul Play" recalled that in Al

smith's campaign of 1928 bigots in Pittsburg hired a woman
who was pregnant to walk the street garbed in a nun's habit.
Just as denigrating to Catholics in 1960 was the widespread
dissemination of two leaflets throughout the United States,
8
America is a Catholic Country and The Pope for President.
America's editorial, "Ghost That Rides Again," foreboded the
worst:

II

• there are growing signs that a

certain

lunatic fringe among the sects is determined to evoke the
long dead bigotry of the 1920's during the battle for the
presidency. 119
The vice-presidential candidate of the Democratic
party, Lyndon B. Johnson, decried the outburst of religious
intolerance after John Kennedy's nomination.

"The way to

size up a man is to look him in the eyes, and I have looked
in Jack Kennedy's eyes.

No human being in the world is

7Mrs. Alice M. Dunn to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 22, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1003.
Other documents that
discuss the bogus oath and its history: Walter D. Harris to
Robert Kennedy, Letter, August 19, 1960 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015;
J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. Arthur S. Landacre, Letter, August
31, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files),
Box No. 1015.
8 Editorial, "Foul Play," The Priest, September 1960,
PP • 7 4 5 - 7 4 6 •

9 Edi tori al,
"Bigotry
September 3, 1960, p. 586.

Rides

Again,"

America,
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He is going to do what is
going t o dictate his decisions.
. ca. "10
In an attempt to weaken this chorus of
best for Arnerl
bigotry and to lessen its impact, Nixon announced on August
2 2 that, in his campaign for the presidency, religion was
.
11 At the end of August,
not and woul d not b e an issue.
Kennedy

received
In

Galbraith.

politics in the

a

it,

lengthy
he

letter

discussed

from

John

religion's

Kenneth

impact

farm belt areas of the country.

on

After

talking with at least one hundred journalists, farm leaders,
and Democratic farmers, he concluded that "Religion in the
rural corn belt, Great Plains, and down into rural Texas has
become an issue greater than either income or peace. 1112

He

recommended that Kennedy address the agricultural problems
in the national media -- posthaste.

"It will help to crowd

out the religious issue but it must be done quickly before
these

attitudes

harden

as

they

surely

will."

Most

important, Galbraith stressed that Kennedy should focus upon
the study and resolution of the American farmers' hardships
by Congress.

Therefore, his major message should read:

I know some farm people have reservations concerning
my religious faith; I tell you why these reservations
are groundless, I warn you of the danger of being
10

congressional Quarterly Almanac, 86th Congress,
2nd Session, Vol. 16 (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 804-805.
11
12

Ibid.

John Kenneth Galbraith to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1004.
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diverted by this issue into attitudes which will make
1 ~11 of the problems we have not had a chance
to solve.

permanent

These voices of concern and advice were heard by
John Kennedy and his campaign staff -- Robert Kennedy, Ralph
Dungan, Theodore Sorensen, and John Hooker, Jr.

They began

to organize and direct efforts either to eradicate or
neutralize the religious issue in the campaign.

Their first

concerted action was to produce a campaign memorandum that
contained numerous statements made by Kennedy addressing his
14
It covered the entire religious
Catholic faith.
controversy

that

had

developed

since

Kennedy's

Look

interview in 1959 -- separation of Church and state, federal
aid to education, birth control, and the Poling incident.
The memorandum also

cited

favorable

positions

held by

Catholic and non-Catholic leaders and had a section on Al
Smith in which it undermined the myth that religion was the
major cause of his

defeat.

The carefully constructed

document ended with these words of Kennedy:
I don't think that my religion is anyone's business but
my business.
Is any one going to tell me that I lost
this primary day when I was born and baptized forty13

John Kenneth Galbraith to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1004.
1411 senator Kennedy and the Catholic Question,"
Memorandum, August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious
Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
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15
two years ago?!
Besides composing and distributing this memorandum,
Kennedy and his advisors, firmly believing that he would win
"unless

defeated

by

the

religious

issue,

11

decided

to

establish a special committee devoted to neutralizing the
religious

tensions

in

the

.
16
campaign.

The

Community

Relations Committee would be responsible for all intrusions
of

religion

in

politics,

concerning Kennedy's faith,

answering

all

correspondence

compiling a fact book on the

religious question for all staff members; directing mailings
to key Protestant areas as well as Democratic leaders across
the nation, establishing a dialogue with Protestant editors
and

ministers,

and

obtaining

the

active

support

of

Protestant leadership on local, state, and national
levels.

17

James Wine, a lay leader of the National Council

1511 Senator Kennedy and the Catholic Question, 11
Memorandum, August 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious
Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
Also see Robert
Kennedy to Representative Ken Hechler, Letter, August 31,
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue File of James
Wine), Box No. 1015.
Eventually the Democratic National
Committee compiled its own Memorandum on Kennedy and the
Religious Issue: J. Arthur Lazell to Mr. John Baker, Letter,
September 12, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015; The Memorandum,
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015 and "Memorandum on the
Religious Issue," Boston Herald, September 9, 1960, p. 1.
1611 Memorandum on the Religious Issue: Community
Relations Program of Action, 11 August 15, 19 6 O (John F.
Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box
No. 1015.
17
Ibid.
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of churches, was the committee's director.

John Cogley, a

liberal Catholic layman, and Arthur Lazell Jr., a Protestant
18
minister, served as Wine's two assistants.
Wine became
director for two reasons.
faith

should be

no bar

He believed that a candidate's
from public

office

and

that

Protestants needed to reveal their true convictions about
19
religious freedom.
He explained that the title of his
committee -- "Community Relations" -- was inclusive of all
citizens.
We reasoned
issue in the
anything to
terms of all
decided upon
Wine
director:

that we were going to have a religious
mind of the voter, whether or not he had
do with the Church and consequently, in
groups. 20so that was the way we finally
the tag.

succinctly

expressed

his

primary

task

as

"It was to say that the religious issue and all

its ramifications were my responsibility."

21

The major

18

James Wine to Steve Smith, Interoffice Memorandum,
September 14, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015; Charles A. Gauld to
James Wine, Letter, August 26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine) , Box No.
1015; James Wine, Oral History Interview, January 26, 1967
(John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History Collection),
Transcript, pp. 10-14, 22-23, 25-29; John Cogley, Oral
History Interview, February 20, 1968 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Oral History Collection), Transcript, p. 32.
l 9J ames

T.1 '

y~J.ne,

Oral History Interview, Transcript,

pp. 22-23.
20
21

rbid., pp. 28-29.
Ibid.
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thrust of his program was directed at Protestants and not
catholics.

He did not seek to convert anyone but "to ferret

our high areas of prejudice and neutralize anti-Catholicism."
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen advised Wine that to
effect neutralization his staff's response to bigotry must
not display

animosity which might

anti-Catholics.

alienate

reasonable

It should be a well-balanced and logical

argument that would not only neutralize bigotry in the
campaign but persuade reasonable Protestants to vote for
Kennedy in spite of his Catholic faith.
Wine's

22

"Projected Analysis of Simulation on the

Religious Issue," portrayed this neutralization strategy as
the biggest vote getter

for Kennedy.

23

His

simulation

concluded that Kennedy already had experienced the worst
Protestant defections because of his Catholicism.

He could

22

"Memorandum on the Religious Issue: Community
Relations Program of Action," August 15, 1960 (John F.
Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files of James Wine), Box
No. 1015.
John Jay Hooker, Jr., Oral History Interview,
February 2, 1966 (John F. Kennedy Library: Oral History
Collection), Transcript, p. 40.
Mr. Hooker managed the
religious issue before Wine's arrival in Washington, D.C.
He was especially close to Robert Kennedy who appointed him
to the temporary position on the campaign staff in the early
days.
He made the following observation concerning Robert
Kennedy and the religious issue.
"Bob felt very deeply
about this.
This was a matter about which he had enormous
conviction. His brother's religion was not relevant to his
brother's ability to run the nation."
23

James Wine, "Analysis of Simulation on the
Religious Issue," September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
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only gain votes.

"On balance he could not lose further from

forthright and persistent attention to the religious issue
but gain."

Wine thought that Kennedy must not sweep the

"religious issue under the rug."

. I_!1s"t:.~c:!.c:l he

sh.~':1:.~.~-

promote

among certain groups

reasonable non-Catholics, Catholics,

and other minorities

that a vote against him was an act

.. ,--.,,~,,_.,.'.

of religious intolerance.
prejudice.
defections

Such

an

approach

would

maximize

Kennedy's

disapproval of

religious

prejudice.

simulation

results

-~

•"

'

They would resent such overt

and

these

.

to

his

minimize
votes

24

state

further

based

Wine

upon

distributed

coordinators,

recommending the implementation of this strategy with one
restrictive stipulation.
It should be clearly understood that the working
policy with regard to this issue from the onset of the
campaign is and has been to meet the issue only when
raised by others.
On no occasion have we or will we
provoke the issue -- rather to combat an attack, but
more particularly to aizsver questions factually, on
all phases of the issue.
As events unfolded, Wine need not have worried about
his staff raising the religious issue first.

As early as

September, he reported that his office was handling 150
24

James Wine, "Analysis of Simulation on the
Religious Issue," September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
25

James Wine to Co-ordinators,
Interoffice
Memorandum, September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
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letters

per day

and

forty-one

out

of

state

calls.

26

Protestant leaders and ministers accommodated Wine on this
matter as well.
in Washington,
personages,

On September 6, 1960 at the Mayflower Hotel
D.C.

one

representing

hundred
37

and

fifty

different

Protestant

sects,

met

as

"Citizens for Religious Freedom" to dedicate themselves to
the proposition that "Jack Kennedy's Roman Catholicism would
by no means be forgotten as an election issue."

Dr. Norman

Vincent Peale, one of the country's prominent Protestant
leaders, presided over the conference.

The author of The

Power of Positive Thinking and the leader of Manhattan's
Marble Collegiate Church whose following rivaled that of
Billy Graham's declared at the meeting:
culture is at stake.

"Our American

I don't say it won't survive, but it

won't be what it was. 1127

Those present issued a two

thousand word statement that "served to make religion the
most emotional issue of the 1960 election."

The resolution

accepted by the group charged that no Catholic president
could remain impervious to Vatican influence and pressure.
"It is inconceivable that a Roman Catholic President would
26J ames
pp. 25-29.

w·ine,

Oral History Interview, Transcript,

2711 The Campaign:

The Power of Negative Thinking,"
September 19, 1960, pp. 21-22; "That Religious Issue:
Hot and Getting Hotter," Newsweek, September 19, 1960, pp.
37-38.
Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the Christian Herald
was the other important Protestant leader at the conference.

~,
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not be under extreme pressure by the hierarchy of his church
to accede to its policies • •

II

Because of this inseparable

connection, the resolution concluded that a Catholic was not
qualified to be president of the United States. 28
Religious leaders of all persuasions and supporters
of Kennedy were shocked and,
Peal's manifesto.

in some cases,

incensed by

Peale was supposedly one of the most

respectable and reasonable Protestants.

His actions

Washington shattered this image of tolerance.
experienced opposition among his own flock.
Yale

Huffman

faithful

of

Wheatridge,

followers,

found his

Colorado,

one

in

Peale even
Congressman

of

Peale's

recent pronouncement very

"painful" because it was using religion for political gain.
"The statement of 150 preachers was calculated to influence
votes; it was a political statement issuing from religious
figures. 1129

Huffman demanded that Peale publicly admit his

grave error in waving the flag of religious intolerance.

30

28 The Campaign: The Power of Negative Thinking,"
Time, September 19, 1960, pp. 21-22; "That Religious Issue:
Hot and Getting Hotter," Newsweek, September 19, 1960, pp.
37-38.
Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the Christian Herald
was the other important Protestant leader at the conference.
Some Protestants saw a position on Catholicism as the same
as a soft position on Communism.
Dr. Harold J. Ockenga of
Boston's Park Street Church compared Kennedy to Khrushchev,
saying that each "is a captive of a system."
29 Yale Huffman to Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, Letter,
September 9, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1012.
30 Ibid.
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Leading liberal Protestants condemned Peale's actions.

Dr.

Reinhold Neiburhr stated, "Dr. Peale and his associates
31
• show blind prejudice."
John C. Bennet, Dean of the
Faculty at the Union Theological Seminary, contended that
the Washington meeting symbolized "a Protestant Underworld
that

stirs

undisguised

hatred

of Catholics. 1132

Rabbi

Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American
Hebrew Congregations,

expressed

profound

"distress"

by

Peale's attempt to transform the presidential campaign into
a

"Religious

Holy

War"

and

"to

provide

a

cloak

of

respectability to the forces of bigotry in this country. 1133
On September 11 Richard Nixon, while on "Meet the Press,"
was asked about Peale's recent statement.

He rejoined that

it betrayed the democratic process because it sought to
determine the election on religious grounds.

He absolved

his campaign of any guilt of raising the religious issue.
"As far as I am concerned, I have issued orders to all of
3111 Bennet and Niebuhr Repudiate Religious Attack on
Kennedy's Candidacy," Press Release of Liberal Party of New
York State, September 9, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1018.
32

Ibid., In Time, September 19, 1960, p. 22. James
A. Pike, Protestant~iscopal Bishop of California,
denounced Peale: "Any argument which would rule out a Roman
Catholic just because he is a Roman Catholic is both bigotry
and a violation of the constitutional guarantee of no
religious test for public office."
3311 statement by Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath,"
President of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations,
September 13, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1019.
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the people in my campaign not to discuss religion and not to
.
raise
i' t •

I wi. 11 d ec l'ine t o d.iscuss re l'igion.
'
" 34

With such an overwhelming negative response, Peale
found it necessary to explain his actions.

He renounced all

association with the Washington statement and sent the
"Citizens for Religious Freedom" the following telegram:
"Please do not

include me

activities in your group.
participate anyway. 1135

further meeting or

It will not be possible for me to

Peale insisted that "I was not duped

• I was just stupid.
the woods."

in any

I went innocently like a babe in

He denied press reports that the meeting in

Washington, D.C. was the "Peale Group," and maintained that
he was invited to attend "A Study Conference for the purpose
of

examining

the

whole

philosophical

relationship of freedom to religion. 1136

question

of

the

He contended that

he had nothing to do with the organizing efforts, presided
only over the morning session,
released statement.

and did not prepare the

He did admit that he had failed to

foresee the statement's impact on the political campaign.
34 Richard M. Nixon, "Meet the Press," September 11,
1960, The Speeches of Vice President Nixon: Presidential
Campaign of 1960, (United States Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C.), pp. 12-14.
35

or. Norman Vincent Peale to Charles B. Feeney,
Letter, September 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1009.
3611 Pastors and Politics," Newsweek,
1960, p. 42.

September 26,
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"I sincerely did not mean it to be so, but perhaps I will be
at least, let us hope so. 1137

a wiser person in the future

Completely "distraught" by the entire fiasco,

especially

"the injection of myself into political publicity which is
actually contrary to my own nature •
his

II

Peale tendered

resignation to his Church elders who rejected it.

Although dismayed and contrite, Peale maintained that he did
nothing wrong.
the

meeting,

"I do not feel that I was wrong in attending
but

it may

have

been

unwise

under

the

circumstances. 1138
While on the campaign trail in California, Kennedy
responded on the day that Peale statement was released.
I do not accept the view that my Church would place
pressures on me. The great struggle today is between
thos3 who believe in no God and those who believe in
9
God.
Wine and his committee on Community Relations initially
considered the "Peale Affair" a very serious threat and
devised a plan of counterattack.

40

Wine decided that the

counterattack should be based upon constitutional,
nonpartisan,

nonsectarian,

and moral

grounds.

Leaflets

37 nr. Norman Vincent Peale to Fellow Church Members,
Letter, September 15, 1960, (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1002.
38

Ibid.

39T.
22.
~, September 19, 1960, p.
40

pp. 35-40.

James Wine,

Oral History Interview, Transcript,
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should be printed and distributed that contained quotes of
important lay and clerical Protestant leaders who denounced
the Peale manifesto.

He also proposed a

among minorities, especially Blacks.

special effort

To acquire the support

of Blacks, he recommended assistance from Black ministers:
Negro parishioners traditionally look to their pastors
for guidance in all areas of living.
This influence
should not be underestimated as these ministTis are
the key to political attitudes of their flocks.
Wine's

plan

of

counterattack was

rendered

ineffectual

because, as already seen, the Peale episode backfired and
was scorned as an intolerant attack upon America's precept
of religious freedom.

Wine determined that " • • . through

bad judgment and naivete on their own parts they pretty well
punctured the balloon without us having to do anything.
a

consequence,

we

took

no

counteraction.

Once

As

Peale

disassociated himself from the statement, it faltered and
fell apart. 1142
As

September progressed,

Newsweek

voting

polls

revealed, "One key to the election, about all agree, is the
religious issue. 1143

Throughout the election, reporters

41

James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript,
pp. 35-40.
Ruth w. Kingman to Ken O'Donnell, Memorandum,
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issues
Files of James Wine) , Box No. 1015.
42 James Wine, Oral History Interview,
pp. 35-37.
430 will

Transcript,

Voters Vote Their Faith?" Newsweek,
September 26, 1960, pp. 42-45. Article provides findings of
its fifty state listening poll of Peale's impact on voters.
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discovered,

"The issue of Kennedy's Catholicism is being

talked about in practically all states, and in some almost
44
to the exclusion of every other political topic."
It
appeared,

in spite of Peale's resounding backfire,

the

incident did catapult the religions issue into permanent
national
campaign.

prominence

throughout

According to Wine,

the
Peale,

remainder

of

the

if nothing else,

revived the more reasonable charges against a Catholic
president, which proved to be the most difficult to answer.
Protestants still were disturbed by Kennedy's Look interview
and its compartmentalization of his religion and public
life.

Wine realized Protestants could simply not believe or

accept this dichotomy of faith and politics.

"Protestants

believe I am a Christian and it affected my daily life, so
it doesn't make sense that the monolithic and authoritarian
posture of the Catholic Church will not affect him. "

45

Another persistent accusation emboldened at the time among
non-Catholics concerned Catholic political power.
It was the idea that there would be control by the
American political Catholic group, that the cabinet
would be full of Catholics, that the Supreme Court
would be full of Catholics, that the Catholic Church
44 "Will Voters Vote Their Faith?" Newsweek,
September 26, 1960, pp. 42-45.
Yet report did leave room
"Clearly, not all
for speculation on its conclusion.
Catholics are for Kennedy, and not all Protestants are
against Kennedy."
45 James Wine,
pp. 51-53.

Oral History Interview,

Transcript,

111

in this country would become a political entity -- not
necessarily a political entity that was controlled by
the Vatican, but a political ewty that would have a
political head in this country.
Taking
strength

and

electoral

into account
numbers

areas,

Wine

and
and

the growth of Catholics

Catholic
others

dominance
perceived

in

in

key,

Protestant

trepidation of the emergence of a large Catholic interest
group in American politics as legitimate and difficult to
reason

away.

47

In

order

emboldened reservations,

to

dispel

these

revised

or

Kennedy realized that he had to

confront the religious issue in a speech that would receive
national attention.

48

While in the eye of Peale's religious

storm, Kennedy accepted an invitation to address the Greater
Houston Ministerial Alliance Conference on September 12.
46

John Jay Hooker,
Transcript, p. 40.

Jr. ,

Oral History

49

Interview,

47

Ibid., After reading a batch of Kennedy's
religious mail, John Cogley concluded that in addressing
these rational objections to his faith, Kennedy should
approach it as a constitutional issue and avoid all
theological questions.
John Cogley, Five Page Memorandum,
September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1018.
48

The Democratic National Committee, headed by
Senator Henry Jackson, also worried about Republican use of
the religious issue to their advantage.
Senator Jackson was
concerned about Nixon's indifference and inaction to his
party's manipulation of anti-Catholicism.
"Nixon must take
positive action and demand that it be stopped right now."
Senator Henry Jackson, Statement of the Democratic National
Cornroi ttee, September 16, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Theodore Sorensen Papers), Box No. 15.
49

pp. 60-66.

James Wine,

Oral History Interview,

Transcript,
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Prior to Peale's manifesto,
leader of the Houston ministers,
participate in the conference.

Dr.

Herbert Meza,

a

had invited Kennedy to

Kennedy, Wine, and others

could not agree on whether or not to accept the invitation.
some considered it "an unwise confrontation in the "Bible
belt"
Even

to an audience of conservative
Wine,

who

favored

acceptance,

fundamentalists. 50
had

very

serious

apprehensions about the conference.
It was set up for somebody who really wanted to make a
mockery of it. If somebody had tried to torpedo it by
bringing up a number of Ministers who would simply be
crying to ask all kinds of questions that would be
irrelevant, but any treatment of which could militate
against you no matter how you look at it lik~ 1 When
did you stop beating your wife?' kind of thing.
1

Despite these apprehensions, all resigned themselves
to Kennedy's participation if he were to win or lose the
upcoming election on a
affiliation.

basis other than his

Wine realized the importance of the speech in

his campaign to persuade reasonable critics.
doubt in my mind it would make or break us.
strongly about it and said so. 1152
50

religious

James Wine,

"There was no
I felt that

Kennedy's Houston speech

Oral History Interview, Transcript,

pp. 60-66.
51

Ibid., This anxiety over the meeting was
exemplified by Wine's careful attention to the details of
the format Kennedy and others would follow at the meeting.
James Wine to John Seigathaler, Letter, September 4, 1960
(John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James
Wine), Box No. 1015.
52

pp. 60-66.

James Wine, Oral History Interview, Transcript,
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was researched by Cogley and Wine, composed by Sorensen;-and
edited with the help of John Courtney Murray.
plane to Houston,

While on the

Cogley drilled Kennedy with possible

questions the ministers might ask.

Cogley recalled that

during the flight both seemed anxious about winning his
Protestant audience at the expense of alienating Catholics.
"He did not want Catholics to think he sold out the Church,
so he had to walk a tightrope."

53

In Houston, Kennedy prefaced his speech by noting
that

"world communism and poverty" were more important

concerns than the so-called religious issue.

"These are the

real issues which should decide this campaign.

And they

are not religious issues -- for war and hunger and ignorance
and despair know no religious barrier."

But because he was

a Catholic and because the real issues were being eschewed,
he thought it was necessary for him to once again state "not
what kind of Church I

believe in,

for

that should be

important only to me -- bu.t 'lf!hat kind of America I believe
in."

54

He proclaimed his belief in an America in which

53 John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript,
pp. 11, 45-46.
Cogley called September the "famous" month
of the religious issue.
During the brainstorming session,
Kennedy wrote out his answers on paper because his throat
was hoarse.
54

complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960.
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy:
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University,
June 1964}, p. 314.
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separation of state and church was absolute,

religious

intolerance was eradicated,

ideal of

and

the American

brotherhood prevailed.
This is the kind of America
is the kind I fought for in
kind my brother died for in
that we might have divided
believe in liberty, or that
group that thre~5ened the
forefathers died.

I believe in -- and this
the South Pacific and the
Europe. No one suggested
loyalty, that we did not
we belonged to a disloyal
freedom for which our

Kennedy then declared, "I am not the Catholic candidate for
I

president.

am the Democratic Party's candidate

President who happens to be Catholic.

for

I do not speak for

the Church on public matters -- and the Church does not
speak for me."

He reassured his audience that he would make

all of his presidential decisions based solely on the
nation's interests.

No ecclesiastical pressure, power, or

threat of punishment could compel him to do otherwise.
if his

official

conscience

duties

or vice

and

versa,

obligations

which

he

violated

believed

But,

his

remotely

then I would resign my office." 56

possible at best, ".

The question and answer period was dominated by the
familiar accusations that had hounded Kennedy since his Look
interview

in

1959:

federal

55

aid

to

education,

the

Complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960.
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy:
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University,
June 1964), p. 316.
56

Ibid., p. 317.
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appointment of an ambassador to Rome, the Poling incident,
57
and his commitment to separation of church and state.
One
comment raised the ire of Kennedy.

It was the suggestion

that he compile a statement of his views on church and state
and submit it to the Pope for his authorization.
responded

that

approbation,

as

he

would

refuse

to

ask

he would

refuse

to

submit to Vatican

authority as president.

for

Kennedy

Vatican

When the questioner persisted after

his answer, Kennedy curtly responded:
I don't have to have the approval in that sense.
I
have not submitted my statement before I read it to
the Vatican.
I did not submit it to Cardinal Cushing
. it seems to me that I am the one that is running
for office of the P1Ss5idency and not Cardinal Cushing
and not anyone else.
He ended his verbal foray by assuring those present that he
did not think that the questions asked were unfair or
unreasonable or were motivated by prejudice or bigotry.

He

colored his closing remarks with a slight twist of humor.
I want you to know that I am grateful to you for
inviting me tonight.
I am sure I have made no
converts to my church./laughter/But I do hope that at
least my view, which I believe to be the view of my
fellow Catholics . • • may be of some value # at
least assisting you to make a careful judgement.
57
complete text of John F. Kennedy's speech to the
Greater Houston Ministerial Association, September 12, 1960.
William David Smith, "Alfred E. Smith and John F. Kennedy:
The Religious Issue during the Presidential Campaigns of
1928 and 1960," (Dissertation, Souther Illinois University,
June 1964), p. 317-328.
58
Ibid. I p. 3 2 2.
59
Ibid., p. 328.
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Kennedy's Houston speeclJ. proved to be the major
turning point in the campaign.

Cogley, looking back in

hindsight, realized its significance.

"But I felt if he got

the nomination he wouldn't be defeated on this score only
(religion).

I think I was wrong now because I believe if it

had not been for the Houston thing he couldn't have been
elected." 60

Kennedy's forensic masterpiece did not bury the

religious issue but it did manage to remove the honest
doubts of most reasonable non-Catholics.

Hooker observed,

"Those people who were sincere became convinced by the
statement in Houston.

I think he got 95% of the people who

were reasonable on the subject whose doubts were genuine.
think he overwhelmingly sold himself on that question."

I

61

Sorensen parroted Hooker's assessment.
It made unnecessary any further full-scale answer from
the candidate, and Kennedy, while continuing to answer
questions, never raised the subject again. It offered
in one document all the answers to all the questions
any reasonable man could ask.
It helped divide the
citizens legitimately concerned about Kennedy's vi5~s
from the fanatics who had condemned him from birth.
The Houston speech not withstanding, the
unreasonable attacks continued.

Wine received one letter

60 John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript,
pp. 48-49.
61
John Jay Hooker, Jr., Oral History Interview,
Transcript, pp. 48-49.
62
The Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam
Books, 1965), p. 218.
For examples of reasonable
Protestants persuaded by Kennedy's speech in Houston see:
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from a Protestant who perceived one way Kennedy could win in
November.

"If you will leave the Catholic Church, you will

get the votes that will make you our president. 1163
out the remainder of the campaign,

American households

received countless anti-Catholic mailings,
leaflets, and pamphlets.

Through-

chain letters,

Abolish the Nunneries and Save the

Girl, Kennedy Supports Pope Order of Segregation by Creed,
and To Kill Protestants were a few examples of the
anti-Catholic

tracts

in

circulation

at

the

time.

64

Robert w. Evans to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September 16,
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1003 and Mrs. Robert Alexander to John
F. Kennedy, Letter, September 19, 1960 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Religious Issue Files of James Wine), Box No. 1002.
Henceforth, Kennedy's campaign packet on the religious issue
contained a copy of his Houston speech.
A film of his
performance in Houston was also widely distributed
throughout the country during the campaign.
"Memorandum on
Religion Packet," Research Di vision of the Democratic
National Committee, September 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Democratic National Committee Press Releases 1958-1960), Box
No. 1034. Assisting Kennedy's attack on the religious issue
was the first of four televised debates against Nixon on
September 26th in Chicago.
"Some 70 million adults, nearly
two-thirds of the nation 1 s adult population watched or
listened to the first debate." Americans observed Kennedy
at his forensic best, and the result was "Protestants no
longer thought of Kennedy only as a Catholic." Sorensen,
Kennedy, pp. 222-229.
63 Mrs. Hallies Blake to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
September 21, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files), Box No. 1002.
For another example of bigoted
reaction to Kennedy's speech see c. Ralph Youngblood to John
F. Kennedy, Letter, October 7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1012. Youngblood
concluded 11 I must confess the more you talk the more
confused you make your stand of your position of your
religion in politics."
64 Patricia Barret, Religious Liberty and the
American Presidency, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963),
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Felknor's Fair Campaign Practices Committee in 1962 analyzed
l,383 reports of unfair anti-Catholic campaign literature.
Felkner estimated that 20 to 25 million pieces of such
literature were distributed, and he discerned four different
types of anti-Catholicism in the materials:
dishonest, 35% unfair, and 35% responsible."

"5% vile, 25%
65

Despite this plethora of anti-Catholic materials,
the religious issue only twice threatened in October to
reach the heights during the days of the Peale controversy.
Three prelates of Puerto Rico,

Archbishop James Davis,

Bishop John McManus, and Bishop Luis Martinez, enjoined all
church members not to vote for Governor Marin's Popular
Democratic Party which supported government sponsored birth
control programs.

Catholics who disobeyed this injunction

. t e d • 66
wou ld b e excommunica

It did not take long for

American non-Catholics to portend a similar incident of the
pp. 28-29.
This work summarized the report of Bruce L.
Felknor's Fair Campaign Practices Committee.
Its appendix
contains a complete list of anti-Catholic material by the
committee, pp. 60-125.
65 Ibid.,

Also see Bruce Felkner to Theodore
Sorensen, Letter, September 2 2, 19 61 (John F. Kennedy
Library: Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1015. He enclosed
in this correspondence to Sorensen a fourteen page list of
anti-Catholic literature which contained approximately 350
different titles.
Numerous examples of this bigoted press
are also contained in The Uncatalogued John F. Kennedy
Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of
Notre Dame.
66

"sticky Issue," Newsweek, October 31, 1960, p. 21.
"The Biggest Issue," Newsweek, November 7, 1960, p. 20.
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church controlling the state when Kennedy became president.
According to Cogley,

11

it started up the whole controversy

again," simply because the bishops' actions in Puerto Rico
acted as a confirmation of earlier Protestant fears.

67

Wine initially thought the issue "a tough one."
issued orders
Osservatore

to

treat

the

Romano article.

incident as

they did

He

the

Wine contended that Puerto

Rico's predicament was not applicable to the religious issue
in the current presidential campaign," that it was strictly
a

local

situation

.
'l y. 1168
pr1mar1

and

that

it

involved

the

Church

It was a flagrant distortion of reality to

compare it to Kennedy or the American Catholic Church.
Marin's Democratic party and Puerto Rico's Catholic Church
were completely separate of both mainland institutions.
Wine thought it was necessary to reiterate Kennedy's longstanding position on such matters.
stated on many occasions

that

he

"Senator Kennedy has
considers

it wholly

improper and alien to our Democratic system for Churchmen of
any faith to tell the members of their church for whom to
vote or for whom not to vote. 1169

In the end, only a few

67 cogley, Oral History Interview, p. 14.
68w.ine,

Oral

History

Interview,

Transcript,

pp.

55-57.
69 Ibid., Kennedy's Campaign Form Letter in Response
to Inquiries about Puerto Rico, November 1960 (John F.
Kennedy Library: Religious Issues Files), Box No. 1015.
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.Americans seemed concerned about the Puerto Rico incident.
To everybody's surprise, it didn't blow up nearly as
big as everybody thought it was going to.
I remember
around the center the day the Bishops' statement came
out that everybody thought this was the end of the
line.
And I must say that I felt somewhat that way,
too .
. The best thing to do was nothing because
Kennedy was in the spot of having been embarrassed by
these bishops and he didn't want to escalate he whole
thing. And it seemed to work out all right.

70

A week before Reformation Sunday, 40 fundamentalist
sects of the National Association of Evangelicals, horrified
by the prospect of a

Catholic president,

transform October 30 into a

attempted to

day of national protest. 71

Charles Kuralt reported from Illinois during this week of
preparation and discovered the religious issue alive and
well in the Midwest.

"We did not come to Illinois to report

on the religious issue.

We came here to report on the trend

of the campaign and found religion a major factor in it. 1172
At the end of his sojourn through the state, he concluded
that Protestants would primarily vote against Kennedy and
Catholics would vote for him. 73
polarization,

In contrast to Illinois'

Reformation Sunday turned out to be more

70 John Cogley, Oral History Interview, Transcript,
p. 15.

7111 sticky Issue," Newsweek, October 31, 1960, p. 21.
72

charles Kuralt, "The Contest for a Key State," CBS
Television, October 28, 1960, The Speeches of Senator John
F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960 (United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961), pp.
309-316.
73 Ibid.
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rhetoric than actual fact.

Wine could recall only two minor

incidents in New Jersey and Washington,

o.c.

"I think it

would have been very hurtful had it been widespread.
the time and the setting it would have caused a
people to have second thoughts,

I

think. 1174

Given

lot of

The protest

failed; only the lunatic fringe rallied around this banner
of religious bigotry.

As in the case of Puerto Rico, Wine

and his staff were pleased and relieved.
While Protestants failed to

fill

the streets on

Reformation Sunday, :Kennedy appeared on "Face the Nation."
Of course the major topic of discussion was religion.

He

was asked if he would give another public exposition on his
religious convictions before the election.
a proposal.

He rejected such

"No, I don't think that there is any reason • •

• after all my statements and after my record has been
carefully scanned for fourteen years

:Kennedy did

not conceal his irritation with uproar over his Catholicism.
If 90% of the population were Catholics, I would still
be opposed to it (Union of Church and State). Why is
it -- we 35 million Catholics -- what is it in their
record that makes anyone think that they are not as
devote9 to this ideas of separation of Church and
State? 6
74 James Wine,
pp. 40-41.

Oral History Interview,

75 John

Transcript,

F. :Kennedy, "Face the Nation," CBS
Television, October 30, 1960.
Speeches of Senator John F.
_K_e_n_n_e_d_..y~:_P_r_e_s_i_d_e_n_t_i_a_l_C_a_m_.p.._a_i...,g_n_o_f_1_9_6_0 , pp. 3 2 3-3 3 8.
76 Ibid., p. 336.
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During the last week before the election, "The hate
literature continued to pour forth."
headquarters

received

correspondence.

numerous

0. W.

77

Kennedy 1 s campaign

pieces

of

bigoted

Reece of Oklahoma, an Evangelical

minister, wrote him a vicious letter, telling Kennedy that
.Americans were nauseous over his attempt to buy the election
"with the tainted millions of booze money which you got from
your now thoroughly discredited father. 1178
be deceived by his comments.

Reece would not

The plain and simple fact was

that the Pope and his fellow Catholics wanted to control
79
.America.
Bob McGee's special television report, "The
Campaign and the Candidates," reported that the delegates at
the Texas Southern Baptist Convention resolved:
this

(religion)

"We believe

is one of the legitimate factors in the

formation of a decision to cast a ballot. 1180
before the election,

On the day

Kennedy appeared on New Hampshire

7711 The Biggest Issue," Newsweek, November 7, 1960,
p. 20.
Bishop Pike admitted that the ugliness of the
bigotry has made him "more defensive of Mr. Kennedy's
position."
78

0.w. Reece to John F. Kennedy, Letter, November 1,
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1009.
79 Ibid.
80
Robert McGee, "The Campaign and the Candidates,"
NBC Television, Joint Appearance of Vice-President Nixon and
Senator John F. Kennedy: The Presidential Campaign of 1960,
(United States Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.:
1961) I PP• 362-370
o
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He entertained several questions

television·

from his

audience and callers.

Inevitably his religion was the major

thrust of one query.

"If elected, will your actions as

president be influenced by your Church?"

Kennedy revealed

his relief that his trial was at and end.

"Well, I suppose

this is perhaps the last time that question will come up • •
• I am glad to have the opportunity to answer that one for
81
the last time."
After

Kennedy's

nomination,

Catholics

were

completely taken aback by the resurfacing of scurrilous
prejudice.

Andrew Greeley, steeped in dialogue, pluralism,

and understanding, admitted his shock when he wrote, "that
the

upsurge

unexpected."
quickly

82

in

irrationalism

seemed

completely

In a short time this shock among Catholics

transformed into anger and bitterness.

Edward

Taylor's animosity emanated from his letter to Kennedy.

"We

are having the screws put to us by bigoted men who would be
known

as

religious

leaders

techniques to fail them."
speech at

were

their

reprehensible

He thought Kennedy's acceptance

the Democratic Convention was

excellent and

recommended that he provide the country's bigots with "the

81 Television Program, "John F. Kennedy Interview,"
Manchester, New Hampshire, November 7, 1960, Speeches of
John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960, p. 944.
82

Andrew Greeley, "The Yardstick,"
Register, September 18, 1960, pp. 4, 9.

The

Alamo
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same kind of hell again. 1183

He commanded Kennedy to "Give

them Hell, and speak loudly.
everything.

Too

logical.

You're being too nice about
The

people

don• t

want cool

squared logic on an emotional issue. 1184
John Ziegler and his entire family of seven had
taken a vacation in the South.

They were very upset with

finding a strong presence of anti-Catholicism there.

"

we were shocked beyond words at the vicious anti-Catholic
bigotry campaign that is sweeping the country.

As converts

and proud of our new religion, we demand Senator that you
make a nationwide talk.

The sooner you give this talk, the

quicker we can get at these bigots. 1185
Birmingham,

Alabama

in

its

editorial,

The Catholic Week of
"U.S.

Catholics

Libeled," expressed similar sentiments of bellicosity.

It

recommended that all Catholics unite and close ranks behind
their bishops in defense of their Church.

Once united,

Catholics must be unrelenting in their attack against
prejudice.
We must make these people realize that lying does not
pay, that the world has moved on since their hate
campaign of 1928, and that they cannot treat Catholics
with the same impunity in the world of today. We must
83

Edward F. Taylor to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
August 25, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1000.
84 Ibid.
85 John Ziegler to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September
2, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1012.
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drag them into the light and expose them to the world
as the real conspirators against this nation. We must
call the bluff of these conspiratorg; we must unmask
and uncloak them in their anonymity. 6
A Catholic attack,

based upon righteousness and

resentment, became prevalent.

John R. Rush in his letter to

the editor of The Tablet insisted that Catholics coalesce
into one voting bloc in opposition to prejudice.
opposed

to

such

a

concerted

attack

were,

at

Catholics
best,

"unrealistic" and, at worst, "betrayers of their own kind."
Instead of trying to eliminate bias on the part of our
separated brethren, we should try and eliminate bias
of Catholics against a Catholic for president.
The
Catholics who are against Kennedy are the same ones
who often say, 'look what they did to Al Smith.' What
do they mean by that? If Senator Kennedy is defeated
we can't say for years to come 'look what they did to
Jack KerwTdy. '
It will be look what we did to ,Jack
Kennedy.
Another letter expressed disgust with Kennedy's obsequious
stand in the face of such attacks.

"I see no reason why the

Catholic community should feel any particular pride in his
nomination.

Senator Kennedy has

tried

to disassociate

himself from that community to the point of near apology for
his religious affiliation in his acceptance speech."

88

Conservative

that

86

~'

journalist,

L.

Brent

Bozell

Editorial, "U.S. Catholics
September 16, 1960, p.
87

implied

Libeled,"

Catholic

Letter to the Edi tor, John Rush, The Tablet,
August 6 , 19 6 0, p. 7.
88
"The Reader's Forum," The National Review, August
20, 1960, p. 7.
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Kennedy was overall to blame for the religious issue.
Finally,
the
Democratic
candidate
could produce
salutary consequences for all concerned by spending
less time disassociating himself from his Church, and
more of it explaiwng those teachings and practices
that give concern.
Peale's manifesto intensified feelings of resentment
and anger among Catholics.

In his letter to Kennedy,

O'Mara's displeasure was self-evident.

c.

W.

"I as a Catholic am

a little tired and disgusted when you as my representative
first as president and second as a fellow Catholic and third
as a

fellow American are pointed to as a

Bitterness

flowed

from

O'Mara' s

traitor. n 90

pen in his concluding

remarks.
I went through the 1928 campaign. Filthy and dirty it
was, this time we Catholics deserve better.
We are
not traitors, second-class citizens to be distrusted.
We are not slyly waiting to turn our country over to
the Pope.
We are single-minded and intelligent.
We
love our country and you are big enough to lead it.
You as representative of the American Catholics are
pointed to as the Arch-traitor. You are condemned to
the role of subservient serf of the country to the
Pope w~ is waiting to take over America
• How
Stupid!
Peale even stirred the pen of William Buckley in the
pages of his National Review.

In his editorial "A Little

89 "The Catholic Issue," L. Brent Bozell,
National Review, September 24, 1960, p. 171.

The

90 c.w. O'Mara to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September
7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1008.
91 Ibid.
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Positive Thought for Norman Peale, " Buckley explained that
his magazine

found

Kennedy

an

undesirable

presidential

candidate because of his accommodation of Communism and his
advocacy of a welfare state.
to

Kennedy,

Buckley

could

But in spite of his opposition
not

agree

apprehension of Kennedy's religion.

with

"Mr.

Peale's

Kennedy is a

disappointment and a serious threat, but not, as Dr. Norman
Peale so recklessly suggests,

because he is Catholic."

92

Buckley assured Peale that Vatican control over Kennedy was
an impossibility.

The Church's authority was infallible on

matters of morality and doctrine but "where moral and civil
law conflict, the Church will distinguish the authority of
Ceasar.

11

Peale's pope hunting as interpreted by Buckley

implied that all Americans desired a

president who was

beyond the influence of religious morality, who was "the
self-sufficient Autonomous man, and who would make all of
his own rules."

Buckley feared such a president.

us from such an event.

"God save

Most of us are guided prescriptively

by tradition, by habits of mind,

and conscience,

and

morals. 1193
Catholic Republican, George Dickenson, was upset
with the political consequences of Peale's actions.
92

In a

william Buckley, "A Little Positive Thought for
Norman Vincent Peale," The National Review, September 24,
1960, pp. 168-169.
93

rbid.
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letter

to

Peale,

he

sarcastically

suggested

that

the

Democratic party should send him a note of thanks for his
He

generous assistance.

saw the need

for

such action

because Peale's manifesto turned many Catholic Republicans
into Democrats.
Republicans
Kennedy."

of

94

"Your brand of bigotry will influence many
Catholic

faith

to

vote

for

Senator

Dickenson canvassed Catholic Republicans in his

district and found that a majority of them had decided to
vote against Nixon.

Dickenson reminded Peale that Catholics

never felt a special rapport with Kennedy, a man who was
never

really

close

to

the

Catholic

Church.

But

his

statement has changed all this.
I am sure that the majority of Americans of all faiths
will now place you along side of the southern jack-leg
preacher, who is educated, ignorant, intolerant, and
stupid. You now have joined what has 9gme to be known
in this country as the Lunatic Fringe.
Anti-Catholicism generated by Kennedy's nomination
and Peale's statement in some instances provoked a more
optimistic response among Catholics.

A Few Catholics viewed

this resurgence of bigotry as a time ripe with opportunity.
As

far as

the editor of the San Francisco Monitor was

concerned, Catholics who found Kennedy's candidacy
uncomfortable,
94

who

decried

"Jack,

Go

Home! , "

and

who

George W. Dickenson to Norman Vincent Peale,
Letter, September 12, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library:
Religious Issue Files), Box No. 1012.
95

Ibid.
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disliked being on the "Hot Spot" because of their faith,
wanted to return to the days of the ghetto "when no one even
96
cared about their religion or way of life."
These "Dog in
the Manager Catholics were spineless and
public witness to their faith.

feared giving

But now we are on trial.

He

has brought the searchlight into our corner.

He has shown
97
that a faith is not only to be lived but defended."
The
editor

thought

that

Kennedy's

nomination

had

provided

Catholics with an audience, both concerned and inquisitive
about their religious beliefs.
in explaining their faith,
analogy,

If Catholics were successful

the editor, using a

football

concluded that Catholics will never again be

"second-class guards, good enough to hang around the locker
room but never classy enough to make the starting line
up. 1198

The Catholic Transcript suggested that "Some good

may come of this gross evil. 11

The bigotry is out in the

open

scurrility,

to

be

adjudged

hyperbole, and hate.

for

its

injustice,

Commonweal noted that the Peale fiasco

was not only the "highpoint of religious bigotry in this
campaign but the turning point."

The turning point

represented the identification and criticism of unreasonable
9611 Jack, Go Home!," San Francisco Monitor, September

23, 1960, p. 24.
97 Ibid.
98

Ibid.
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sources of prejudice by both Catholics and non-Catholics.
Archbishop Connally of Portland, Oregon, although shocked
and

outraged

by

the

anti-Catholicism

of

fair-minded

protestants comprising Peale's group, was optimistic that
such

pronouncements would extinguish the fires of
10
prejudice.
Connally believed that irrational anti-

°

Catholicism would lead to the paradoxical result of Catholic
converts who despised such religious intolerance.

"This

verification will drive thousands of non-Catholic friends
and neighbors into the Church and we must be prepared to
meet them

11101

Such propitious forecasts of anti-Catholicism were
believed only by a Catholic minority.

Most Catholics were

indignant and harbored intense feelings of animosity toward
their non-Catholic accusers.

Church leaders and Catholic

editors realized that the religious issue was not buried by
Kennedy's nomination.
ghost of Al Smith,
strategy

of

Fearing religious strife and the

they upheld their primary campaign

political

responsibility.
and restraint.

neutrality

and

Catholic

They called on fellow Catholics for calm
America's editorial staff announced it was

9911 catholicism and the
September 23, 1960, pp. 507-508.

Campaign,"

Commonweal,

lOO"Archbishop Connally Deplores Current Attack on
Church," Northwest Progress, September 30, 1960, pp. 1-2.
lOlibid.
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"No time for anger."

They advised Catholics to remain calm,

even though they were convinced that the country

"was

apparently right back where we were thirty years ago." 102
What especially disturbed these editors was not the bigots
of

the

lunatic

fringe

but

the

"rational

bigoted

pseudo-urbanites such as Norman Peale and Dr. Poling."

They

were dismayed that men of such stature could ally themselves
with "the theologically bankrupt Protestant underworld of
bigotry."

Such false accusations deserved no answer.

To do

so would give them validity and distract from the real
issues of the campaign.
The saddest thing about Dr. Peale's excursion into
national politics on this level is that he is bound to
divert needed energies and precious time into totally
unprofitable channels of ignorant, enervating, and
bigoted controversy.
The problems to which he calls
attention are pseudo-problems.
Yet their unfortunate
capacity for distracting and misleading even the
intelligent citizen is so great that they tend to
driv7 the re~l Pf8~lems off the limited horizons of
public attention.
Monsignor George Kelley in the pages of America
beseeched Catholics that it was "A Time for Keeping on
Shirts."

He predicted that the religious conflagration

would perhaps become worse than 1928, and advised fellow
Catholics not to react to these despicable charges against
American Catholicism.
102

"Do not answer such idiocy nor react

Editorial, "No Time for Anger," America,
September 24, 1960, pp. 689-690.
The entire issue was
devoted to anti-Catholicism in the presidential campaign.
lOJibid.
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with typical resentment or anger, or your own bigotry.
I
will only dignify the charges of bigots." 104 At the very
least,

Kelly recommended

Coolidge

Campaign

reasonable

and

that Catholics

slogan,

proper

"Keep

Cool,"

perspective

on

adhere

to the

maintaining
this

a

current

anti-Catholic hysteria.
Plenty of fertilizer will be used to propagate bigotry
this fall. Let us use the DDT of common sense to keep
it from growing in our own yards. The Catholic Church
has
survived much more vicious
and much more
i~telli~ gt
attacks
than
these
made
by southern
bigots. 0
Ave Maria's editor,
Kelley's sage advice.

John

C.

Reedy,

reiterated

Charity was the proper Catholic

reaction to bigotry which was a "sickness of mind and soul."
Catholics had no reason to fear such a cancer.

"This

bigotry constitutes no threat to the Church in the United
St a t es. 11106
Reedy reminded Catholics that they were no
longer an immigrant minority but forty million full-fledged
Americans.
innocuous,

Because

these

forces

of

intolerance

he discerned Catholic demeanor as

were

the most

ominous dimension of this potentially explosive situation.
"The real danger comes from the difficulty in controlling
ourselves, in the avoidance of political muscle-flexing by
104 George Kelly, "A Time for Keeping on Shirts,"
America, September 24, 1960, pp. 700-701.
lOSibid.
106 John Reedy, "The Editor's Desk, 11 Ave Maria,
September 17, 1960, p. 2.
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.
.
.
. t y. "10 7
successful Americans
an d b y a d e f ensive
minori
Later, he reported a large Catholic response of charity but
still warned of the dangers of falling into a retreat of
anger.
The real issues in this all-important campaign are
political and not religious.
The greatest disservice
we could do to our nation and our Church would be to
allow the campaign to be dragged down to the depths by
a
handf11_\> 8 of
rabble-rousing
and
religious
hucksters.
Although he admitted that " • • . I am hurt by their
attacks,

I

charges,"
Many

feel

a

deep

sense of frustration at their

Dale Francis in his syndicated column "To Talk of

Things"

unreasonable

implored
and

Catholics

unconscionable

patience and understanding.

to

counter

attacks

with

these
Christian

"We are the ones who must act.

It will not be easy but we must meet hatred with kindness.
It is a time for love. 11109

The Advocate,

subsequent to

Peale's fiasco, instructed members of the faith to perceive
their predicament as "a wonderful opportunity of practicing
the virtue of charity."
107

Suspicion of Catholic patriotism

John Reedy, "The
September 17, 1960, p. 2.
108

Edi tor's

Desk,"

Ave Maria,

John Reedy, "How Should We Answer Them?"
Maria, September 17, 1960, p. 2.
109

Ave

Dale Francis, "A Time for Love," Our Sunday
Visitor, (National Edition), September 18, 1960, p. 6.
He
suggested that Catholics should react in the following way
to prejudical attacks: "by being better Catholics, by loving
even those who attack your faith, by not allowing them to
make you angry or bitter."

134

stemmed from ignorance and not malice; it was this ignorance
that had engendered the religious tension in the 1960
presidential campaign.
culprits.

Catholics, therefore, were the true

"They had failed to adequately explain their

faith to non-Catholics.

They had failed to live up to their

responsibilities, in removing this non-Catholic shortcoming

. . . 110
II

Renowned

theologians

and

church

leaders

felt

compelled to publicly state their positions during the
campaign, becoming most conspicuous with the advent of Peale
in Washington.
remain

tranquil

John Courtney Murray asked Catholics to
and

imperturbable,

despite

his

open

admission that anti-Catholicism was in full bloom.
The brutal fact became increasingly clear.
'The
Oldest American Prejudice, ' as anti-Catholicism has
rightly been called, is as poisonously alive today as
it was in 1928, or in the eighteen nineties or even in
the eighteen-forties • • . The ancient anti-Papal text
is embellished by a new set of footnotes.
The time
worn anti-CatholifJ.. prejudice is cloaked in semblance
of "rationality." 1
Shocked by the renewal of anti-Catholicism, Bishop John
Mussio of the Steubenville diocese in Pennsylvania denounced
Peale's platform of "filthy insinuations and rigamarole of
dirty innuendoes," and boasted that Catholics were true
American patriots.
llOEditorial,
"With
September 15, 1960, p. 8.
111

Charity,"

The

Advocate,

Frontpage, America, September 24, 1960, p. 702.
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We love our country with the same love we love our
God.
To betray the one would be to betray the other.
If they will not take our proven word, what do they
want?
That we give up our Catholic faith?
To force
us into this choice in order to secure the full rights
of American citizenship would be to make those very
r~gh~s. henchllJ.~12 to tyranny and a mockery of their
s1gn1f1cance.
In spite of his unsettled state, Bishop Mussio demanded that
his co-religionists remain "calm and controlled when faced
with anti-Catholic agitation," asking them to adhere to the
Church's policy for all American-Catholics -- to be good and
'
113
1 oya 1 c1' t 1zens.

This

position

of

restraint

and

understanding

compelled the leadership of the Church to penetrate and shed
its ghetto mentality in order to respond rationally to
anti-Catholic charges and to explain fully their faith to
non-Catholics.

Archbishop Karl

L.

Alter,

in his essay

"Nineteen Questions About A Catholic President," presented
the official reply of the American Catholic Church. 114
Methodically, he refuted all current accusations about the
Church's role in American politics:
control

and

education policies,

Catholic loyalty, birth

appointment of Vatican

112

Press Release, "Bishop Mussio Condemns Spread of
Anti-Catholic Bigotry in Presidential Campaign," September
1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1016.
113
114

Ibid.

Karl J. Alter, Archbishop of Cincinnati,
"Nineteen Questions about a Catholic President," Catholic
Mind, September-October 1960, pp. 440-449.
Originally
published in The Sign, July 1960, pp. 11-14, 65.
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Ambassador,

and the volatile church-state

relationship.

Alter wisely assuaged American fear of Catholic intolerance.
The fear that we as Catholics will use religious
tolerance here to gain ascendancy in our country and
then, having achieved political hegemony, proceed to
deprive our fellow citizens of freedom of speech in
religion,
freedom of conscience,
or
impose our
convictions
upon
them,
willy-nilly,
is
utterly
unwarranted by any doctrine of the Catholic Church, as
well as by the consistent pronouncements of the
American Hierarchy. We seek no privileged status1 we
proclaim our full adherence to the provisions
5he
1
constitution as of now as well as for the future.

01

Another official Catholic promulgation consistently
referred to throughout the remainder of the campaign was an
address given by Gustave Weigel, professor of Ecclesiology
at Woodstock College in Maryland.

Entitled "A Theological

Consideration of the Relations between Church and State,"
Weigel' s

address expressed his sense of disappointment,

frustration,

and even desperation with the persistence of

non-Catholic

doubts

commitment

to

the

about

the

Constitution

sincerity
and

of

religious

Catholic
freedom.

Weigel divulged his trepidation.

"At this moment what we
116
are discussing can be explosive and destructive."
After
discussing the roots of non-Catholic fears, the feasibility
of dialogue, the Church's stand on church-state relation115

Karl J. Alter, Archbishop of Cincinnati,
"Nineteen Questions about a Catholic President," Catholic
Mind, September-October 1960, pp. 440-449.
Originally
published in The Sign, July 1960, pp. 11-14, 65.
11611 Text

of Father Gustave Weigel' s Address on
Church and State," The Catholic Transcript, October 6, 1960,
p. 11.
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ship,

and the extent of Catholic support of religious

tolerance, he described all Catholics in public office as
devoted

servants of

the

nation's

common

good

and

as

stalwarts of religious liberty.
I conclude with a personal testimony.
I have been
working theology for 30 years.
I have always admired
and loved my country with its institutions and
history. I can sincerely say that there is absolutely
nothing in Catholic doctrine which would prevent a
Catholic from holding public off ice on any level
accorqi17g to the letter and spirit of our American
laws.
Weigel's and Alter's discourses on Catholicism and
Americanism inspired America to remind non-Catholics that
Catholic patriotism represented a two-hundred year heritage.
The

Church's

leadership

since

its

inception

to

the

present -- Archbishop John Carroll, Bishop John England,
Archbishop John Hughes, James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop
John T. McNicholas -- was a strong advocate of religious
freedom and tolerance.

It was, in fact, because of this

tradition, that the American Church had created "one of the
most flourishing and promising Catholic communities that has
ever existed. 11118

The magazine concluded that the real

issue was not Kennedy's personal faith but the Catholic
Church and its teachings.
117

This tradition of Americanism

"Text of Father Gustave Weigel' s Address on
Church and State," The Catholic Transcript, October 6, 1960,
p. 11.
118
Editorial, "On Religious Toleration," America,
September 24, 1960, pp. 690-696.
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should clarify all non-Catholic perceptions of Catholics
being

"Un-American,"

constitutional

of

their

relationship

not

between

accepting
the

"the

government

religion as defined by the First Amendment.

and

11119

This rational Catholic defense, based upon selfrestraint, was the Church's public stance throughout the
campaign.

Such a posture entailed a neutral reaction to the

Democratic presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy.

Afraid

of raising Catholic resentment, of reinforcing Protestant
trepidation,

and of revealing any inkling of favoritism

towards Kennedy, Catholic clergy, journals, and newspapers
were factual and not interpretative in their comments on
Kennedy's Houston performance.

Nevertheless, some members

of the Catholic laity unleashed their anger and disgust.
Mrs. Sylvia Murch, deeply impressed with Kennedy's Houston
speech, admonished that Nixon had better not win because of
anti-Catholic sentiment.

"Senator Kennedy, I do not want to

sound bitter, believe me, I am not.
discouraged.

I

live in the

I am just disgusted and

suburbs where

3/4 of the

families are Catholic and believe they are really bursting
with anger over this religious matter. 11120

T. P. Cyrus of

119

Edi tori al, "On Religious Toleration," America,
September 24, 1960, pp. 690-696.
120Mrs. Sylvia Murck to John F. Kennedy, Letter,
October 7, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue
Files of James Wine), Box No. 1008.
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Texas commended Kennedy on his oration but perceived it as
appealing only to borderline moderates.
Baptists were no t
alienate

and

.
d • .,121
convince

isolate

the

"The Hardshell

In order to completely

beliefs

and

aims

of

these

hardliners, Mr. Cyrus suggested the following scenario; one,
he insisted, was his and not that of a crank's.
I suggest that the Democratic Party itself prepare and
circulate anti-Catholic literature and posters of the
mostly vile and bigoted exaggeration -- I mean Hitler
hatred stuff -- which I believe would effectively
separate moderates
from the extremists.
what I
propose to do is to out babble the Baptists. 122
One hundred and sixty-six Catholic laymen also broke
this official position of silence by the Church in an
attempt to demonstrate to non-Catholics that Kennedy's views
were

congruous

with

other

Arnerican-Catholics.

123

In

defiance of clerical authority, these laymen resolved, that
with bigotry rampant

in the country,

Catholics

had a

responsibility not to retreat in silence but to make their
position clear to their fellow Americans as Kennedy was
doing.

Catholics must break out of their ghetto and explain

their faith's devotion to religious liberty, and to the
sanctity of private conscience.

According to these laymen,

121

T.P. Cyrus to John F. Kennedy, Letter, September
13, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1003.
122 Ibid.
123 Barret, American Presidency, pp. 164-166.
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catholics were not Catholic citizens but American citizens
who happen to be Catholic.

As true Americans, Catholics

based their public and private acts upon the

following

precept.
In his public acts as they affect the whole community
the Catholic is bound in conscience to promote the
common good and to avoid seeking any sectarian
advantage.
He is also bound to recognize t~2 4 proper
scope of independence of the political order.
By October, Catholic clergy and laity had explained
their

position

to

non-Catholic

neighbors

and

critics.

Preaching calm and restraint, the American Church's reply to
the

Puerto

Rico

understandable.
typical.

incident

was

very

predictable

Richard Cardinal Cushing' s

and

response was

He insisted that American Church leaders would be

"totally out of step" in telling American voters how to
vote.

In an attempt to reassure fellow Americans that the

American Catholic Church was a

separate institution from

Puerto Rico's Church, he said:
We must repeat that whatever may be the custom
elsewhere, the American tradition of which Catholics
form so loyal a part, is satisfied simply to call to
attention moral questions with their implications and
leave to the conscience of the people the specific
pol~tici~
5 decision which comes in the act of
voting.
Sheerin in his Catholic World wrote:

"This bombshell was a

surprise and shock to us in view of our constant and
124

Barret, American Presidency, pp. 164-166.

125 "Kennedy Campaign Form Letter on Puerto Rico,"
October 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files
of James Wine), Box No. 1015.
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insistent assurances to Protestants that our hierarchy has
no political aspirations."

Throughout the campaign thus

far, Sheerin insisted that the Church has purposely avoided
meddling in politics or influencing the Catholic vote.
clergy, in fact,

Most

"favored the non-Catholic candidate."

In

closing, Sheerin promised that what happened in Puerto Rico
would never happen in America "because the American Bishops
have no desire to cast suspicions on American Catholic
loyalty to and support of the First Amendment."

126

The Church's neutral political stance outraged a few
lay Catholics like Mrs. Rita Menick.

In a letter to Wine's

Community Relations Committee, she complained that Kennedy
was fighting the Catholic Church's battle "alone!."

Such a

cumbersome responsibility to fall upon the shoulders of one
man was unfair and unjust.

The Church and its hierarchy

were pathetic in its stance of neutral retreat in this time
of crisis.

She conveyed to Wine that she failed in her

efforts to provoke the entrance of the Church into the
political fray in its own defense.

Her request to Cardinal

Spellman and the National Welfare Conference to reissue the
1948

statement on separation of Church and State went

unan~wered.

Such action on the Church's part, she insisted,

"was not necessarily to elect Kennedy, but to clear the air
for millions of American Catholics who want to look at this
126 John

Sheerin,"The Embarrassing Puerto Rican
Pastoral," Catholic World, December 1960, pp. 132-136.
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.
11 y. 127
election unemotiona
Concern

over

bigotry

comITiunity up to election day.
the

National

dominated

Catholic

As balloting day approached,

Review printed some of the most commonly
"A Protestant slogan:

expressed Catholic jokes.

the Middleman and Vote for Pope John.
elected I will go to Rome.
catholic who won't vote
Harvard.

the

Eliminate

Nixon's Slogan:

Definition of bigotry:

If

A Yale

for Kennedy because he want to

A Democratic cocktail:

and two parts Holy water."

128

one part southern comfort,

This satirical litany by the

National Review divulged its disdain and its impatience with
the survival of this "bogus issue."

Father Gorman in the

Sign revealed irritation with bigotry's longevity.
several months,

"For

we have had an exhibition of religious

bigotry similar to that of the presidential campaign of
1928.

Few thought there could be such an outbreak again.

Even intelligent and experienced observers of the

1\.u1eLt•.

•

scene underestimated the power of what has been referred to
as

the

Protestant underworld."

129

The major source of

127 Mrs. Rita Menick to James Wine, Letter, October
26, 1960 (John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of
James Wine), Box No. 1008; Also follow-up letter of October
27, 1960, Box No. 1008.
128 Editorial, "Going Around," The National Review,
October 8, 1960, p. 201.
129 Father Gorman,
November 1960, p. 14.

"Bigots,

1960 Model," The Sign,

143
Gorman' s

exasperation was

the persistent

repetition of

questions by non-Catholics that had already been answered
"Such a

one hundred times before.

constant recurrence

signified a belief that American Catholics individually and
as a group were lying when they declare their adherence to
the Constitution.

That is bigotry!" 130

Gorman advised

catholics to ignore such bigoted importuning and to realize
that the Church would neither lose or gain by the outcome of
the presidential elections.
Lawrence Fuchs in his article "Religious Vote-Fact
or

Fiction?"

also

argued

that

religion

would

insignificant in the outcome of the election.
relevant or even comparable to 1960.

be

1928 was not

Nixon was not Hoover,

and perhaps most important of all, Kennedy was not Smith.
Fuchs was convinced that Kennedy would win in spite of his
faith because he was the best qualified candidate.

He did

admit that Kennedy's Catholicism would affect the votes of
Protestant liberals and Jews,
conservative Catholics.

anti-Catholic bigots,

and

But overall, Fuchs maintained that

the election results would demonstrate, "the pluralism and
variety of opinion within American Catholicism,

and the

primary party loyalty over religious faith."
The Catholic factor, which will be talked about, will
not be as important a vote determinant as people
think. Millions of Catholics will swell with Catholic
13 °Father Gorman,
November 1960, p. 14.

"Bigots, 1960 Model," The Sign,
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pride because Jack Kennedy heads the Democratic party
ticket, but the overwhelming1 j'iajori ty of them would
have voted Democratic anyway.
That religion was not and should not be a factor in
the election became the Catholic theme during the final week
of the campaign.

The fact that the Church had maintained a

neutral position concerning the candidates reflected the
lack of religion's influence.
that no other religious

The Catholic Sentinel boasted

group was

as

"neutral as

the

Catholic Church."

Of the 53,796 Catholic priests listed in

the

Directory,

1960

Catholic

only

himself into the political arena
Official Catholic reticence was
Louis'

Parish

published

the

Bulletin
following

of

one

injected

Father Juniper Caro1.
illustrated in

Bellevue,
policy

priest

the

Washington.

regarding

132

St.
It

campaign

literature.
No partisan campaign literature of a political nature
should be distributed, or a speech given at a Guild
meeting or any other parish function.
Parish lists,
Guild lists, or any list pertaining to the parish must
not be given to advertising agencies, merchants, or
political
parties.
This
is
the
rul~
of the
Archdiocese and must be strictly enforced.
Monsignor George Casey, while praising his fellow priests
131
Fiction?"
132

Lawrence Fuchs, "The Religious Vote-Fact or
The Catholic World, October 1960, pp. 9-16.

Editorial,
"President
Sentinel, November 10, 1960, p. 1.

Kennedy,"

Catholic

133 saint Louis Parish Bulletin, October 16, 1960
(John F. Kennedy Library: Religious Issue Files of James
Wine), Box No. 1007.
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for doing a remarkable job of keeping politics out of the
church, restated the noble purpose for imposing such selfcontrol.
Let me also tell you that this determination of the
Catholic priests of the United States to avoid
politicking at this time is neither a tactic nor a
feint.
It is a high purpose to keep first things
first, and that is the communication of God's will and
the dispensing of his saving grace to souls.
It is
not fpf4 anybody's political sake, but for religion's
sake.
The Catholic press importuned Catholics to vote for
the best qualified candidate regardless of his faith.
Boston

The

Pilot

commanded Catholics to vote and vote
.
11'igen tl y. 135 Reedy in his Ave Maria advised his fellow
inte

Catholics

to

vote

their

conscience

and

not

to

feel

embarrassed about voting for a non-Catholic "if for the
right reason."

Reedy reassured Catholics of religion's lack

of influence on election day.

"Our ballots will be cast on

non-religious grounds • • • and we feel so will the ballots
of the vast majority of Arnericans. 136 The Catholic Sentinel
implored Catholics not to vote out of the hate for
Protestants.

Instead, "we must give back love, which as we

134 George Casey, "Priest and Poli tics," Boston
Pilot, October 22, 1960, p. 4.
135 Edi torial, "Time for Decision," Boston Pilot,
November 5, 1960, p. 4.
136 Editorial, "How a Catholic Should Vote?"
Maria, November 5, 1960.

Ave

146
know is the basis for all Christ's teachings."
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The Texas

Catholic advised its readers not to cast a vote of revenge.
"These bigots will receive their just punishment in the
hereafter, when God will decide which souls will go to
heaven and which souls will go to hell." 138

Finally, Our

Sunday Visitor editor lamented that only six out of ten
persons would vote in the upcoming election.

He impressed

upon Catholics that it was a moral duty to vote and to vote
wisely for the common good.

139

Three days before the election the editor of America
observed that there had been a larger circulation of hate
literature

in

1960

than

in

1928.

In

spite

of

this

augmentation, the editor commended his peers for their lack
of resentment and bitterness and for never acting as a
partisan protagonists of John F. Kennedy.

"Catholics in the

United States can be proud of how their priests and their
Catholic press conducted themselves with such admirable
.
d uring
.
.
t'imes. ,,140
restraint
t h ese trying

According to the

137

Editorial, "Vote As a Free Citizen," Catholic
Sentinel, November 3, 1960, p. 1, 28.
138

Gordon O'Neill, "The Godless . • • Versus . . .
The Grace of God," The Texas Catholic, November 12, 1960, p.
1. He penned article three weeks before election.
139 Editorial,
Visitor,

"Politics and You," Our Sunday
(Lafayette Edition), October 19, 1960, p. 2A.

140 Edi torial,

"Voting
November 5, 1960, p. 162.

Is

Our

Duty,"

America,
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editor,

Catholics will

not

base

their

franchise

upon

religion but upon two critical aspects of the country's
needs
exceptional
.
141
po 1 icy.

leadership

and

a

strong

foreign

Reedy in Ave Maria echoed similar sentiments as the
campaign neared its end.

He was pleased with Catholic

moderation in spite of bigoted attacks and in spite of the
harboring

of

inner

resentment

"disloyalty or stupidity."

to

these

charges

of

Reedy insisted that if the

Catholic candidate won the election,

it would not be a

victory for the Church, and if he lost, it would not be a
defeat for the Church.

The election was a political event

whose ramifications would affect the entire citizenry of the
country.

Reedy, in his closing remarks, drew one lesson he

hoped Catholics had learned as a result of this tumultuous
campaign:

"We also know that we have a serious obligation

to make ourselves and the Church better known and better
understand by our fellow citizens. 11142
Robert Hoyt in the pages of Kansas City-St. Joseph
Register provided the most realistic assessment of the
campaign and its impact upon the Church on the eve of the
election.

Although he commended fellow Catholics for their

141 Edi tori al, "Voting Is Our Duty," America,
November 5, 1960, p. 162.
14 2 John Reedy, "The Edi tor' s Desk, " Ave Maria,
November 5, 1960, p. 2.
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restrained

response

to

the

unreasonable

charges

of

anti-Catholics, he feared that the religious issue in the
campaign and the election result would determine whether the
American Catholic future would be directed by ghettoism or
dialogue.

The main thrust of his advice was really an

attempt to separate the election results from the religious
issue in the hopes of circumventing a retreat of bitterness
on a larger scale than in 1928.
My own feeling is that the Church does not stand to
gain or lose greatly from the election itself.
The
general trend toward the integration of Catholics into
the life of the country was not begun by Kennedy and
its continuance does not depend on his personal
fortune.
The important question is not whether the
trend continues, but whether Catholics will be able to
preserve and deepen their Catholicity as they assume
the
responsibilities
of
full
civic
and
social
acceptance.
The question is not only wha\ Satholics
4
stand to gain, but what they have to offer.
John F. Kennedy won the election, becoming the first
Catholic president of the United States.
electoral college votes to Nixon's 219.

Kennedy won 303
In terms of the

popular vote, it was one of the closest in election history:
144
Kennedy 34, 221, 349, and Nixon 34, 108, 456.
Most

·contemporary commentators attributed Kennedy's one hundred
thousand vote margin to his religion.

Newsweek determined

that Kennedy's Catholicism had a positive impact on the
143

Robert Hoyt, "Opinion Worth Nothing," America,
(Reprint) November 4, 1960, pp. 171-175.
144 catholic Quarterly Almanac,
Session, Vol. 16, pp. 804-809, 1025.

86th Congress:

2nd
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election results, because Kennedy's overall strategy was...to
trade the little states for the big states.

"As a result of

this strategy, one of the great issues of the campaign -the Catholic faith of Kennedy -- took a turn that on balance
145
resounded to his advantage."
Newsweek was willing to
concede

that religion had

decisively,"

to his

losses

"contributed heavily if not
in

smaller states

such as

Tennessee, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Iowa.
But these losses had been much more than offset by
victories
in
New
York,
Pennsylvania,
and
Massachusetts.
Kennedy's Catholicism had been a
decided asset, not only because it won him many
Catholic votes but also because the anti-Catholic
propaganda it inspireq 4 ~on him the sympathy of Liberal
Protestants and Jews.
Time magazine agreed with Newsweek's analysis of the
election results.

It concluded
Kennedy's Catholicism
....-......--,, that
-

-----·~~.,.~.-

"·•·

"was certainly a factor in his favor in the big cities,
where Catholics are most heavily concentrated, though the
Catholic
h ope d .

vote

.. 147

was

not

so monolithic

as

Kennedy

had

John Wicklein of the New York Times remarked

that "a strong, silent Protestant vote cut into Senator John

F. Kennedy's margin of victory • . . but was offset by a
more strategically placed Catholic vote which aided the

19 6 0 I

14511 Election Blue Extra," Newsweek,
p. EE2.
146 Ibid.

November 14,

14711 Analysts Disagree on Role of Religion Played in
Elections," The Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1.
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senator in large states he needed to win. 11148
the political

analyst,

inferred the

Kennedy's victory over Nixon.

Samuel Lubell,

same rationale

for

"How the electoral
vote fell
.. .
-~· .,.~.

~

indicates that Senator Kennedy's religion helped rather than
hurt his

~l~.ction chances. 11149

Even the

post-election

Gallop Poll, taking into account that out of the country's
population of 180 million, 40 million or 22.8 per cent were
catholic, demonstrated that the Catholic vote for Kennedy
was strongest in the regions that consisted of the big
states with large electoral votes -- East and Midwest. 150
Catholic Vote
Region

Kennedy

Nixon

East

77%

23%

Midwest

81%

19%

South

75%

25%

West

74%

26%

One year after the election, the Brookings Institute
analyzed the election in The Presidential

Election and

14811 Analysts Disagree on Role of Religion Played in
Elections," The Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1.
149

Ibid.

15011 Post-Election

Analysis-The Catholic Poll,"
Gallop Poll, 1960, pp. 1692-1693. Also provided a regional
breakdown of the Protestant vote.
Kennedy's greatest
support among Protestants was in the south: Kennedy 47% and
Nixon 53%.
In the Midwest Kennedy received 38% of the
Protestant vote, in the West 37% of the Protestant vote, and
in the East only 28% of the Protestant vote.
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Transition 1960-1961.
Election

Results"

151

v.o.

Key's essay "Interpreting the

acknowledged

that

"the

most

marked

accreditations to Democratic strength 1956-1960 occurred in
states with extremely high proportions of Roman Catholics,"
and confirmed previous interpretations that the religious
factor "was of overwhelming importance in shifting voters in
the 1960 election. 11152

He,

however,

perceived political

loyalties as very intricate and complex.

Although there was

a dramatic increase in the Democratic vote in Catholic areas
in the Northeast and Midwest,

there were other heavily

Catholic areas failing to produce such
results.

conspicuousl~

biased

Al though Kennedy ran behind Stevenson in the

Protestant South, there were other Protestant areas he ran
ahead in.

Key attributed these diverse voting trends to the

religious issue's impact on party affiliations.
appeals peculiar to the campaign,

the

religious

"Of the
issue

evidently far outweighed the others.

For some people, it

reinforced the pull of partisanship;

for others it ran

counter to the tugs of party loyalty."

153

In the final

analysis, Key maintained that Kennedy captured most but not
all of the ·Democratic Catholic defectors of 1956 and
151

Paul T. David, The Presidential Election and
Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institute, 1961).
152 Ibid., pp. 150-176.
153 Ibid., pp. 155-158, 174.
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received the same vote amongst Protestant Democrats in 1960
as in 1956 -- roughly 38%.

This twin influence of party and

religion convinced Key that "Probably the best guess is that
Kennedy won in spite of rather than because of the fact that
154
he was Catholic."
Later scholars have also debated the detrimental or
beneficial impact that religion had on Kennedy's election.
Albert Menendez concluded:
without

a

respectable

"He (Kennedy) could not have won

Protestant

showing,

but

his

outstanding triumph among Catholics and Jews who turned out
in large numbers,

saved the day for him. 11155

The net

Catholic gain for Kennedy, according to Menendez, was 12.1
million votes and net Protestant loss was 13.6 million.

All

told, therefore, 26 million of the 68 million presidential
votes were determined by the

religious

issue.

Due to

traditional party preferences, Kennedy did best among the
Southern Protestants with 47% of their vote and worst among
Northeastern Protestants with

28%

of their vote.

The

heaviest anti-Catholic voting occurred in the Border states
such as rural Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. 156

Essentially, Menendez concluded, Kennedy owed

154

Paul T. David, The Presidential Election and
Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institute, 1961), pp. 175.
155Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls,
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), p. 78.
156

Ibid., pp. 82-83.
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his victory to both Protestants and Catholics.
Paul Lopatto attributed Kennedy's victory to the
Catholic vote.

"This election contest, which witnessed an

inordinate amount of attention being paid to Kennedy's
religious
millions

affiliation,
of

Catholic

candidate. 11157

resulted in the mobilization of
voters

behind

the

Democratic

Taking a historical perspective of the 1960

election in the 1980's, he determined that it was the last
time a Democratic candidate would be the beneficiary of the
heretofore
Prejudice

traditional party
had

induced

loyalty amongst Catholics.

Catholics

to

revert

to

their

traditional party preference in 1960, despite the fact that
their economic interest had drastically changed from the
days of FDR.

Social mobility since World War II had

catapulted a large majority of Catholics from the working
class to the middle and upper classes, which induced a swing
to the Republican party.

But this tenuous Catholic support

of the Democratic party in the 1960 election was shattered
by Kennedy's victory and assassination.
rendered anti-Catholicism null
presidential

campaigns

and

and

void

elections

Catholics into loyal Americans.

These two events
in

and

subsequent
transformed

According to Lopatto, "This

new acceptance meant that in the future it would be easier
157

Paul Lapatto, Religion and the Presidential
Elections, 1960-1980, (New York: Praeger Studies, 1985), pp.
67, 162.
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for many Catholics to support a Republican party that had so
often in the past acted as a vehicle for the nativist and
anti-Catholic elements in the political system."

158

Thus,

over the next 20 years, more and more Catholics found it in
their interest to join the Republican party. 159
Whether Kennedy's political strategy of capturing
Catholic ballots in states with the largest electoral votes
allowed him to win the election because of, or in spite of,
his faith does not detract

from the

importance of the

candidate's and the Church's successful avoidance of a
repeat of 1928 in the presidential campaign.

Kennedy's

Houston speech and Community Relations Committee cautiously
undermined the charge of Catholic political disloyalty.

The

American Catholic Church discredited bigoted accusations by
providing numerous explications on sensitive Church-State
issues, by maintaining its stance of neutrality toward the
political fortunes of either candidate, and by imploring its
members

to

endure

understanding.
eradicate

the

crisis

with

impartiality

and

Al though Kennedy and the Church did not

anti-Catholicism

from

contain its hate and rancor.

the

campaign,

they did

This containment dislodged

bigotry as a significant factor in the election results,
158 Paul

Lapatto, Religion and the Presidential
Elections, 1960-1980, (New York: Praeger Studies, 1985), pp.
67, 162.
159 rbid., pp. 162-163.
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persuaded non-Catholics with honest doubts that Catholicism
... .
~

and Americanism were compatible, and once and for all,
shattered the seemingly ageless American tradition of "No
ca-t:liolic in the White House."

EPILOGUE

The Catholic Church celebrated Kennedy's victory and
its role in preventing a
election of the

sectarian conflagration.

The

first Catholic president represented a

psychological victory that meant Catholics had become firstclass citizens.

Edi tors of The Catholic Press declared

boldly the death of bigotry and announced the ushering in of
a "New Frontier in Religious Relations," characterized by
tolerance

and

understanding.

Monsignor

Francis

Lally,

editor of the Boston Pilot, was pleased with the election
results

which

proved

that

"The

mass

of

Protestants

considered the religious issue at least a secondary one" and
which symbolized the death of bigotry.
Kennedy was doubtless correct when he said he buried
the religious issue in the Hills of West Virginia. He
might have added that he preached its eulogy in
Houston and that the American peop\e raised a massive
monument over its grave on Tuesday.
The Trenton Monitor declared that "Naturally, there
is a pride among Catholics • • • and there will be fervent

111 Religious Issue Dead," Monsignor Lally Says," The

Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1.
156

157
prayer for his success."

2

The Providence Visitor proclaimed

that never again will the hardcore bigotry "be dignified
with public respectability."

3

The Catholic Herald-Citizen

of Milwaukee proclaimed the official burial of Catholic
American second-class citizen status.

The San Francisco

Monitor ordered fellow Catholics to tear up their secondclass citizen cards and declared that "The irresponsible
teenage years are over.

Catholics have matured to adulthood

because Kennedy's victory broke the walls of prejudice and
ended the days of Catholic exile in American society." 4
Even The Tablet

joined in the celebration.

congratulated Kennedy on his victory.

It

"His is an historic

triumph and all will rejoice in the fact that a Catholic has
been elected president -- that 1960 has put to rest the
allegation that this great land of ours practiced religious
discrimination for its highest office."

5

The paper's editor

reminded Margaret Sanger to keep her promise about moving
out of the United States, and facetiously speculated how
many Kennedys would Sanger have birth controlled out of
211 Diocesan Papers

See a Defeat for Bigotry," The
Catholic Messenger, November 17, 1960, p. 1.
3 rbid.
4 Editorial,

"The Breakthrough,"
Monitor, November 11, 1960, p. 16.
5 Editorial, "Our
November 12, 1960, p. 10

New

President,"

San
The

Francisco
Tablet,

158
. t ence. 6
ex1s

The Alamo Register exemplified the tribal pride

as well as thanks for Kennedy's triumph.

"A Catholic can be

pardonably proud in Kennedy's election.

He can be proud

that a giant barricade to his own potential as a citizen has
been rernoved. 117

Kennedy was a Catholic hero as well as an

"American Hero. 118
Ecclesiastical

Francis

J.

Connell

in

Review encouraged Catholics

celebration with all Americans.

the American
to

share

in

"We have reason to rejoice

that at last a Catholic has been regarded worthy of the
presidency by a sufficient number of Americans.

But rejoice

as Americans rather than Catholics. 119
Kennedy's win engendered Catholic praise for the
liberal secularists.

America compared the New Republic's

1928 and 1960 reaction to a Catholic presidential candidate.
It discovered that in 1928 the New Republic ignored the
Catholic issue, printing only one editorial, a book review,
and two letters.
6

10

In contrast, thirty years later, the

Editorial, "Our
November 12, 1960, p. 10

New

President,"

The

Tablet,

7Dick Meskill, "In the Shadow of San Fernando," The
Alamo Register, November 10, 1960, p. 1.
8

Ibid.

9 Francis

J. Connell, "Now That the Election Is
Over," American Ecclesiastical Review, June 1961, pp. 1-14.
1

OEdi torial, "Catholicism Cornes of Age,
December 17, 1960, p. 389.

11

America,

159
magazine devoted
printed

numerous

it~

March 21 issue to Catholics in America,

editorials

defending

Catholics,

and

published book reviews that clarified the Catholic position
on Church-State issues.
the

Catholic

"This change in the treatment of

issue between

1928-1960

is a

significant

it
11
marks Catholicism's Corning of Age in American Society."
development in the liberal secular mind.

On its own ,

This emotional bliss influenced the editor of the San
Francisco Monitor to predict the rise of another minority in
"It is an indication that America is

American society.
growing up,

though painfully.

another question:

It is now a time to ask

What about a Jew in the White House, or

an American of yellow skin and slanted eyes, or a Negro?
12
The day may not be far off."
Catholic enthusiasm and optimism was infectious.
James Wine, who fought in the trenches of religious bigotry
throughout the campaign, declared the demise of intolerance
and the birth of religious understanding.

"Both Catholics

and Protestants have been enlightened about each other.
They found they had much more in common than they suspected
before.

Everyone knew where the differences lay -- they

were the things that got talked about -- but no one bothered
11 Edi torial,

"Catholicism Cornes of Age," America,
December 17, 1960, p. 389.
12 Editorial,

"The Breakthrough,"
Monitor, November 11, 1960, p. 389.

San

Francisco
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to notice how much both groups shared.

The climate is right

for cooperation an.d the friendly exchange of ideas; now it's
up to individuals -- and I think they are ready for it." 13
Journalists of the secular press concurred with Wine.
New York Journal American described the election as

The
"a

momentous milestone on the road to religious tolerance. 1114
The Pittsburg Post-Gazette offered Kennedy's

triumph as

proof that "religion is not a barrier to public office in
the United States. 1115
concluded:

Rabbi Richard C. Hertz of Detroit

"Brotherhood is no longer a wild dream.

I

believe bigotry was dealt a hammer blow by those who realize
that what a man stands for must become more decisive than
what his religious label is. " 16

Finally,

the bliss of

winning seemed to temper Catholic assessment of the severity
of their trial of bigotry.

Robert Hoyt in Jubilee concluded

that the anti-Catholicism of 1960 was less severe than past
outbreaks and contemporary prejudices against Blacks and
Jews.
In retrospect, the ordeal of American Catholicism was
not really much of an ordeal.
This is easy to say
now, of course, because the anti-Catholic agitation
13

"End of an Issue," Newsweek, November 28, 1960, p.

82.

1411 Religious Issues,"
November 17, 1960, p. 12.
15

The

Catholic

Messenger,

Ibid.

1611 End of an Issue?" Newsweek, November 28, 1.960, p.
82.
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failed the accomplishment of its objective.
It was
tiresome, irritating sometimes, humiliating to listen
to the slander and read the calumny; but despite all
the noise, the thing was mild compared with the trials
our Catholic forebears suffered here and those our
contemporaries are suffering elsewhere. Suppose a Jew
had been nominated; the filth would have piled up to
our ears. Consider what happened when Mr. Lodge dared
to suggest -- quelle folie -- the possibility of a
Negro in the cabinet.
I suggest that Catholics who
felt they were being put 'tf?an ultimate test had lost
their sense of proportion.
In
Catholic

the

aftermath

editors

existence

of

blamed

bigotry

of

Kennedy's

their

in

the

own

victory,

community

presidential

some

for

the

campaign.

According to these observers, religion was an issue because
of one major Catholic American shortcoming that was exhumed
and

accentuated

by

the

presidential

campaign

the

ostensible lack of religious educated leaders among its
laity.

The

Providence

Visitor

argued

that

Kennedy's

political struggle revealed "the horrifying ignorance" of
18
Catholic lay persons about their faith.
This Catholic
disability

contributed

to

the

non-Catholics had of the Church.

distorted

image

that

When lay persons were

approached by other Americans with questions about their
faith,

"It was too plain that they did not have the

17 Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism,
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16.

and

the

18 Edi torial, "A First Catholic President,"
Providence Visitor, November 10, 1960, p.4.

The
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answers."

19

The Denver Catholic Register depicted Catholic

lay persons as incapable and unwilling to explain their
faith to concerned non-Catholics and recommended that such a
deplorable shortcoming must be eradicated to avoid future
calamities.
I have the impression that there are many more
Protestants than Catholics who are acquainted with the
contents of Pope Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors.
It is
going to take more to dispel Protestant fears of the
Church than the simple reassurances of Catholics who
do not know the issues.
It is going to take
knowledge.
It is time we started gathering that
20
knowledge.
Ave Maria insisted that, now with a Catholic president, it
was more urgent than ever for Catholics to be knowledgeable
of Church doctrine.

"John F. Kennedy, as well as you, will

be constantly asked about your Church's position on any
issue.

Today's American Catholics will have to be better

informed about the teachings of their religion than any
previous generation was or they will be responsible for
.
.
1121
t h eir ignorance.

The dearth of Catholic lay leadership was another
significant source of non-Catholic misunderstanding and
bigotry during the past year.

Kennedy improved this area of

19 Edi to rial,

"A First Catholic President,"
Providence Visitor, November 10, 1960, p.4.

The

20 Edward Smith, "Catholic Ignorance, Protestant
Fear," Denver Catholic Register, November 17, 1960, p. 4.
21 John Reedy, "The
November 26, 1960, p. 2.

Edi tor's

Desk,"

Ave

Maria,
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deficiency by speaking out as a
independent

of

the

Church's

member of his

hierarchy.

"He

faith,

asked no

Cardinal, Bishop, or priest to become his spokesman.

It

probably amazed some American Protestants that thought this
.
.bl e. .,22
was even 1mposs1

Robert Hoyt was impressed with

Kennedy's example of lay leadership in the Church.

But he

also noted the statement of the 166 laymen as another
illustration of autonomous action.

To Hoyt, the content of

the statement was not as important as the act itself -- a
conscious and public act by the laity entirely independent
of clerical authority.

"It was the confidence the signers

displayed in taking this initiative; confidence, first, in
their ability to express the American Catholic consensus;
and

second,

in

their

right

as

Catholics

to

address

themselves to the public without prior consultation with
clerical authorities

-- all

this without creating any

suggestion of disrespect for clerical prerogatives. 1123

In

the end, Hoyt contended that this novel development in the
Church -- the emergence of an independent Catholic lay
leadership -- was quintessential if Catholics were to allay
all Protestant fears and to erase all Protestant doubts
24
about Catholic loyalty.
22 John J. Kane, "The New Frontier in Religious
Relations," Ave Maria, November 26, 1960, p. 2.
23 Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism,
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16.

and

24 Robert Hoyt, "Kennedy, Catholicism, and the
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Underlying this reasonable scruitiny of the sources
of bigotry was a realistic foreboding over the Church's
future role in this "New Frontier" in American religious
relations.

The Catholic Herald Citizen after its initial

celebration cautioned fellow Catholics that the real trial
.
b eginning.
.
.
25
was JUSt

The Michigan Catholic agreed that the

first Catholic president and his community "will be more
closely scrutinized. 1126

The New World of Chicago asked

Catholics to pray for the president's and their community's
successful passage through this crucial state in the process
of becoming accepted Americans. 27

Father Ralph Gorman,

editor of the Sign, argued that the major consequence of
Kennedy's election and campaign was its divulging of a less
than desirable and misconceived public image of the Church.
Americans believed that the American Catholic Church owed
Presidency," Jubilee, December 1960, pp. 12-16. Also, see
Robert Hoyt, "Church-State Relations, 1960," Ave Maria,
December 31, 1960, pp. 5-6. He noted that another positive
aspect of the campaign was that "Catholics of high and low
degree were forced to restate doctrine in terms of the
modern American context."
He listed the following as
examples: speech by Gustave Weigel, questions and answers by
Archbishop Karl Alter, statement of 166 Catholic lay
persons, Murray 1 s We Hold These Truths, and Kennedy's
Houston speech.
25 Editorial, "A Memorable Election," The Catholic
Herald Citizen, November 19, 1960, p. 2.
26 Edi torial, "The World Watches,"
Catholic, November 10, 1960, p. 1.

The

Michigan

27 Editorial, "A Time for Prayers Rather
Cheers," New World, November 18, 1960, p. 4.

than
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its first allegiance to a foreign power, wanted to destroy
religious liberty in the country, sought union of church and
state,

desired to use civil

legislation to impose

its

morality on all Americans, and as an organized interest
group,

feigned concern about others in society "when she

thinks she can derive some selfish advantage."

Horrified by

such misconceptions and wanting to dispel them,
called for "Operation Understanding."

Gorman

For such operation to

be successful, an educated lay leadership was needed to
emerge and to make a conscious and public effort on local,
state, and national levels to disseminate the true image of
American Catholicism. 28
John F.

Kane,

former director of the

National

Conference of Christians and Jews, believed that the future
of the American Church was
fortunes of this
either promote
country.

inextricably linked to the

first Catholic presidency, which would

religious

harmony or disharmony

in the

Kennedy would have to walk a tightrope, displaying

no favoritism toward the Catholic Church.

Fellow Catholics,

Kane admonished, must walk the same tightrope,

fostering

understanding, while not abusing their new status in society
with an outburst of sectarianism.

Kane resolved, "Kennedy

must be viewed as an American president.

One can only

28 Ralph J. Gorman, "The New President," The Sign,
January 1961, p. 6 and "Public Image of the Catholic
Church," pp. 7-8.
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sincerely hope that whatever his achievements may be

and

Americans may hope that these will be many -- there should
be no Catholic tendency to make capital out of it on a
1129
. .
b asis.
.
re 1 1g1ous

George Kelly in the pages of America

recognized the difficult role Catholics would have
undertake for the next four years.

to

"Catholics face the

paradoxical task of keeping shirts on and taking them off."
Catholics must keep shirts on when President Kennedy is
criticized

by

non-Catholics.

Such

critic ism must

be

perceived not as prejudice but as an honest difference of
opinion.

Catholics, on the other hand, must be willing to

take their shirts off when attempting to explain their faith
to other Americans.

Although the old religious issue was

badly :wounded on November 8, "We can do much to make that
wound mortal during the next four years!" 3 o
Foremost

a

realistic

and

skillful

politician,

Kennedy was more circumspect about this "New Frontier in
Religious Relations."

He disagreed with other Catholics

that the religious issue was dead in American politics.

His

election demonstrated that a Catholic could be elected to
the highest office in the land, "but the real test was not
29

John J. Kane, "The New Frontier in Religious
Relations," Ave Maria, December 17, 1960, pp. 9-11.
30 George Kelly,
21, 1961, pp. 502-504.

"The Years Ahead," America, January
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his election but his administration." 31

The real test was

the continued vigilance by his non-Catholic opposition as to
whether or not he would succumb to the influence of his
Church leaders while in office.

Sorensen expressed both his

and Kennedy's concern about the religious implications of
his actions as president.

"But if his conduct of the office

was in keeping with his campaign pledge and constitutional
oath, then, while unreasoning bigotry would always remain
and

legitimate

church-state

questions

would

always

be

raised, the unwritten law against a Catholic president would
not only be temporarily broken but permanently repealed. 1132
From the

first days of his presidency,

Kennedy

walked a tightrope of religious neutrality, never advocating
for his fellow Catholics, basing all of his policies on
constitutional grounds, and frequently stressing in actions
and words his independence from the hierarchy's authority
and influence.

Not to show any favoritism to any faith,

Kennedy's staff and cabinet members consisted of Catholics,
Protestants, Jews, and secularists.

Pierre Salinger wrote:

"President John F. Kennedy's personal staff was an unlikely
mixture.

We were Catholics, Protestants, Jews.

from

East,

the

Midwest,

and

31

Theodore Sorensen,
Books, 1965), p. 400.
32

rbid., pp. 400-401.

the

Far West,

Kennedy,

We came

and

(New York:

from
Ban tum
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backgrounds of poverty and wealth." 33

Salinger observed,

the only thing they held in common was salary and "a total"
commitment to the president.

34

A simple response to Pope

John XXIII's congratulatory note of January 20, 1960 proved
to be a major and critical undertaking in the president's
attempt

to dispel

Vatican

and

the

suspicions
White

of collusion between the

House.

His

advisors

issued

precautionary guidelines that he should follow in composing
and sending his return note.

Because the United States did

not maintain diplomatic relations with the Vatican,

he

should send his note directly from the White House to the
Pope without passing through the American embassy at Rome.
Just

as

important

stipulation:

to

his

advisors

was

this

second

The text of the President's reply should not

be released in Washington.

35

By following these procedures

and by carefully crafting the note, Kennedy and his advisors
believed they followed the course least likely to incite
Protestant fears and suspicions of papal influence in the
White House.

36

33

Pierre Salinger, _W_i_t_h___K_e_n_n_e_d_y_,
Doubleday, 1966), pp. 63-70.

(New

York:

34 rbid.
35 walter

J. Stoessel, Jr. to White House,
Memorandum, February 1, 1961 (John F. Kennedy Library: PrePresidential Papers, President's Office Files), Box No. 28.
36 rbid., Also contains Kennedy's note of thanks to
Pope John XXIII. Kennedy's papers contain additional
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Unfortunately, Kennedy's vigilance of non-Catholic
fears and sensitivities throughout his presidency terminated
the

Church's celebration of his victory

Frontier in Religious Relations."

and

his

"New

The volatile Catholic

dimension of the religious issue was revived.

Like the days

of the Look interview, the Church hierarchy and press took
umbrage with the effect that Kennedy's appeasement had upon
his presidential decisions.

Catholic ire, disagreement, and

frustration erupted over such issues as

federal aid to

parochial schools, prayer in the public classrooms, Civil
Rights,

Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy's

adroit handling of his presidential religious trial until
his untimely death is another critical episode to be told by
historians.

But in the end, his assassination ensured that

future presidents of the United States never again would
have to face the same challenges of the oldest of American
prejudices.

correspondence to Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI.
See
John F. Kennedy to Pope John XXIII, Letter, May 7, 1963
(John F. Kennedy Library: President's Office Files), Box No.
31; Press Release on Pope John's death, June 1963, Box No.
31, and Pope Paul VI to John F. Kennedy, Letter, July 11,
1963, Box No. 32.

CONCLUSION
In 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was elected the
first Catholic President of the United States.

The American

tradition of "No Catholic in the White House" was shattered.
Kennedy succeeded in 1960 for many reasons.
world,

the

United

transformation.
pluralistic~.
~

-~-'

States

was

Protestant

Catholic

undergoing
America

America was

In the postwar
a

was

cultural
becoming

transforming.

This

--

religious cornrnuni ty was leaving its ghetto past behind,
experiencing upward social and economic mobility, and was
emerging as a potent force in American politics.

Catholic-

America was becoming Americanized.
Kennedy's rise to national prominence in the 1950's
was

built

on

the

foundations

of

Americanized-Catholic

community.

represented

breed

politician

this
who

new
felt

of

Kennedy
an

comfortable

Anglo-American tradition.

pluralism

and

the

himself

American-Catholic

with

the

country's

His non-Catholic education and

privileged upbringing also manifested themselves .in his
public

image

of pure Americanism.

Unlike

Smith,

his

ethnicity and religion were afterthoughts to his pervasive
Americanism.
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Beginning in 1956 when he sought the vice-presidential
bid of the Democratic party and up until his election in
1960, Kennedy openly and directly confronted the religious
issue.

In 1956,

he overcame the ghost of Al Smith by

persuading Democratic

leaders

that

there was

Catholic vote in the American electorate.
Catholic was,
liability.

therefore,

Although

he

a

the

solid

His being a

political asset

lost

a

and not a

vice-presidential

candidacy, he became a nationally recognized leader of the
Democratic party and a viable contender for the presidency
of the United States.
Kennedy defended his faith throughout his pursuit of
the highest office in the land.

In 195 9,

he assuaged

Protestant fears in his Look interview.

During his primary

campaign,

speech

Associated
declared,

he delivered
Society

of

an overpowering
Newspaper

Editors

to

the

in which

he

"I am not a Catholic candidate."

presidential campaign,

he

presented his

(perhaps the most eloquent of his career)
Peale's manifesto.

During the

Houston speech
in response to

Up until the last day of the campaign,

Kennedy answered queries about the compatibility of his
faith with the constitutional obligations of the presidency.
Although at times exasperated, Kennedy, unlike Smith, never
once retreated into a posture of bitterness, resentment, or
defensiveness.

By

fielding

all

questions

and

by

demonstrating his independence of the Church's hierarchy in
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words and deeds, he conveyed to his fellow citizens an image
of an American candidate who happened to be Catholic, and as
a result, received 38% of the non-Catholic vote.
Just

as

important

as

Kennedy's

Protestant fears was the Catholic issue.
encountered

the

unexpected

Catholic

allaying

of

Kennedy first

dimension

of

religious issue after his Look interview in 1959.

the
His oath

statement which severed religious and public life engendered
the criticism and wrath of the Church's hierarchy and press.
They perceived his comments as a

shocking espousal of

godless secularism and as a humiliating attempt to appease
anti-Catholic bigots.
Kind."

The

tension

Kennedy became a "Betrayer of his own
between

heightened over birth control.

Kennedy

and

his

Church

He was convinced that the

untimely issuance of the bishops' pastoral letter on the eve
of the campaign proved the hierarchy's inherent animosity
for him and their disapprobation of his election.

Filled

with trepidation and anxiety over both the Catholic and
Protestant dimensions of the religious issue, he announced
his nomination in January of 1960.
The

fear of a

repeat of the bigotry of

1928,

however, brought the American Catholic Church and candidate
into a fortuitous and cooperative defense of the faith.
West

Virginia

primary

raised

criticism of a Catholic vote.

anti-Catholic

fears

The

and

Now the Church and press

perceived the candidate as a victim of bigotry and adhered
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to certain principles in reacting to anti-Catholic charges.
Together, they maintained a posture of political neutrality
toward the political fortunes of any candidate, willingly
explained the compatibility of Catholicism and Americanism
to non-Catholics, and enjoined fellow Catholics to remain
calm and to forgive their ignorant accusers.

After Kennedy

won in West Virginia and the nomination at the Democratic
convention in July, the Church and press championed Kennedy
as a "Defender of the Faith" and declared prematurely the
demise of the religious issue.
But in September,

the Peale proclamation revived

Catholic fears of bigotry's influence.

Until election day,

the Catholic hierarchy and press upheld Kennedy as defender
of the faith and adhered to its primary strategy of Catholic
neutrality and responsibility.

Never once did they resort

to name calling or to raising the walls of defensiveness or
bitterness.
conflagration,

Instead

of

generating

a

sectarian

the Church prevented it by containing the

volatility of bigotry.

On election day, Kennedy was deeply

indebted to his most unlikely ally for his non-Catholic
vote.
Pluralism,

an Americanized Church and candidate,

Kennedy's direct confrontation of the religious issue, the
fear of another 1928, and the strategically located Catholic
vote were all significant factors in the election of this
country's first Catholic president.

But just as, or
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perhaps,

more

important

in Kennedy's

election and the

avoidance of a remake of 1928 was the campaign of neutrality
and restraint conducted by the American Catholic hierarchy
and press.

All told, these factors converged to destroy the

oldest of American prejudices -- "No Catholic in the White
House."

In

the

end,

anti-Catholicism as

a

Kennedy's
serious

election

consideration

removed
in

future

presidential politics, symbolized the demise of Protestant
America and the birth of pluralistic America, and finally
lowered the walls of Herberg's three cultures, opening up
avenues for dialogue and understanding.
In

terms

of

the

Catholic

community,

Kennedy's

campaign and election represented a psychological victory
and cultural triumph.
class

citizen

Americans.

status.

Catholics had been raised to firstThey

were

now

fully

accepted

These two years also exhumed the appalling

ignorance of the Catholic laity and the frightening lack of
lay leadership in the Church.

Hierarchy and press alike

realized that these shortcomings would have to be addressed
to ensure the
Finally

future of the American Catholic church.

Kennedy's

pronouncements

and

the

represented a
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laymen's

liberalizing

independent
trend

in the

Church that its hierarchy would have to face in the future
and eventually accept.
The question will always be asked: what would have
happened if Kennedy had lost the election?

Would the
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country have been set back decades in religious relations?
would the anti-Catholic tradition still be alive and well
today?

Would Catholics have returned to their ghettos and

refused to embrace the ecumenical spirit of Vatican II?
Fortunately,
historians
indebtedness

these
can

are

make

historians

hierarchy and press.

only

"if"

questions

provocative
owe

to

the

of which

speculations,
American

an

Catholic
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
VITAL STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 1960
U.S. Catholic Population:
40,817,302 out of 171,238,845.
Archdiocese: 26
Diocese: 113
Parishes: 16,896
CLERGY
Cardinals: 5
Francis Cardinal Spellman, New York
James Francis Cardinal Mcintyre, Los Angeles
Richard Cardinal Cushing, Boston
John Cardinal O'Hara, Philadelphia
Albert Cardinal Meyer, Chicago
Archbishops: 32
Bishops: 170
Priests (Diocesan and Religious): 53,796
Brothers: 10,473
Sisters: 168,572
PRESS
Readership: 25,932,461
Publications: 575
Diocesan Newspapers: 113
Circulation (Leading Newspapers): Our Sunday Visitor:
913,331; The Tablet: 140; The New World:
178,139; San Francisco Monitor: 49,866; Boston
Pilot: 86,288.
Leading Periodicals: Catholic Digest: 760,744; The Sign:
345,129; America: 48, 1004; Commonweal:
20,006.
Source: The Official Catholic Directory and The Catholic
Almananc, 1960.
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